Shelving the hot and difficult issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf/AEZ, Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in their sixth meeting in a year (18:40 local time), will seek to once again send the message of the continuation of the mild climate in Greek-Turkish relations at a time when the clouds in the international environment have become dangerously thick and signs of “fatigue” in the rapprochement process are evident.

Despite the optimistic messages emitted by Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis about a “historic opportunity” in Greek-Turkish relations, it does not seem that the conditions have matured for the start of talks, even at an exploratory stage, on the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf/ EEZ, which constitutes a crucial step for the substantial normalization of Greek-Turkish relations.

Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis himself from the TIF made it clear in a categorical manner that “there are no illusions about the difficulties of rapprochement with Türkiye noting that “the core of Turkish revisionism has not changed. The ‘Blue Homeland’ remains on the table and constitutes a challenge to the country’s sovereign rights” and this is precisely the “main difficulty to be able to get to the core of the discussion of our major dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ in the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean.”

The experience of recent months and following the signing of the Athens Declaration (December 2023) in addition to the positive results (visas for visits to Greek islands and partial reduction of migration flows) showed that the maintenance of revisionism in Turkish foreign policy and the insistence on the agenda of claims against our country will constitute a constant quicksand in the process of rapprochement.

The raising of the issue of extended and even “grey zones” in an official manner on the occasion of Greece’s announcement of its intention to create marine parks, the episode of Kassos on the occasion of the investigations for laying an electric cable, the constant announcements about the alleged obligation to demilitarize the islands, the constant raising of the issue of the “Turkish minority” and the inclusion of the “Blue Homeland” in school textbooks, grounded in the harsh reality of the Greek-Turkish conflict. At the same time, however, they show how “vulnerable” the process of rapprochement is, given that Turkey perceives in its way the maintenance of a mild climate, considering that this implies that Greece abstains from exercising its sovereign rights, which de facto challenge the doctrine of the “Blue Homeland”.

In Athens it is clear that if any attempt is made to start discussions on the demarcation in the current circumstances, they will prematurely end in a deadlock and this will cause serious shocks to the whole process of rapprochement, threatening the maintenance of the mild climate.

The meeting that Mitsotakis and Erdogan are to have in New York will take place in an extremely dangerous and volatile international environment with two wars going on in the wider region and Turkey gradually shaping this autonomous foreign policy with the aim of becoming a regional leading power. In anticipation of the US elections, the Turkish president has other priorities than Greek-Turkish relations, hoping that with a new US president, especially if he is Donald Trump, he will be able to restore a relationship that has been problematic for Ankara’s aspirations in recent years, even though sanctions were imposed on Türkiye during Trump’s term.

The fact that remains excluded from the F-35 program for which there is already a concession agreement with Greece, the upgrade of Alexandroupolis and the facilities to the US in other Greek military installations, but also the latest “blow” with the signing of the US-Cyprus Roadmap for Defense Cooperation, have angered Ankara, which, among other things, is in constant tension with Washington over both the issue of support for the Kurds in northern Syria and, more importantly, US support for Israel in the Gaza war, where Tayyip Erdogan has emerged as the most extreme “enemy” not only of Netanyahu but also of the State of Israel itself, causing deep concern in the diplomatic-military establishment in Washington about Turkey’s real aims and orientation. A climate aggravated by the close relations with Russia and President Putin and Erdogan’s intention of Turkey joining the BRICS.

Athens cannot overlook, also, the fact that Türkiye taking advantage of the environment created by the war in Gaza and Israel’s isolation from its Arab neighbors, seeks to fill the gap in the Eastern Mediterranean and to strengthen its presence in the Arab world. The policy of normalizing relations with Egypt after Al Sisi’s visit to Ankara is also part of this framework, a development that is of direct interest to Greece, as the strategic relationship with Egypt was based in its first phase precisely on the containment of Turkish revisionism and hegemonism in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. However, Cairo has sent reassuring messages to Athens and Nicosia and another sign that this relationship remains strong is the trilateral meeting that George Gerapetritis will have with his Egyptian and Cypriot counterparts on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.

At the New York meeting, Mitsotakis and Erdogan will formulate the roadmap for the next period until the convening of the Supreme Cooperation Council, which is likely to be convened in December in Turkey.

As far as the Thetical Agenda is concerned, there is a positive report, but there is a risk, as has happened in the past, that agreements signed even on “low policy” issues will remain on paper and not be implemented, which takes away the momentum of this process. The military Confidence Building Measures are moving at low speed and more symbolic moves, as a substantial discussion on military-style CBMs stumbles on the objections raised by Turkey, whether they concern demilitarization, “grey zones” or competences in the air and maritime space of the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the Political Dialogue, the next round of which is likely to be held in October, the agenda, apart from a useful general exchange of views on regional issues, limits its subject matter to cooperation on immigration which takes on another dimension after the situation in Europe and the risk of escalating conflicts in the Middle East, and Civil Protection where positive results have been recorded with the cooperation of the two countries during the fires in Greece and Turkey.

An important test in the immediate future will be the issue of the electric interconnection between Greece and Cyprus, as after the apparent removal of the pending issues that existed after the Mitsotakis-Christodoulides meeting in Athens, the Italian ship Ievoli Relume will receive an order to continue the investigations. The ship is still docked in Limassol and is expected to start the search now from Cyprus to Greece. Turkey is also contesting the Cypriot EEZ, recognising only 12 nautical mile territorial waters for Cyprus, as well as the area of Cypriot jurisdiction for the issuance of NAVTEX and the question is whether there will be a Turkish reaction as happened in the case of Kasos, wanting either to block the work of the electrical interconnection or to ensure acceptance of its claim as a condition for the Italian research vessel to continue its work.

The Cyprus issue

Cyprus also remains one of the difficult issues on the agenda of the leaders of Greece and Türkiye UN Secretary General Antonio Gutiérrez has invited Cyprus President Nicos Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar to separate meetings in New York to find “common ground” for the next step. Despite the fact that there is a huge distance between the two sides, reports say that the UN is working towards a Christodoulides-Tatar meeting in October, which will determine whether a decision will then be taken to convene a Five-Party Conference that would mark the start of a new process on the Cyprus problem. The statements by both Tatar himself and the entire Turkish leadership demanding implicit recognition of the pseudo-state as a precondition for the resumption of talks are negative, as they are completely outside the framework of UN Security Council resolutions.

However, the occupation regime’s attempt to indirectly achieve its goal by demanding as Confidence Building Measures “direct flights, direct trade, direct contacts” (the three D’s as Tatar calls them) that effectively lead to recognition of the occupied entity is also rejected by Leuquisition.

The climate in Cyprus has been aggravated not only by direct accusations from Ankara and Tatar that Cyprus is militarily involved in supporting Israel in the Gaza War but also by continued violations of the Green Line regime, which Nicosia denounced in a letter to the UN last week.

The trilateral meeting with Macron-Christodoulides

An extremely important Trimateral Meeting Mitsotakis-Macron-Christodoulides is expected to take place this afternoon in New York following the interest shown by the French side in the electrical interconnection in the telephone conversation between the presidents of France and Cyprus on Saturday. Moreover, NEXANS, the company which has undertaken the surveys and the laying of the cable, is also French.

France’s support for the project and more importantly its participation in it is of great importance as France has a strong presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and reaffirms the strong Greece-France-Cyprus relationship in the region which is not only limited to political and defence cooperation but also to major energy transmission projects such as the IMEC corridor which for the moment is certainly frozen due to the Gaza war.

The speech at the General Assembly and the rest of Mitsotakis’ contacts

The prime minister’s speech at the 79th UN General Assembly next Thursday will effectively mark the unofficial start of Greece’s participation as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2025-26 term.

Mitsotakis is expected to make a special reference to how Greece sees the assumption of this important position, to which it was elected by a large majority with the motto “Dialogue, Democracy, Diplomacy”, while his speech will also focus on the major global geopolitical and technological challenges.

During his stay in New York, Kyriakos Mitsotakis will also have a series of bilateral meetings focused on the Western Balkans, the Arab World and the Gaza war. On Thursday he will meet with UN Secretary General Antonio Gutiérrez, while among the meetings scheduled are those with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. These meetings are of particular interest, as Greece, without abandoning its policy of supporting Israel’s right to self-defence, is in favour of an immediate ceasefire, the return of the hostages and the cessation of any action that exacerbates the humanitarian disaster in Gaza.

Channels with Tel Aviv remain open all the while in a difficult balancing exercise as Athens voted in favor of the latest UN General Assembly resolution which is damning to Israel.

Mitsotakis will have meetings with Serbian President A. Vusic, but also with Kosovar Prime Minister A. Kurti, Armenian Prime Minister N. Pasinan, and Panamanian President H.R. Mulino. In an effort to expand relations with Arab countries of the Gulf, Mitsotakis will meet with the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Bahrain Salman bin Hamada Al Khalifa, the Crown Prince of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah Al Khalid Al Sabah and the President of Iraq.