On February 21, 1913—112 years ago—the capital of Epirus, Ioannina (officially known as Ioannina), was liberated after 85 days of siege from Ottoman rule. This was one of the greatest achievements of the Greek Army, as the legendary city had surrendered (but was never conquered) to the Ottomans under Sinan Pasha on October 9, 1430. For over 482 years, Ioannina remained under Ottoman control.

On February 21, 2017, we published a comprehensive article on the liberation of Ioannina on protothema.gr. You can find it alongside today’s article in the “Related Articles” section. Since repeating the same details would be pointless, today we will present lesser-known facts about Ioannina’s liberation, drawing from the accounts of Georgios Roussos and Lieutenant General Panagiotis Panagakos.

The liberation of Ioannina – The first vehicles entering the city on February 22, 1913 – Colorization by Christos Kaplanis

Sapountzakis’ Responsibility for the Significant Delay in Epirus

Many have written that the delay in Ioannina’s liberation was due to the inadequate leadership of Lieutenant General Konstantinos Sapountzakis (1846-1931), Commander of the Army of Epirus. However, Georgios Roussos offers an alternative perspective, attributing responsibility instead to Metaxas and Dousmanis, the staff officers who planned the military operations.

Konstantinos Sapountzakis

Sapountzakis had previously been part of the “royalist” faction. He was a military advisor to King George I and the “military tutor” of Constantine. However, he also participated in the disastrous 1897 war, as George had placed him close to Constantine as his Chief of Staff.

After the defeat, blame was assigned, and attempts were made to shift responsibility away from Constantine. According to Roussos, the real culprits for the 1897 defeat were Theodoros Deligiannis and King George, “who not only agreed to that sham of a war but also directed military operations from his palace and special military office, creating the impression that he was part of the scheming behind that military farce.”

Ultimately, Sapountzakis was made the scapegoat, dismissed from the palace, and his name was placed on the so-called “blacklist.”

By 1912, according to Roussos, efforts were made to restore Constantine’s tarnished reputation and the privileges he had lost after the 1909 Goudi coup. Metaxas and Dousmanis placed the “Great Army” (of Thessaly and Macedonia) at his disposal to make his task easier, while Sapountzakis commanded the “Small Army” (of Epirus), consisting of only two divisions.

Greek Artillery Soldiers at Bizani

Before Being Stalled at Bizani

Before being stalled at Bizani due to the terrain, the Turkish fortifications, and the heavily reinforced Ottoman troops (which had received reinforcements from the Monastir region in Macedonia), the Army of Epirus had notable early successes.

In October 1912, with assistance from the navy, it managed to liberate Preveza, take Filippiada, and secure the strategically vital location of Pente Pigadia (October 25-30, 1912), a site well-known since 1821! This area lies between Arta and Ioannina, near the Ionian Highway.

Regarding Sapountzakis’ army’s battles at Pesta and Pente Pigadia, the later dictator Theodoros Pangalos wrote:

“Sapountzakis’ forces, especially the Evzone battalions, fought with exceptional bravery and determination in the fierce battles at Pesta and Pente Pigadia. Distinguished in these fights were Lieutenant Colonels Polymenakos, Ioannou, and Kontoulis, the last of whom was wounded twice while leading his Evzone Battalion in the front lines. His battalion was composed almost entirely of mountain warriors from Valtos and Evrytania. The mountain artillery also performed remarkably, with special commendation given to Captain G. Lestos and Second Lieutenant Kyriakos Tavoularis. Tavoularis, upon arriving in Epirus, became an idol for the Evzones, who praised his extraordinary leadership as a platoon commander. He had not graduated from a military academy, proving once again that nature produces warriors, while schools and education merely refine them.”

Why Didn’t Constantine Want to Go to Epirus?

With no significant progress in November and early December, the Venizelos government decided that Crown Prince Constantine should go to Epirus to accelerate developments. However, Constantine resisted, not wanting to risk losing the laurels he had won in Macedonia (according to Roussos).

Dousmanis, in his Memoirs (p. 75), wrote that the government tried to persuade the Crown Prince to go to Epirus, but he “gave the operations in Epirus only secondary importance from a broader strategic perspective.”

Dousmanis continued, noting that according to Constantine, “we should not risk our position in Macedonia for the sake of winning a few laurels in Epirus.” Roussos attributes these thoughts directly to Dousmanis himself.

As Constantine remained reluctant, the Venizelos government “cleverly devised” a way to “corner the Crown Prince” by appointing him commander of both the Macedonian and Epirote armies—a position he fortunately accepted.

Meanwhile, Major Velissariou, the man largely responsible for the liberation of Ioannina, was in Thessaloniki without command of any unit due to a serious dispute with his brother-in-law, Colonel Papakyriakis, commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment. Eventually, Velissariou was given command of the I/38 Evzone Battalion, whose commander, Major Georgoulis, had been killed in the battle of Giannitsa.

Constantine Arrives in Epirus – How Venizelos and Constantine Escaped Turkish Fire at Bizani!

On January 7, 1913, Sapountzakis attempted another unsuccessful attack on Bizani. A few days later, Constantine arrived in Filippiada. As even Theodoros Pangalos admits, with his arrival, the army’s supply lines significantly improved. The prolonged effort to capture Ioannina had stirred public opinion in Greece, as people saw their soldiers fighting under extremely harsh weather conditions with no results. However, many private individuals sent food and clothing to the front.

A few days later, Venizelos also arrived in Filippiada. “He was warlike,” according to Dousmanis, and he requested permission from Constantine to go to Bizani. The Crown Prince agreed and accompanied him to the Prophet Elias Hill, where the Artillery Chief Paraskevopoulos was stationed. Venizelos, wearing a “black overcoat,” did not stay in the position indicated to him by Paraskevopoulos but instead moved to the side of the hill facing Bizani. Seeing movement on the hill, the Turks began shelling it!

Quite literally, Venizelos and Constantine barely escaped being hit. A large-caliber shell struck a tree very close to them. One soldier was killed, and another was wounded. According to Paraskevopoulos, Venizelos and Constantine displayed “admirable composure.”

Venizelos – Constantine

However, the Crown Prince was deeply unimpressed by the behavior of the officers present (it is implied they were terrified and panic-stricken). “Did you see all of them?” Constantine asked Paraskevopoulos.

Dousmanis wrote that the entire incident was Venizelos’ fault, as his black overcoat made him an easy target, and he had not thought to request a khaki cloak to blend in. He added that if Vehib Bey, the Turkish commander of Bizani, had known who was at Prophet Elias Hill, he would have insisted on continued shelling.

Paraskevopoulos, on the other hand, wrote that Vehib Bey later confided to him—after being captured—that had he known that Venizelos and Constantine were there, he would never have ordered the bombardment.

If, however, through sheer recklessness, Venizelos and Constantine had been killed that day, Greece would have been left without a Prime Minister and without a Crown Prince-Commander-in-Chief! The consequences, obviously, would have been tragic and immeasurable…

Leonidas Paraskevopoulos

Dousmanis, however, is ridiculed by Paraskevopoulos, as he writes that “he had thrown himself flat on the ground, with his nose to the dirt…”

Georgios Roussos writes that after weeks of preparation, the final attack on Ioannina took place. Bizani was pounded with 50,000 shells!

For more on the role of Velissariou and Iatridis, and the surrender of Ioannina, see the article from February 17, 2017.

Viktor Dousmanis

The Protocol of Ioannina’s Surrender

Of historical significance is the Protocol of Ioannina’s Surrender. It was signed by Vehib Bey (Lieutenant Colonel) as the representative of Esat Pasha, the last Ottoman governor of Ioannina, and by the General Staff Captains Ioannis Metaxas and Xenophon Stratigos, representing the Crown Prince. The signing took place at dawn (the faint light just before sunrise) on February 21, 1913.

Protocol No. 1527/B’

Protocol

Between the undersigned, Captain I. Metaxas and Captain X. Stratigos, plenipotentiaries of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Constantine, Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army of Macedonia and Epirus, and Lieutenant Colonel Vehib, plenipotentiary of His Excellency Esat Pasha, Commander of the Turkish Army of the Fortress of Ioannina, the following were agreed upon:

1. The fortified position of Ioannina is surrendered to the Greek Army.
2. The Turkish troops currently stationed in the aforementioned fortified position surrender to the Greek Army as prisoners of war.
3. All military equipment, including weapons, horses, and flags belonging to the surrendered troops, shall be handed over to the Greek Army in their present condition.
4. All officers and soldiers, including the wounded and sick among them, shall be subject to the Laws of War.

Ioannina, February 21, 1913
I. Metaxas, X. Stratigos, Vehib

At 5:50 a.m. on February 21, the Crown Prince issued the following order:

Order No. 1505/B

General Order

“The Turkish Army has surrendered unconditionally as prisoners of war. Enemy units shall raise white flags. Divisions will soon receive my relevant orders.”

Chani Emin-Agha, February 21, 1913, at 5:50 a.m.
Constantine

The People of Ioannina Welcome the Greek Army with Enthusiasm

A Frenchwoman describes the scenes of joy in Ioannina after the city’s liberation.

In 1913, the French Consul in Ioannina was the philhellene Edgar Dussapp. His wife, Jean Dussapp, writing under the pseudonym Guy Chantepleure, authored an important work titled The Besieged City, documenting the events from the summer of 1912 to March 1913 in the capital of Epirus. Let us see how she describes the entry of the Greek Army, led by Constantine, into Ioannina.

Constantine Enters Ioannina

“Ioannina—the capital and sacred altar of Epirus. Epirus—the dearest shrine in the heart of Greece. That morning was a dawn like no other, a historic dawn. The city, which for five centuries had been tormented under a foreign yoke, went to sleep Turkish and Muslim and awoke Greek and Christian.

Under General Soutsos, the Greek vanguard was the first to enter on February 21. The people—old and young, poor and wealthy—laughed, cried, and embraced each other. Frenzied, their voices choked with sobs, as if in delirium or ecstasy, they shouted: ‘Long live Greece! Long live the Greek Army! Long live Crown Prince Constantine!’

And the endless roar of cheers, pulsing, jubilant, and thunderous, mingled with the ringing of bells resounding throughout the city, as if they were scattering light into the clear and sweet atmosphere.”

According to Guy Chantepleure, the Greeks of Ioannina greeted each other with “Christ is Risen!”, and the response came back, “Truly He is Risen!” as though it were Easter. “The miracle of the Resurrection had already taken place in their hearts.”

Princesses Helen and Alice of Greece were present in Ioannina from the first day. The people of Ioannina tore off the red fezzes they had been forced to wear and threw them to the ground, ripping them apart. And over these tattered fezzes, Constantine made his triumphant entry into Ioannina, followed by Princes Andrew, Christopher, George, and Alexander, General Danglis, and the entire General Staff.

Guy Chantepleure

For the first time, the Hymn to Liberty, the Greek national anthem, was heard in Ioannina. Flowers, laurel branches, perfumes, and grains of rice—symbols of faith and endurance—were showered upon the Crown Prince.

The only discordant note: an Albanian, strapped with explosives, lay in wait to detonate them as Constantine passed by. Fortunately, he was spotted in time by Evzones (elite Greek soldiers), who swiftly eliminated him.

Epilogue

The liberation of Ioannina sparked a wave of enthusiasm throughout Greece. “Ioannina was the city of dreams and traditions of the Greek race,” wrote P. Panagakos.

112 years ago, Greek soldiers fought with unparalleled courage in 30 centimeters of snow. Their only shelter: their meager tents. Out of 750 men in his battalion, writes Theodoros Pangalos, 250 were unable to fight due to frostbite. Around 15 Evzones had to have their toes amputated.

Some refused surgery, determined to keep fighting. One Evzone, Pangalos recounts, “suffering terribly,” was ordered to go to the hospital. Yet he begged to stay, promising that even if he had to crawl, he would follow his battalion into Ioannina.

We bow in respect and gratitude to these heroes. Let us reflect on our own responsibilities. And to those ignorant of history—whether foreign or domestic—who belittle this country and those who gave their lives for Greece: let them first perfect themselves. Only then will Greece become perfect.

Some of us still love her, no matter how much she wounds us…