The suicide of a well-known businessman live on television shocks public opinion, while politicians remain silent. Public suicides, however, continue, and thus Inspector Haritos is called to find the thread that connects them while dealing with those inside the Homicide Department who covet his position. The above description refers to Petros Markaris’s novel “Che Committed Suicide.”

The story takes place in Athens during the Olympic Games, amid development programs, financial scandals, racism, and brutal violence. The book came to mind not because I found direct parallels with what is happening today in political and public life—though there may be some—but because of its title. More specifically: if, in place of “Che,” you insert the word “SYRIZA,” you will understand what is unfolding at Koumoundourou after Alexis Tsipras’s resignation from Parliament.

The decision of SYRIZA’s Political Secretariat to declare unconditional submission to Tsipras is, in effect, suicide. From now on, the party led by Sokratis Famellos—until the former prime minister announces his decision to found a new political organization—will operate like a bankrupt company in liquidation.

The problem is what the MPs and officials at Koumoundourou will do if Tsipras ultimately does not proceed with founding a new party. Will they parade themselves on TV and radio, pleading with him for a quick answer? When journalists, politicians from other parties, or their voters ask them what their plans are ahead of elections—what their goals or electoral stakes are—will they respond, “We’re waiting for Tsipras”?

With the Political Secretariat’s decision, SYRIZA essentially ceases to exist as a party and turns into a component of a quasi-party—the Tsipras Party—which has not yet been founded and whose creation, for some, is uncertain or even doubtful. If Famellos and his comrades have not received firm assurances from Alexis that he will immediately take the initiative to found a new center-left political formation, then SYRIZA is entering a very dark tunnel. Its deadlock will be reflected in falling poll numbers, the longer the “Tsipras Party” delays in appearing on the political scene.

For instance, if Tsipras were to announce a new party in July, what would SYRIZA’s MPs and officials do until then? Would they just idle, waiting for the boss? How could they credibly claim that “we’re continuing independently of Alexis’s decision”? The Political Secretariat decided otherwise: “We’re waiting for Tsipras,” they said, “and we place SYRIZA at his service.”

According to some, the decision by Famellos and his comrades does not actually help Alexis, since it effectively destroys his rebranding effort. He worked hard to free himself from SYRIZA and to create the impression that he is starting something new—something that would not include his “marked” comrades from the past, that would move away from radical leftism and toward reformist social democracy, that would take issues like patriotism and migration seriously, and would not focus solely on rights, minorities, and the “cosmopolitanism of the big picture.”

If the impression suddenly arises that Tsipras is once again effectively at the head of SYRIZA, all his efforts—with the Institute, international conferences, Harvard, the Sorbonne, Bernie Sanders, and his shift toward the center-left—will go up in smoke. It would be a grave mistake, an act of utter foolishness, if Tsipras thanked his old comrades for this “gift” of giving him back his old party. “Tsipras may have many flaws,” a historic leftist figure who has left SYRIZA and is not on good terms with Alexis told us, “but he’s not a fool.”

He will turn his back on them

It is most likely that Tsipras will turn his back on his former comrades—not because he dislikes them, but because he understands that the Political Secretariat’s decision to become a component of his (possibly) future party is a trap. They want to present him as theirs, while he does not want that—and, truthfully, he does not want most of them. Tsipras sees SYRIZA as a burden, and his old comrades are trying to pass that burden back onto him—so that “they can lighten their load and save themselves.”

In a sense, it’s like the “gift” the politicians of the Center Union offered to Andreas Papandreou in 1974. Admittedly, the comparison isn’t exact—the circumstances were different, and Tsipras bears no resemblance to Papandreou. But, in essence, it’s the same proposal: “Leader, we’re here, come and take over. Why go to the trouble of starting something new?”

If Tsipras were to accept the “gift” offered by Famellos, Theocharopoulos, Kalpakis, Olga (Gerovasili), Mariliza (Xenogiannakopoulou), Pappas, Zachariadis, Matzouranis, Ragousis, and the rest, he too would be committing political suicide. Tsipras may not know Deianira, Iole, Lichas, and the poisoned tunic of Heracles, but he knows that if he puts on the “wedding suit” tailored for him by his old comrades in the Political Secretariat, he will likely suffer political poisoning—and, come the elections, he will be wrapped in a political shroud by both Mitsotakis and, on the other side, Androulakis, Velopoulos, and Zoe Konstantopoulou—the parties he must surpass to reclaim second place.

If Tsipras appears as the continuation of SYRIZA — and indeed without the New Left, the “Kasselistas,” and those who, disappointed by the 2023 result, either went home, or joined the KKE, Varoufakis, or PASOK — Mitsotakis will, quite logically, throw a party.

However, it’s not easy for Tsipras to simply discard his comrades’ offer to be his flag bearers in the electoral parade of the pluralist Center-Left. If he does so and refuses their “gift,” they will then be able to claim that they themselves are not to blame for SYRIZA’s collapse, but rather Alexis — who, even after Kasselakis’s departure, refuses to take responsibility for the reconstruction of the party he himself essentially founded as a vehicle of governmental power.

They are willing to “sacrifice” themselves and hand him the keys to Koumoundourou, but he prefers to travel with centrists and moderate center-leftists, not “Polakists” or “Tsakalotos-types.” In this way, they also relieve themselves of pressure from SYRIZA voters who urge them to “abandon autonomous paths and alliances with the New Left and go with Alexis.” In a sense, it’s a peculiar blame game — or, as they say in Vrachori, “who gets stuck with the joker.”

Smart tactic

Shifting responsibility for SYRIZA’s disintegration may be a clever political tactic, but if Alexis doesn’t take the bait — and instead of embracing “the whole of SYRIZA,” chooses to take only a few select members and MPs whom he respects — then the strategic problem will fall on the “gift-givers.” They could, instead of turning to Tsipras, approach Haritsis or even Androulakis, and SYRIZA might then become just one component of a center-left alliance, in which PASOK, inevitably, would take the lead.

In truth, according to senior figures from both SYRIZA and the New Left, Nikos Androulakis has ruled out such a prospect. In the many behind-the-scenes discussions taking place, he appears “excessively cautious.” What’s certain is that the leader of Harilaou Trikoupi (PASOK headquarters) is deeply concerned about Tsipras’s rebranding and return, but he cannot stop it. PASOK today appears to have three “arteries”: a right one, a left one, and a central “aorta” that seeks an independent course. Unfortunately for the party founded by Andreas Papandreou, its current leadership either lacks the qualities needed to reorganize it and make it once again a major governing force—or mistakenly believes that time works in its favor.

The “rotten fruit” theory as an electoral tactic (2019–2023) destroyed Tsipras, while the current “investment” in upcoming scandals expected to be revealed by the European prosecutor may turn out to be as useless as Thanasis Veggos’s “Astrakhan mule.”

It should be noted that these “upcoming” developments (financial scandals, court cases over the Tempi train crash, OPEKEPE, etc.) are indeed factors Tsipras is taking into account in his political planning for his new center-left movement. On the other hand, delays in his announcements carry risks, as the “Karystianou party” (a rumored new political formation) is being mentioned more and more often. Of course, polls are not in Tsipras’s favor — his numbers are far from ideal. With a “hard core” of 9–10%, Tsipras will likely be battling Androulakis and Velopoulos for third place if Karystianou actually launches her own party.

That is something the former prime minister doesn’t even want to think about. Some claim that one more reason for the Political Secretariat’s decision was to pressure him into acting faster, since, as one member put it, “the delay certainly hurts us, but it also hurts Alexis, because events may overtake him. And apart from Karystianou, Samaras too could change the political balance if he forms a party, reshaping both the electoral and governmental landscape.” He adds, quoting Lenin: “Yesterday was early, tomorrow may be too late — now is the time for Alexis.”

To our impatient SYRIZA interlocutor, Alexis’s time is now — but for Tsipras himself, it isn’t. In the coming days, if not this week then certainly next, he will announce the scientific advisory council of his Institute, and then present his new book. For 2025, beyond a few articles or interviews, he has nothing else on his agenda.

After all, December is a festive month — and this year, Tsipras’s joy may be double, if what’s circulating in publishing circles proves true. The advance payment he will receive from the publishing house is said to be substantial. Rumors claim it could even cover the loss of his parliamentary salary through 2026.

Others say that if sales exceed 50,000 copies — which is very likely — then the royalties Tsipras receives could equal a full parliamentary term’s compensation, if his percentage is as high as rumored. Of course, these are only rumors, but if even partly true, they might explain the unusual announcement by the Journalists’ Union (ESIEA) calling on the former prime minister to donate all proceeds from his book to the unpaid employees of SYRIZA’s media outlets (“Avgi,” “Sto Kokkino,” etc.).

A state of waiting

Finally, it should be noted that “Ithaca”, the title of Tsipras’s book, is awaited not only by politically engaged readers but also by those who participated — ministers, state officials, institutional figures, even businesspeople — in SYRIZA’s time in power. They are eager to see how the former prime minister evaluates them or whether he exposes them.

Indeed, some reports suggest that in the initial manuscript, there were revisions — possibly to avoid objections or tensions from those (comrades, political opponents, EU officials) who might feel that they are portrayed unfairly or that events are not accurately represented.

They cite as an example the 2015 referendum. In a recent statement, Alexis, commenting on the current debate about Syntagma Square and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, referred to the historic gatherings of 1843 and 1943 — but, as some point out, he forgot the “Upper” and “Lower” squares of 2011, which first propelled him to the opposition and then to the premiership.

He didn’t even mention his own rally on July 3, 2015, two days before the referendum — when, addressing tens of thousands of “No” supporters, he declared: “Today, the whole world’s eyes are on Syntagma Square,” because “we are sending a message of democracy, dignity, and hope to the blackmailers of Brussels and the IMF.”