The first meeting between Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides and Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman takes place today at 9:30 am, at the residence of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative to Cyprus, in the neutral zone, in the area of the old Nicosia airport. This is the first face-to-face contact between the two leaders since the election of Erhiurman in the occupied territories, at a time when the UN and Brussels are looking for a “window of opportunity” to restart the process.

Cypriot government spokesman Konstantinos Letibiotis has already announced that Nicos Christodoulides is coming to the meeting “with a constructive attitude and sincere political will”, reiterating that the Greek Cypriot side’s goal remains the resumption of substantive negotiations from the point where they were interrupted in Crans-Montana, based on UN Security Council resolutions and European Union principles.

Typically, today’s meeting is described as “etiquette”. The new Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Hashim Dian, will receive the two leaders at his residence and then leave them alone to have a first, informal exchange of views without the presence of advisers.

In practice, however, this will be a test of the real limits of the political will of the two sides. More than eight years have passed since Crans-Montana, and the international situation has changed dramatically, with the war in Ukraine, the flare-up in the Middle East, and the intensification of the West-Russia confrontation. In this environment, Cyprus is preparing to take over the Presidency of the EU Council on 1 January 2026, and Nicosia is trying to link the Cyprus problem with the European agenda for Turkey, from the customs union to security and defence issues.

The meeting is an opportunity for the two leaders to see what room for manoeuvre there is, and how far they are willing to go.

Lefkosia’s expectations

For the Greek Cypriot side, the key issue is a clear signal that the Turkish Cypriot leadership remains within the framework of the Bi-zonal Bicommunal Federation, as defined by UN resolutions, and does not move to the “two-state” positions publicly expressed by Tayyip Erdogan.

Nikos Christodoulides has already warned, from Berlin, that if the Turkish president insists on a two-state solution, Ankara cannot approach the European Union or claim access to European defense and security tools. Today’s meeting, therefore, is part of a broader tactic to put pressure on Turkey, with Cyprus taking advantage of its role ahead of the European Presidency and the fact that the EU remains Ankara’s main geopolitical and economic target.

At the same time, Nicosia seeks to gauge whether Erhiurman is willing to enter a preparatory process for substantive talks with a concrete timetable and terms of reference and to open the discussion on confidence-building measures, from improving facilities on the line of confrontation to practical arrangements on energy, trade, environment and to take advantage of the presence of the new UN envoy

Christodoulides’ message that “everyone will be judged at the negotiating table” shows exactly this intention, i.e. to shift the focus from statements to commitments.

In the shadow of Erdogan

Erhiurman is caught between the image of a “moderate” and Ankara’s red lines. He presented himself as a candidate who opposed the two-state policy of Ersin Tatar and Ankara and pledged to bring the solution of a UN-sponsored bizonal bicommunal federation back to the forefront.

This was the image that was cultivated in a part of the Greek Cypriot public opinion, which saw in Erhiurman a “new Akinci” and a possible interlocutor to break the deadlock.

However, just a few weeks after his election, reality reminded that the Turkish Cypriot leader is not moving in a vacuum. His first visit to Ankara was rather disappointing.

He stood next to Tayyip Erdogan at a joint press conference, in which the Turkish president reiterated in no uncertain terms that “the most realistic solution to the Cyprus problem is the coexistence of two states on the island”, effectively closing the door on any return to the federal model.

Erhürman, for his part, did not publicly refute Erdogan’s line. Instead, he emphasized the “political equality” and “sovereign rights” of Turkish Cypriots across the island, claiming that they are “one of the two equal founding partners” and that this position is not up for negotiation.

Pre-election, Erhürman spoke clearly about resuming talks on a federal solution based on UN parameters. After the visit to Ankara and the events marking the 42nd anniversary of the illegal declaration of the pseudo-state, he preferred to stand on concepts such as “sovereign equality”, “equal sovereign rights” and “non-negotiable political equality”.

In his message on the anniversary of the unilateral declaration of the pseudo-state, he even invoked the passage in the declaration where “a hand of peace and friendship is extended to the Greek Cypriot people”, but then stressed that Turkish Cypriots have “as much sovereignty on the island as Greek Cypriots” and will not allow their rights to energy and security to be ignored.
At the same time, he outlined a “method” for future talks, which includes a clear timetable, guarantees that there will be no further Greek Cypriot withdrawal without result and, most importantly, a refusal to bring political equality itself to the table. He insists that these are not “preconditions” for not holding talks, but the conclusion of “years of experience.”

Tactics or shift?

Erhiurman’s supporters attempt to explain this shift in terms of pragmatism. The argument is that no Turkish Cypriot leader can ignore the will of Ankara, let alone at a time when Erdogan needs tough talk on Cyprus for domestic consumption while negotiating with the EU to restart relations.
In this context, Erhiurman’s rhetoric is interpreted as an attempt to “fit” the federal perspective into a vocabulary that does not provoke open conflict with the Turkish leadership. The emphasis on political equality and sovereign rights can be read, by the more optimistic, as a reminder of the Guterres parameters from Crans Montana, where political equality was a central element.

On the other hand, it is still a dangerous balance. When Erdogan declares in every tone that “the most realistic solution is two states on the island” and praises Erdoğan’s references to “sovereign equality”, he sends a signal that he expects alignment with his own line.

The shift can therefore only be “justified” on the grounds of tactical manoeuvring. Erhiurman may be attempting to gain time and space to maneuver by assuring Ankara that it will not publicly challenge its red lines, while leaving the door open for participation in a solution process, provided an “effective and result-oriented negotiating table” is formed.

Whether this is an effective tactic or a gradual adjustment to the Ankara line will be determined when it comes to negotiations. Until then, assurances of federation remain in the realm of statements, while the language of “two-state sovereignty” is increasingly heard in public discourse.

The illusions

In the free regions, there is no shortage of voices warning that part of the political system is fostering excessive expectations of the new Turkish Cypriot leader, repeating the mistakes of the past with Akinci. The reality is that, regardless of ideological positioning, the Turkish Cypriot leadership is operating within a narrow framework, with Turkey holding all the critical cards in defence, security, energy and international recognition.

At the same time, today’s meeting is being closely monitored by Western capitals. For the European Union and the United States, a process of resuming talks with the prospect of a solution of a single, federal state in Cyprus remains the only acceptable path, not only for reasons of principle but also for reasons of security in the Eastern Mediterranean and energy planning. The logic of partition mainly serves revisionist powers, such as Russia, who are invested in disintegration and fait accompli.