Measured, timely interventions, not untimely measures that could add fuel to the fire, are what the government is seeking. Everything will depend on the duration and intensity of the war, which will determine the consequences and the cost–benefit ratio of any interventions ultimately deemed necessary. In their calculations, officials are also considering the warning from IMF head Kristalina Georgieva: “In this new global reality, we must even consider the unthinkable and prepare for it.”

For immediate decisions, the government is analyzing data that points to three main possible scenarios:

– Immediate cessation of the war within 7–10 days:
For the economic team, this appears to be the most favorable and manageable scenario. Even if hostilities end as soon as projected—such as former President Donald Trump hinted recently—the economic consequences of the war—and the uncertainty of a potential recurrence—will continue to influence international fuel, energy, insurance, and freight costs for some time. Price pressures will remain persistent for months. Annual inflation in Greece could rise by up to half a percentage point, approaching 3% again.

– War lasting another two or three months:
In addition to persistent price pressures, losses in tourism and Greek production (industry and primary sectors) would occur. Inflation could rise by up to 1 percentage point (near 3.5%), making state support measures unavoidable. Economic damage during the summer, as well as in agriculture due to higher fertilizer and supply costs, would require more substantial support. Another risk is if a European defense mechanism is not activated at this stage, leaving each country reliant on national measures. The possibility of announcing extraordinary benefits by late 2026 would be limited or eliminated.

– War lasting more than three months:
This scenario carries the risk of uncontrolled developments, even destruction of oil facilities. Consequences would be incalculable, and the next EU Summit in June—or possibly an emergency meeting sooner—would need to consider escape clauses or a new Recovery and Resilience Fund, as the current fund would be ending. In this case, planned measures and benefits for 2027 would be disrupted.

Another crisis, not “just another” crisis

For all scenarios—from mild to extreme—there is no “all-in-one” solution. New developments arrive daily, altering both the situation and the needs. While the experience and tools Greece and Europe gained from the 2022 energy crisis are assumed, the solutions and threats now are not merely a repeat of the past.

“Let there be no misunderstanding: we should not prematurely talk about relief measures that boost consumption,” officials stress. They explain: “Unless profiteering is first curbed, any state subsidies during crises may actually increase prices further. In a scenario where the war continues and strategic fuel reserves of countries are limited globally—measured in weeks or months—maintaining unchecked fuel consumption is not a strategic goal. Consumption must, if necessary, be controlled or limited to prevent depletion if the international situation worsens.”

Measures two months later

In 2022, Greece and Europe were reacting to a price shock caused by the Russian embargo. In 2026, however, attacks on oil facilities and infrastructure in Iran and neighboring countries threaten global energy production and supply, not just fuel and trade flows. This, the government notes, is a major difference from 2022. Similarities are fewer than differences.

For example, the primary social and political demand during any energy crisis is relief for households, production, and business operations.

Experience from 2022 shows that even under pressure, measures do not reach citizens immediately. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, caused the TTF gas price to spike the same day, but Fuel Pass 1 only launched on April 26, roughly two months later, while Power Pass began on June 17, almost four months later. This reminder is particularly relevant today. Current developments may accelerate government and market responses, but the question is not just whether new measures will be taken, but whether 2022’s tools suffice for a crisis of a different nature: in 2022, the state mainly absorbed price increases at the pump and on bills; in 2026, there may be actual interruptions in energy flows—and the resulting costs for consumers.

A more difficult equation

Moreover, the 2022 crisis was primarily Europe-centered, transmitted through gas and oil prices. Today’s crisis is more globalized. Over a quarter of maritime oil trade—the largest in the world—and roughly one-fifth or more of LNG passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making the Middle East a center of global energy and trade risk.

Thus, discussions focus not only on how much energy prices will rise, but also on how many days of supply exist and whether strategic reserves need to be used. The G7 has already stated readiness to support global energy supply with “necessary measures.” Simply put: in 2022, the problem was the embargo; in 2026, it is war and the impact on production and energy supply.

Household finances will be strained again, but differently

In 2022, governments responded with massive subsidies for electricity, gas, and fuels. From September 2021 to December 2022, Greece provided roughly €10.7 billion in relief measures. Today, however, if shocks hit energy, shipping, fertilizers, agriculture, and the overall cost of the economy simultaneously, horizontal subsidies alone will not be enough.