The agreement the United States and Saudi Arabia are preparing to announce is not simply about building a handful of nuclear reactors. It touches one of the most sensitive balances in the Middle East: the right of another regional power to acquire the technology and infrastructure needed to enrich uranium on its own soil.

US President Donald Trump has approved a nuclear cooperation agreement lasting up to 30 years, expected to open the door for American companies to take part in developing Saudi Arabia‘s nuclear industry. Once a joint US-Saudi study is completed, the plan could even lead to the creation of a uranium enrichment facility inside the kingdom.

Formally, this was a programme for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In practice, however, the agreement brings Saudi Arabia noticeably closer to acquiring what is known as “threshold nuclear capability”: the ability to convert a civilian nuclear infrastructure into a military programme in a relatively short time, should such a political decision be taken.

Washington’s major retreat

The contentious point is not the construction of nuclear power plants. Dozens of countries use nuclear energy without possessing nuclear weapons. The difference lies in the nuclear fuel cycle. Uranium enrichment is necessary to produce fuel for certain types of reactors, but the same technology, if used to a much higher degree, can produce fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons. Reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, from which plutonium can be extracted, poses similar risks.

For this reason, Washington spent years pressing its Middle Eastern partners to give up the right to enrich and reprocess uranium domestically. The clearest example is the agreement with the United Arab Emirates, which came into force in 2009. Abu Dhabi accepted what became known as the “gold standard”: it committed not to enrich uranium and not to reprocess nuclear waste. It also signed the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), allowing for broader and more intrusive inspections.

According to what has become known so far, the agreement with Saudi Arabia includes neither a renunciation of enrichment and reprocessing nor the Additional Protocol. This means international inspectors may not have the same capacity for snap inspections of undeclared facilities that they would under a stricter regime.

The Trump administration maintains that bilateral security and verification mechanisms will apply, and that the agreement meets the legal US requirements on nuclear non-proliferation. However, these mechanisms have not been fully disclosed and can hardly be considered equivalent to the unrestricted access granted to the IAEA.

The contradiction with Iran

The timing makes the agreement even more politically explosive. The United States has built its pressure on Iran around the argument that domestic uranium enrichment can serve as a pathway to building a nuclear weapon. Washington now appears ready to allow Saudi Arabia to retain exactly this capability, albeit under different terms and American oversight. The image of an America seeking to deny Tehran enrichment technology while leaving open the possibility that Riyadh could acquire it will become a key argument for Iran’s claim of a double standard.

The problem is significant and not merely theoretical. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will seek to do the same “as soon as possible.”

Uranium enrichment does not automatically lead to a nuclear bomb; further technical knowledge, weapon design and the development of a suitable delivery and detonation system are also required. It does, however, create the most significant industrial and technological foundation for a future military programme.

Israel and fears of a chain reaction

The agreement is causing understandable concern in Israel too. Although the Israeli government views Saudi Arabia as a potential strategic partner against Iran, it can hardly view the acquisition of enrichment technology by any Arab country without reservations. Israel’s security strategy has for decades rested on maintaining overwhelming qualitative military superiority and, although never officially confirmed, on its nuclear exclusivity in the Middle East.

A Saudi enrichment infrastructure could trigger a chain reaction. Turkey, Egypt and other regional powers would gain an additional argument to claim similar capabilities. The nuclear balance would then be defined not simply by whether Iran possesses a weapon, but by how many countries would be able to build one relatively quickly.

The economic and geopolitical trade-off

For Donald Trump, the agreement also carries a clear economic dimension. The construction of reactors, fuel facilities and supporting infrastructure could bring tens of billions of dollars to the American nuclear industry. Westinghouse and other US companies are hoping to play a central role in the Saudi programme, at a time when the United States is competing with Russia, China, France and South Korea for contracts to build nuclear plants abroad. The US government also calculates that, should it refuse to cooperate, Riyadh could turn to Beijing or Moscow instead, accepting even looser restrictions. By this logic, the presence of American companies and technicians is seen as a better guarantee of control than Washington’s complete absence.

At the same time, the agreement seeks to place US-Saudi relations on a more stable footing. The war with Iran, differing approaches toward Tehran, and Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to fully commit to American military planning have created new tensions. Riyadh still needs the United States for air defence, interceptor missiles, technology and advanced weapons systems. At the same time, however, it is concerned that Washington’s close relationship with Israel and its military confrontation with Iran increase the risks facing the Gulf monarchies.

No recognition of Israel required in return

Under President Joe Biden, nuclear cooperation formed part of a much broader package. Saudi Arabia would recognise Israel and, in return, gain access to American nuclear technology, advanced weapons systems and stronger security guarantees. Following Hamas’s attack on 7 October 2023 and the war in Gaza, the prospect of Saudi recognition of Israel receded.

Trump decided to decouple the two issues and proceed with the nuclear agreement without demanding normalisation of Saudi-Israeli relations as an immediate condition. This amounts to a significant concession to Mohammed bin Salman. The crown prince secures one of the key strategic gains he has long pursued, without yet having to bear the political cost of formally recognising Israel.

A tough battle in Congress

The agreement is known as a “123 Agreement,” named after the relevant article of the US Atomic Energy Act. Such agreements establish the legal framework that allows American nuclear material, equipment and expertise to be transferred to third countries. Once signed, the agreement will be sent to Congress, which will have around 90 days of continuous session to review it. To block it, lawmakers would need to pass a joint resolution of disapproval. Even then, Trump could exercise a veto, which would require a two-thirds majority to override. This arithmetic makes outright rejection difficult, though it does not rule out a fierce bipartisan confrontation, particularly if the administration refuses to disclose the classified supplementary letters and bilateral verification mechanisms accompanying the deal.

A new nuclear landscape

The Trump – Mohammed bin Salman agreement does not by itself turn Saudi Arabia into a nuclear power. It does, however, offer something Washington has until now avoided granting: the ability to develop the most sensitive part of the nuclear fuel cycle on its own soil. Trump is betting that American involvement will keep the Saudi programme under control, secure enormous contracts for US companies, and prevent Riyadh from turning to China or Russia.

The opposite scenario is equally real: the agreement could legitimise domestic enrichment as a new standard for the Middle East and trigger a nuclear readiness race in which countries would not need to possess a bomb, only the capability to build one.