The victory yesterday of the “Student List” over the country’s outgoing president, the until-recently all-powerful Aleksandar Vučić, marks a watershed in Serbia’s modern political history.

In the midst of a political “earthquake,” after Vučić publicly acknowledged his defeat, the “Student List” ultimately secured 135–140 seats, while the outgoing president’s political camp won only 105, signalling the neighbouring country’s transition into an entirely new political phase.

More specifically, post-communist Yugoslavia initially, and post-war Serbia later, followed a broadly similar trajectory: a process of adaptation and direction under a senior political leader, within a closed system of governance that reflected a conception of government established as a political culture many years earlier, during the late Tito era.

This culture of Serbian “imperialism” was built on a centralised system of administration, authoritarian practices or limited accountability, pockets of corruption that were tolerated to some extent at various levels of the party hierarchy, and a lack of institutional scrutiny regarding the country’s strategic choices.

Diplomacy was conducted largely on the basis of personal agendas, while the country’s geopolitical orientation did not necessarily correspond to its declared commitment to European integration.

On the contrary, the exceptionally close relationship that Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, had developed with Chinese President Xi Jinping translated into millions of euros, as China is the largest foreign investor in the neighbouring country and has even sold the Serbs modern Chinese weapons systems.

Beyond China, outgoing President Vučić also maintained a personal channel of communication with the Russian president, having attempted to follow Vladimir Putin’s example in rotating political offices in order to continue leading the Serbian people.

At the same time, the delay in the neighbouring country’s EU accession process, despite pressure from Brussels and initiatives undertaken by other member states, clashed with the post-war generation’s desire for Serbia to remain anchored to an ethnocentric model of governance.

The “Headless” Student List

At the same time, the closed nature of Serbia’s governance system made social mobility slow or impossible, particularly for the post-war generations, who feel the need to rebuild institutions and prospects for the Serbian people without pre-war nationalism, now that some degree of economic recovery has been achieved.

In reaction to weak institutions, a lack of accountability and social justice, and the state of contemporary Serbia, the student movement erupted like a volcano on 1 November 2024, when the canopy at the railway station in Novi Sad collapsed, killing 16 people, including a child.

Although the station had recently undergone renovation, the collapse of the roof intensified accusations within Serbian society of widespread corruption among the political elite—an elite that took every possible measure to reproduce itself.

Students took to the streets demanding Vučić’s resignation. In an initial attempt to defuse the situation, the ministers responsible resigned, but Serbia’s until-recently powerful leader did not.

Resilience Was the “Key”

The fact that this movement, initially organised around university-based groups and centred primarily on students, subsequently incorporated politicians, artists and members of the neighbouring country’s middle class was largely due to its resilience.

The students continued to take to the streets with the same unwavering determination they had shown in the first days after the disaster, while the government’s handling of the situation appeared to deepen rather than defuse the political crisis.

In practice, as it turned out, a radical protest movement was not easy to manage for a political regime that was rigid rather than flexible and unaccustomed to such large-scale and persistent demonstrations.

Initially, the movement was underestimated. But as the students demonstrated some organisational capacity and began identifying concrete responses—such as demanding early elections—the room for manoeuvre available to the Vučić administration rapidly narrowed.

The West Is the Goal

In reality, the transition to a more liberal political system, with different levels of authority and Western characteristics, is another objective underpinning the “headless” Student List. It has no single leader, but rather a group of prominent figures who campaigned in the election.

This does not mean that the List’s period of parliamentary representation will be an easy one. The choice of individuals to lead it and the overall government programme will determine the success of a political experiment unprecedented in Serbia’s history.

The response and performance of its leading figures will determine whether the “Student List” ultimately becomes the principal driving force advancing Serbia into the post-Cold War era, helping establish a new reality in everyday life and politics, or whether the country will return to its familiar “imperialism.”

If the “Student List” succeeds in emancipating Serbia from its political past, its relationship with the EU, NATO and the revisionist powers—Serbia and China, as characterised in the original article—could thoroughly reshuffle the Balkan deck.

Until then, it remains to be seen whether the List can effectively manage domestic order, the economy and infrastructure; whether it can instil a new understanding of Serbia’s place in the contemporary world; or, at the very least, whether it can successfully secure better terms for the redistribution of wealth and greater social justice.

If some or all of these objectives are achieved, a “Serbian spring” may be approaching, following an authoritarian “political winter.”