Turkey is seeking to consolidate its presence and influence in Libya, safeguard its controversial maritime agreement against future political developments and open a second front of confrontation with Greece, following the dispute over an electricity interconnector in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ankara is taking advantage of Libya’s unstable political situation and the ambitions of Saddam Haftar, the son of eastern Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar, who is seeking a leading role in the country’s political future.

The decision by Libya’s eastern-based parliament to ratify the 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime memorandum of understanding has created another point of confrontation between Libya and Greece. Eastern Libya’s leadership has effectively rejected Athens’ diplomatic overtures, possibly underestimating the consequences of its decision.

Greece immediately rejected the Libyan parliament’s decision, stressing that ratification “does not alter the illegal, invalid and null-and-void nature of the memorandum, which contravenes international maritime law and infringes upon the sovereign rights of states in the region”.

Athens also called on Libya to “refrain from any action that violates international law and undermines stability in the Eastern Mediterranean”, warning that it would “take all appropriate measures to safeguard its sovereign rights”.

EU throws its weight behind Greece

Greece received immediate backing from Cyprus and the European Union, with European Council President António Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen issuing a joint statement declaring the memorandum invalid and without legal effect.

The two EU leaders recalled the European Council’s condemnation of the agreement dating back to 2019 and expressed their full support and solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.

We deeply regret the ratification today by the Libyan Parliament of the so-called Libyan-Türkiye Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions in the Mediterranean Sea. We recall that the EU’s position on this matter was clearly stated by the European Council in 2019 and remains unchanged. This agreement infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states, it does not comply with the Law of the Sea, and is null and void. We reaffirm our solidarity with Greece and Cyprus. We reiterate the EU’s well known position against any outside interference in Libya.

— Ursula von der Leyen (@vonderleyen) October 20, 2026

Their statement also reiterated the EU’s position against interference by third countries in Libya’s internal affairs, in an implicit reference to Turkey’s involvement.

Athens is now expected to adopt a tougher approach towards Libya, which could face an increasingly united European front.

EU programmes, funding and other forms of assistance, all particularly valuable during Libya’s political transition, are expected to become subject to stricter conditions and requirements.

This would mark a significant shift in Greece’s approach, using its position within the EU to increase diplomatic and economic pressure on Libya.

Parliamentary upheaval paves the way for ratification

Warning signs had reached Athens two weeks earlier, when Aguila Saleh, the speaker of Libya’s House of Representatives, was removed from his position in what has been described as a parliamentary coup.

Saleh had been among the first Libyan political figures to oppose the Turkey-Libya memorandum in 2019 and had continued resisting intense Turkish pressure to bring the agreement before parliament for ratification.

His successor, Al-Salihin Abdulnabi al-Obeidi, is considered a close ally of Saddam Haftar and serves as chairman of the parliamentary Turkey-Libya Friendship Committee.

At the first regular parliamentary session under his leadership, the ratification of the maritime memorandum was immediately placed on the agenda.

Saddam Haftar, who has been designated by his father as his political and military heir, has emerged as the dominant figure in eastern Libya.

Backed by substantial financial resources, powerful armed forces and near-total control over the eastern part of the country, he is seeking to build alliances that would position him as a leading contender for the presidency when elections are eventually held under the UN-backed peace process.

How Turkey won over the Haftar family

Turkey’s diplomatic success is particularly striking given that Ankara and the Haftar camp were on opposing sides of Libya’s civil conflict in 2019.

At the time, Turkish military intervention helped save the internationally recognised government in Tripoli from Khalifa Haftar’s offensive against the capital.

Since then, however, Ankara has systematically rebuilt relations with Benghazi.

By offering investment, financial support and assurances that it would back Saddam Haftar’s political ambitions, Turkey gradually opened doors within the eastern Libyan leadership and the Haftar family.

Ankara also promised to rebalance its previous policy of overwhelmingly supporting western Libya, presenting itself as a potential partner for both sides of the divided country.

The contrast between 2019 and 2026 is particularly revealing.

In 2019, Turkey secured the original maritime memorandum by promising military assistance to the Tripoli government against Khalifa Haftar. Seven years later, it achieved parliamentary ratification of the same agreement by promising support for the presidential ambitions of Haftar’s son.

Turkish officials were quick to celebrate what they regarded as a diplomatic victory.

The development comes at a difficult moment for Ankara’s regional strategy, with its confrontation with Israel producing limited results, its policies in Syria facing growing challenges and relations with Azerbaijan, traditionally one of Turkey’s closest allies, having deteriorated.

The presence in Libya on Tuesday of Ibrahim Kalin, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) and a close associate of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was also significant.

His visit appeared intended to underline Ankara’s growing influence over developments in the country.

Greece, meanwhile, had pursued an extensive diplomatic campaign in recent months and had initially succeeded in delaying ratification of the memorandum.

However, Khalifa Haftar had never made a firm commitment to prevent its approval.

During his last meeting with Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis in Benghazi on 28 March 2026, the eastern Libyan commander appeared cautious about ratifying the agreement but offered no explicit assurances.

Similarly, when Saddam Haftar visited Athens on 15 June 2026, he expressed a willingness to cooperate with Greece while avoiding any concrete commitment concerning the maritime memorandum.

Athens’ policy of engagement with Benghazi ultimately failed to prevent, or even discourage, the Haftar camp from proceeding with ratification.

Ratification changes little legally but carries political consequences

In practical terms, parliamentary ratification does not fundamentally alter the maritime dispute.

It does not grant international legal legitimacy to an agreement that Greece considers a violation of the law of the sea. Instead, it provides the memorandum with a greater appearance of domestic legal validity and signals a degree of unity between Libya’s rival political authorities.

The decision also addresses one of the objections previously raised at the United Nations concerning the memorandum’s validity: the fact that it had never been ratified by Libya’s parliament.

Nevertheless, the absence of parliamentary approval had not prevented Turkey and Libya from attempting to implement the agreement.

Both countries had already submitted maps to the United Nations showing the outer limits of the continental shelf they claim under the memorandum.

Turkey’s efforts to enforce the agreement in practice are therefore unlikely to change substantially as a direct result of ratification.

Libya had also invoked the unratified memorandum in diplomatic protests and formal communications to Greece, particularly over the designation of offshore exploration blocks south and southwest of Crete.

However, the latest decision is not without significance.

By formally endorsing the agreement, Libya has strengthened its commitment to it at state level, potentially complicating ongoing efforts to reach an agreement with Greece on maritime delimitation.

Moreover, with eastern Libya’s previous opposition removed, Tripoli and Benghazi may now seek to activate a second Turkey-Libya memorandum.

That agreement envisages the exploitation of maritime areas unilaterally claimed by Libya, opening the way for Turkey’s state-owned petroleum company, TPAO, to conduct energy exploration activities.

Any attempt to launch such operations in waters disputed by Greece would almost inevitably trigger fresh tensions between Athens and Ankara.

Egypt’s cautious response comes under scrutiny

Egypt’s position is another important dimension of the developing diplomatic confrontation.

Cairo has lost one of its closest political interlocutors in Libya following Aguila Saleh’s removal as parliamentary speaker.

At the same time, the Egyptian leadership is increasingly concerned about the expansion of Turkish influence along its western border, particularly given Ankara’s growing relationship with the Haftar family.

Nevertheless, Egypt’s initial diplomatic response to the ratification has been notably cautious.

A statement issued by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry following a telephone conversation between Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and his counterpart George Gerapetritis made no explicit reference to the ratification of the Turkey-Libya memorandum.

Instead, it said only that the two ministers had “discussed the issue of Libya in light of recent developments”.

The omission is significant, particularly given Egypt’s longstanding opposition to the maritime agreement.

It may suggest that Cairo is currently seeking to avoid fully aligning itself with Greece in a renewed public condemnation of the memorandum, while carefully assessing the implications of Turkey’s expanding influence in eastern Libya.

For Athens, the challenge now extends beyond the bilateral dispute with Libya.

Greece must respond to Turkey’s diplomatic gains in Benghazi, maintain European support and assess whether Egypt will ultimately adopt a more assertive position against the agreement.

Although parliamentary ratification has not changed the geographical realities or the international legal objections raised by Greece, it has altered the political landscape in Libya, potentially making future negotiations over maritime boundaries considerably more difficult.