The Greco-Italian War of 1940-41 is not only about what everyone more or less knows: the Italian arrogance, the unparalleled Greek heroism, the retreat of the Italians, the occupation of much of Northern Epirus by the Greek Army, and the Italian spring counteroffensive, which would likely have ended in failure if the Germans had not invaded Greece on April 6, 1941. It also includes behind-the-scenes events. Politicians, diplomats, spies, and others were traveling between various European capitals, aiming to end this war. The most critical month was December 1940, as the Italians were in a dire situation.

Mussolini decided to ask for a ceasefire with the help of the Germans but was blocked by the Foreign Minister and his son-in-law, Ciano. Meanwhile, the Germans, who probably disagreed with the Italian attack on Greece, seeing the tragic position of their allies, attempted to mediate to end the Greco-Italian War, “offering” Greece the territories of Northern Epirus that our Army had occupied.

Painting by Alexandros Alexandrakis inspired by the Greco-Italian War in which he participated

The Germans only requested the complete removal of all British forces from Greece. Despite the fact that the German proposal seriously occupied the Greek side, it was not implemented, mainly because the British exerted unbearable pressure on Metaxas to reject it. The death of Metaxas on January 29, 1941, is at least suspicious. In fact, some serious historians and researchers believe that Metaxas was murdered (see our related articles from 25/4/2020 and 16/6/2024).

Ioannis Metaxas

Today, we will reveal the deceitful way in which Churchill did not allow the proper arming of Greece and how he “provoked” the German invasion of our country. Next week, we will see new evidence regarding the suspicious death (or murder?) of Ioannis Metaxas, in which the British are once again involved! For now, let’s look at some excerpts from Churchill’s letters to Mussolini, in which he essentially gives him the “green light” to attack Greece and the way the British Prime Minister practically “forced” the Germans to invade Greece…

Churchill to Mussolini: “If Italy deemed it appropriate to carry out an operation in Greece, Great Britain would not oppose it”!

We begin our references to the events of the time with two letters from Churchill to Mussolini in the spring of 1940, in which he essentially gives him the “green light” to attack Greece!

Churchill became Prime Minister of Great Britain after Chamberlain resigned on May 10, 1940. On May 16, 1940, Churchill sent a personal letter to Mussolini in which he emphasized: “I have never been an enemy of the greatness of Italy, nor, deep down, an enemy of the Italian master,” adding that the British and French governments were willing to consider any reasonable claim Italy had in the Mediterranean (Spyridon Linardatos: “Foreign Policy of the 4th of August”, p. 355).

In another letter, Churchill wrote that “if Italy decided to enter the war later (note: Italy “joined” WWII in May 1940, attacking the already defeated France, so the letters from Churchill were sent before this event), it should primarily act in the Balkans to prevent Germany from entering there, and that, in any case, if Italy deemed it appropriate to launch an operation in Greece, Great Britain would not oppose it” (!) (“Metaxas’ Diary – Volume 8, p. 425, Newspaper ‘Akropolis,’ June 20, 1959”).

How Churchill hindered the arming of Greece by sending weapons to “neutral” Turkey!

Just before the outbreak of the Greco-Italian War, specifically on 18/10/1940, the British Ambassador in Greece, Michael Palairet, wrote: “If we continue to send quantities of weapons to Turkey only, without responding to Greece’s vital needs, we will provide the Axis with a very dangerous weapon.” The weapons sent to Turkey were rusting away in warehouses in the neighboring country.

The British Ambassador to Turkey, Knatchbull-Hugessen, reported: “The Turks are far from being able to use, either tactically or technically, the large volume of British equipment already provided to them, and certainly will not be able to manage additional equipment by spring.”

Adrian Norton Knatchbull Hugessen in 1940

In fact, on October 21, 1940, the British General Staff suggested sending “all the material support we could possibly spare” to Turkey! Even when the Italians attacked Greece, even when the Greek Army achieved great victories, surprising the global public opinion, the British were particularly stingy with their help to Greece.

In his iconic work “The War of Greece,” Marshal Papagos writes, targeting Churchill and not the British military: “Unfortunately, British assistance was never substantial. Despite the repeated requests from the British and Imperial forces in the Middle East, as well as the Greek Government to the British, the air force support was limited to a few planes, and the action of British warships in the Adriatic was extremely rare and almost not worth mentioning.”

Metaxas and Papagos

At the same time, Greece was purchasing fuel from the British SHELL, paying in cash (!). The only British assistance to Greece, in the first critical ten days of the war, which coincided with the crucial period before the U.S. presidential elections, was 15 aircraft.

At the same time, ten squadrons of British warplanes remained inactive in Turkey! After three months of fighting, only 4 British warplanes were available to Greece. The British had no shortage of warplanes, as by August 1940 their factories were producing 1,600 warplanes per month!

In fact, from the autumn of 1940, the danger of a German attack on Britain had ceased, as Hitler indefinitely suspended the execution of Operation “Unternehmen Seelöwe” (“Sea Lion”) on 17/9/1940, recognizing Germany’s unpreparedness. Churchill himself wrote in “The Second World War”: “As can be seen from my memoranda of that time (late September 1940), I never faced the threat of an invasion of England in 1941.”

The British did almost no intervention even in the Adriatic. Mussolini, in a speech he gave on June 10, 1941, said the following: “During the Greek War, our ships carried out 1,360 voyages between the ports of Bari and Brindisi and the Albanian ports of Avlona, Durrës, and Saint John of Meduë. They transported 560,603 officers and soldiers, 15,591 vehicles, 83,072 animals (mainly horses, mules, etc.), and 754,150 tons of material.”

The British sent only 300 of the 1,000 vehicles that Greece had requested in February 1941, after the Greeks’ ability to further penetrate Albanian territory was limited, the German initiative for a ceasefire had stopped, and Metaxas was dead…

Papagos notes that if Greece had been reinforced with British aircraft and vehicles, not only would it have penetrated deeper into Albanian territory, but the Italians would likely have found themselves in a dire position…

How did Churchill involve Greece in a war with Germany?

Churchill had a broader strategy in mind. He wanted the systematically planned German attack on the Soviet Union to start in the spring or at the latest by the summer of 1941. Crucial for Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union was the misleading information he received from the German Intelligence Service, under Von Canaris.

The huge Soviet superiority in troops and tanks, as well as their many reserves, led Hitler to the conclusion that Von Canaris was working for his enemies (probably for British MI6). Von Canaris was arrested for attempting to assassinate Hitler and, after a brief stay in a concentration camp, was executed. Even if Mussolini succeeded, as almost everyone believed, in conquering Greece in a few weeks, the British were firmly focused on “facilitating” the Germans’ attack on the Soviet Union.

As David Irving recently discovered in the German archives, Hitler acknowledged Germany’s inability to wage a two-front war. He launched an attack in the West not to secure a foothold for operations against Britain, but to avoid German landings, such as in Narvik, Norway, where Hitler is considered to have suffered his first defeat. Lastly, the Führer would never have decided to carry out the campaign against the USSR if he had not been misled by Von Canaris.

Churchill believed that after occupying Greece, Hitler would send all his forces to the Eastern Front and leave the Italians in our country. He began to orchestrate a German attack on Greece through diplomatic traps and, eventually, with the involvement of the SOE (Special Operations Executive), the special, secret British paramilitary organization.

On 3/11/1940, Metaxas received an invitation from the British to have Greece participate, “next week,” in a council of the United Kingdom “with members from the governments of Poland, the Netherlands, Norway, Czechoslovakia, as well as French General De Gaulle,” which would issue a joint resolution. In other words, the British were inviting Greece to a conference of the defeated, including those defeated by the Germans, giving them the pretext to attack Greece.

Metaxas understood the trap the British had set for him and refused Greece’s participation. However, the British persisted. In addition to the Ambassador in Athens, Palairet, the Permanent Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of the UK, Cadogan, also asked Greek Ambassador to London, Charalambos Simopoulos, to have Greece participate in the “council.”

Charalambos Simopoulos, the Greek Ambassador in London in 1940

Michael Palairet, the British Ambassador in Greece in 1940

King George II

On November 10, Metaxas responded to Palairet that he would have no objection to the Greek Ambassador in London attending the “council” as an observer. At the same time, he asked King George II to send a letter to the British King George VI, requesting British intervention to stop the Italian reinforcements in Albania and simultaneously secure “a safe base from which they would continue the war against the heart of Italy.”

George also wrote: “What is wanted is a large striking action.” And he concluded by stating that this would be a catalyst for the participation of Yugoslavia and Turkey alongside Greece. On 14/11/1940, the Greek Permanent Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs (note: should this position be created again?) Nikolaos Mavroudis telegraphed Simopoulos, asking him to inform the British that, according to various sources, a German intervention in the Balkans was expected, and he urged him to ask the British for “swift decisive action.”

In a new telegram the same day, Mavroudis informed Simopoulos again that, according to reports from the Greek embassy in Belgrade, the Germans wanted peace in the Balkans, but the Italians were maneuvering to get involved in military conflicts. On 16/11/1940, the response letter from George VI to the Greek monarch arrived, full of generalities and promises: “We have decided to send to Greece a great measure of the support which we realize that you so sorely need.”

Metaxas’ response was immediate and direct. On 16 November 1940, he sent the British Naval Attaché in Athens, Admiral Charles Edward Turle, to London with the mission to propose: The transfer of the British war effort from Egypt to Greece, a change in the war doctrine from purely defensive to offensive (“in Greece, the base of operations is ready”), with the hope of “drawing in” the “wavering Yugoslavia and friendly Turkey,” possibly even Bulgaria.

Metaxas, with impressive foresight, added: “I assure him that we will continue in the winter, and we anticipate a German attack!”

The American Aircraft Ordered by Greece and Received by Britain!

Metaxas finally requested, “that the British Government give an order to its American Committee to agree to the transfer of 60 fighter planes to us, from those destined for Britain.” The Greek embassy in Washington had already made the necessary request to the U.S. Turle was received by Churchill, and he conveyed to him what Metaxas had said.

At the same time, the British capital received Metaxas’ stern diplomatic notes of November 17, 1940, addressed to the British Ambassador in Athens and to the British Middle East Headquarters, via Air Vice-Marshal D’Albiac, who was serving in Athens, for the “urgent need to send immediate, and indeed tomorrow, air support to Greece.” Lastly, Minister Halifax was also informed of Metaxas’ renewed rejection of Greece’s participation in the “allies” conference.

Metaxas, diplomatically, wrote that he had responded to Palairet saying that he was fully willing to cooperate with the British government, but such an action would give the Germans a reason to attack Greece. “I am sure that this attack will happen sooner or later (“sooner or later”), but that even a fifteen-day delay is a significant gain for us.”

In the entry of November 18, 1940, Metaxas notes in his “Diary”: “The British government insists we join the conference of the nations. I tell Palairet clearly: Do they want to provoke a war with Germany? If they want, I’ll do it, but they are also responsible – and if they cannot provide us with aircraft to fight the Italians, what will happen when the Germans join?” (Am I going to have pro-German sympathies again?)

On November 20, 1940, Greek Ambassador in London Charalambos Simopoulos met Churchill and reiterated the Greek request for “real, complete assistance.” Churchill assured him that Greece would receive “unwavering” help. On the same day, Greece secured the U.S. agreement for 30 Tomahawk fighter planes (P-40). On November 23, Metaxas sent a letter to Palairet to inquire about the date of the infamous conference.

Tomahawk P40, the American aircraft that never reached Greece

This letter states, among other things: “If this meeting is postponed, we would have the pleasure, and the ability, to provide an answer in line with the circumstances of the moment. It is obvious that we cannot preempt our response.” On October 24, Simopoulos telegrammed from London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Very urgent. Our 5608 (forecast for the council meeting on November 25 at 11:30). Meeting postponed.”

In the meantime, the Greek Army captured Korçë and Moschopolis. The road to Avlona and the expulsion of the Italians from Albania had opened, with no substantial help from the British. Churchill dismissed Attaché Turle, who, according to Metaxas, was “a strong advocate of the Greek perspective,” and appointed Brigadier General Gordon Heywood in his place on November 25.

Greek soldiers in Korçë, 1940

On December 27, the British Ambassador to the U.S. met with U.S. Undersecretary of State Summer Welles and conveyed a proposal to have London immediately give Greece 30 Mohawk fighter planes, with the 30 American Tomahawks delivered to Britain at a later date. Metaxas accepted. We do not know the reasoning behind his decision, but it turned out to be a misjudgment.

The British did not keep their promise! The British Mohawks were not available in Egypt! When the 30 American Tomahawks were ready to be delivered to the British in mid-January 1941, the British delayed the delivery of the 30 Mohawks to Greece!

With this maneuver, Churchill delayed any British or American support to Greece until mid-January 1941, when General Wavell (pronounced Wavell), Commander of all Allied forces in North Africa, arrived in Greece with orders to begin the phased transfer of British Commonwealth troops to Greece, which was a direct provocation for a German attack…

British General Archibald Wavell

Conclusion

From what has been mentioned, it is clear that the British, especially Churchill, did everything possible to provoke a German attack on Greece. Metaxas, who handled the situation expertly and with foresight, made one, but significant mistake: he should not have accepted the British proposal to send 30 British aircraft to Greece, but should have insisted on receiving the American ones.

Had Greece had those planes in mid-January 1941, the course of the war would likely have been different. And, as we will see in a future article, it is now almost certain that Metaxas was assassinated by the British, presumably because he was a reactionary element, an obstacle to their dirty plans…

Sources: IOANNIS NASIOULAS, “The Death of Ioannis Metaxas,” GREEK FRONTIER PUBLISHERS, 2024
We sincerely thank Mr. Nasioulas for the additional information he provided.
ANNIBAS VELLIADIS: “METAXAS – HITLER – Greek-German Relations during the Metaxas Dictatorship 1936-1941,” ENALIOS PUBLISHERS, 2003.