The conflict between Israel and Iran, which now takes on existential dimensions for both countries, is the one that could become the catalyst for a radical reshaping of the broader Middle East map and, by default, poses critical challenges to another key regional player, Turkey.

From the outset, President Erdoğan took a stance against Israel and supported Iran’s right to self-defense, as the rivalry with Israel has now assumed a strategic character and is no longer limited to Gaza.

In all his public statements and communications with foreign leaders, including Donald Trump, the Turkish president has sought to portray Israel as the greatest threat to regional and global stability.

For Turkey, however, the escalation involving the Americans—with the bombing of Iran’s aerial facilities, the potential regime change in Iran, and even the ongoing exchange of missile strikes between Tehran and Tel Aviv—presents a series of critical challenges and dilemmas for the Turkish leadership.

A telling sign of Ankara’s difficult position is the Foreign Ministry’s statement, which did not condemn the American bombings but merely expressed concern that they could lead to further escalation, calling on both sides to avoid actions endangering lives and proposing the path of negotiations.

Shortly after, the spokesman for the Turkish Presidency issued a more critical statement, warning the US that if it is swept up by Israel’s aggression and the “Netanyahu network,” it would lead “to chaos and confusion, not peace and stability in the Middle East.”

Ideologically framing the Turkish stance, addressing Washington, he declared that “just as the US military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to greater radicalization and terrorism worldwide, so too the US attack on Iran is likely to have similar effects, as there is a direct link between America’s military interventions and the dynamics reshaping Europe’s political map, provoking xenophobia and Muslim hatred in the West, and fueling hostility towards the West and anti-Americanism in the East.”

Turkey has based its foreign policy since the Gaza war on confronting Israel as a rival regional power, since the area is too small to “fit” two regional powers, with Turkey also having ambitions for a hegemonic role in the region and among Muslim populations.

It invested in this role from the start of the Gaza war and is now trying to adjust this strategy to the new circumstances.

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For Ankara, the prospect of a war of attrition between Iran and Israel is the ideal scenario, as two of the strongest regional rivals would neutralize each other.

However, Erdoğan is trying to exploit the opportunity to “sell” to the susceptible Donald Trump the role of Turkey as a “mediator” in conflict resolution, copying the Ukraine war model, although the mediation attempt (revealed by Axios) did not advance, since after a phone call between Trump and Erdoğan, the US president ignored the Turkish president’s offer and proceeded with the bombing of Iran.

Turkey watches with concern that Washington, which had shown signs of distancing from the Israeli government, is returning to the longstanding US foreign policy doctrine of an uncompromising guarantee of Israel’s security.

Erdoğan’s statements last Monday after the Cabinet meeting, warning in aggressive tones that Israel’s actions “risk its existence and the future of its society step by step, with every brutality, every bloodshed, and every crime against humanity,” were heard as a threat similar to Iran’s calls for Israel’s annihilation.

The US involvement is a highly negative development for Turkey, as it will further strengthen the US–Israel bond, and then every enemy of Israel could be seen as an enemy of the US.

Until now, Turkey targeted Netanyahu to justify its anti-Israel campaign. But now, regarding Iran, things have changed, since even the Israeli opposition supports government choices, while mainly Western governments believe what German Chancellor V. Merz said: that “Israel is doing the dirty work on behalf of everyone.”

The threat now is that Israel may emerge wounded from this war episode but, if it achieves its goals with US support, it will remain an undisputed regional power that Turkey will be forced to respect and accept.

This naturally cancels Ankara’s ambitions towards Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, thus curtailing its regional aspirations in the Middle East.

Erdoğan’s government coalition partner, nationalist far-right party leader Devlet Bahçeli, who often acts as Erdoğan’s “front man,” did not hide his words: “The operation against Iran is also a veiled warning to Turkey. It is an indirect response to the vision of the ‘Turkish Century,’ a future free of terrorism and of the regenerative spirit rising in our homeland… Stopping Israel is both a matter of national security and a historic responsibility for regional peace and stability.”

Erdoğan’s relations with Tehran had other facets. The Turkish leader was personally involved years ago in a giant Iranian operation to launder billions of dollars and gold, bypassing the oil export embargo via the Turkish bank Halkbank.

However, Turkey’s relations with Iran are based on mutual suspicion.

Iran’s Shiite leaders remain chronically distrustful of Erdoğan’s intentions, as he tries to take a leadership role in the Sunni world while simultaneously attempting to “sit on two boats.” The Iranians do not trust him, even though he offers them indirect support against Israel. Tehran does not forget that Erdoğan’s effort to overthrow Assad ended a long-term Iranian political plan to gain influence in Syria and, through it, access to the Mediterranean and Israel’s northern borders.

They also believe Erdoğan uses his contacts with Tehran not to strengthen Iran but to consolidate his own regional role and to restore relations with the US.

The possibility of regime change in Tehran is particularly problematic for Ankara. The restoration of democracy and normalcy in Iran would shift the “borders” of the West eastward. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, Turkey had been projected as the West’s advanced outpost against the Iranian threat but also as a bulwark against Russian influence (a role questioned due to its alignment with Putin). Such a transformation in Iran would weaken this role.

Moreover, Ankara cannot overlook the fact that Greece, by maintaining a careful and balanced stance, has managed both during the Gaza war and the Israel–Iran conflict to preserve and maintain high-level relations with Israel—a relationship Turkey views as a threat to its interests, especially when it takes the form of regional cooperation with countries like Cyprus and Egypt.

Perhaps Turkey itself would benefit most, even more than Iran, if plans like IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Corridor), which bypass Turkey and emphasize Gulf Arab countries, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, are canceled or long delayed.

The possible creation of a new geopolitical map in the region—with Iran’s surrender, the end of the Gaza war, and the restoration of Saudi Arabia–Israel relations—may seem distant today, but it lies at the core of Donald Trump’s strategic agenda. And this “big picture,” in which a new balance of power may emerge in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, does not seem to leave room for a “hegemonic” Turkey.