Attempting to be as persuasive as possible regarding the July 5, 2015 referendum — which ended up turning the overwhelming “No” of the voters into a “Yes” — Alexis Tsipras in Ithaca claims that he himself never shared “the fears of the Left regarding processes of direct democracy.”

Hence, as he writes in his book, he never feared referendums, which he describes as “tough and polarizing” but also “redeeming.” It was this redemption he sought as Prime Minister following the unsuccessful negotiations of 2015.

At that time, he raised the issue of the referendum urgently, first to his close collaborators and not even to the full cabinet.

Even so, the depiction of the scene highlights the diversity of opinions that prevailed within the first government under Alexis Tsipras.

Today, the description of the scene provokes amusement, but at the time, the image of the government team was simply sad, given that the future of Greece depended on the decisions of these people.

Below is the characteristic excerpt from Alexis Tsipras’ Ithaca:

At that historic meeting on June 26, apart from me, Dragasakis, Kammenos, Kotzias, Lafazanis, Voutsis, Pappas, Tsakalotos, Valavani, Mardas, Chountis, Baltas, Skourletis, Flambouraris, Paraskevopoulos, Stathakis, and Kouroublis were present. Initially, I asked them to have a brief and not overly long session, under special conditions: to put away our phones and have no external communication until we reached a conclusion and made announcements. A chill fell over the room. I saw one looking at the other with furtive glances, revealing both ignorance and anxiety about what I was about to say.

Immediately after, I began my presentation, going straight to the point. [Ed.: Tsipras reviews the reasons that led him to the decision to call a referendum, presents alternative scenarios for the day after, etc. The first of those present to speak was Yannis Dragasakis, as Deputy Prime Minister and overseer of the economic sector. His intervention was concise and serious.]

Next, Kammenos spoke. Panos, with his familiar explosive temperament, came in strong, talking about sparks that had already been lit, special circumstances, almost warlike scenarios. He proposed three things: First, to have an absolutely clear answer to the question: “What do we do if ‘No’ prevails?” Second, he suggested declaring the country in a state of emergency and for the Government to immediately, on its own initiative, close the banks. Third, he argued that we should also be prepared for the “success scenario”: if our partners accepted our proposal before the referendum.

I remember interrupting him jokingly — perhaps also to lighten the mood a bit: “I’m starting to fear they’ll accept even more…” I said. Laughter did not occur, but the tension relaxed slightly. He concluded, however, with the request to withdraw the idea of a transitional Government and my resignation in case of defeat. “If we lose the referendum,” he said, “it doesn’t mean that the people turn against us. We must stay, to implement the decisions of the Institutions. Elections, under no circumstances. They would tear us apart.” It was clear that Panos was already in a trench warfare phase but also on edge with the discussion about our resignation.

Lafazanis’ statement was, without doubt, interesting both for me and for the others in the room. He described the referendum proposal as radical, even if it came late, according to him. He warned that a storm would erupt and that we had to be ready to manage it. He spoke of a “state of war.” He was certain that the partners would not accept the referendum and that we had to prepare, starting Monday, for the next phase: to control the key pillars of the state and begin the transition to a national currency. “This is where it will lead,” he said confidently. He even proposed that we immediately take control of the Bank of Greece.

I interrupted him: “Exactly what are we taking and how are we taking it, Panagiotis?” At that moment, I had no patience for theoretical discussions. We were under absolute pressure. The only thing we needed was concrete proposals. There was no time for exercises on paper. Moreover, I had no desire to get involved in the usual debates about transitioning to a national currency, which I had repeatedly clarified. Lafazanis was consistently on a different wavelength: “I’m speaking roughly now, it requires preparation, I didn’t even know this proposal would be made,” he insisted.

For some of my comrades, I always wondered if they even minimally grasped reality. Lafazanis was one of them.

Other interventions followed a different trajectory. Voutsis clearly stated that he did not agree with the warlike tone of the statements of the “two Panagiotises.” He proposed a strategy of mild tones, orderly, democratic, with broad consensus and dialogue. He emphasized, finally, that he did not consider the referendum a precursor to the national currency for the country: “This may happen or not at any time, but I don’t consider the referendum a stage to go there.”

Tsakalotos spoke and immediately declared that he agreed with the referendum proposal. He then described to the others what had happened at the last Eurogroup. It was, he said, a prearranged scenario, with Schäuble in the role of director and the usual “companions” following his line faithfully. He did not hide his pessimism. […] He specifically said: “If capital controls are introduced, they will last for a while, but at some point, they will be lifted. But if you nationalize the banks or pursue Stournaras, then you have cut the bridges.”

It was a clear and realistic statement, with the melancholy that almost always accompanied Euclid’s voice, but also with an absolute sense of the seriousness of the moment.

Nikos Kotzias followed the same line. He explained to those present why we had to move toward the referendum and outlined how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would support our objectives.

Pappas was an enthusiastic supporter of the referendum proposal and, in his usual combative style, said things like “cut them off at the pass” and other similar expressions. Essentially, though, he followed my line of reasoning, that the discussion should in no way be turned into a confrontation about the currency.

Mardas disagreed with the choice of the referendum. He argued that Brussels “is democratically insensitive” and that “they don’t understand referendums.” […] He proposed that Parliament decide, without a concrete proposal from the Government. I explained to him that such a thing simply couldn’t happen. Parliament cannot vote on the non-existent. There must be a specific bill.