The transition from the American 28-point plan to the new 19-point version is not merely a technical or diplomatic rearrangement. It is a shift in the balance, a change in language, an acknowledgment that the war cannot end with a list of Russian demands wrapped in an American diplomatic ribbon. From the 28 points — which resembled a pre-agreed text from a secret Russo-American forum — we moved to a new framework with Ukraine at the table, albeit under pressure. The current document, which Washington seems to accept and put forward, is the first in which Kyiv participates as a “co-author” rather than as a recipient of faits accomplis.

Ukraine itself is changing not only its stance but also its rhetoric. From “unacceptable” it has moved to “we are discussing the sensitive issues.” And the “sensitive issues” are not details. They are the very core of the conflict: borders, security guarantees, Crimea, the Donbas valley, the degree of neutrality, the timeline for lifting sanctions on Russia, and the funds required for the country’s reconstruction. All this is now effectively in Donald Trump’s hands as material for personal summit-level bargaining — and, judging from what we have seen since August 15 and the Siberia conference, it is not at all far-fetched that he might choose to discuss these matters first with Vladimir Putin rather than with Volodymyr Zelensky and the European “Willing.”

Moscow insists on its initial red lines, even though it is now gaining far more than it would have dared ask for a year ago. This is the paradox: although the new framework de facto consolidates its territorial gains and opens a pathway toward lifting sanctions, Russia’s rhetoric remains in the “all or nothing” mode. The hard line works as a negotiation lever and as a narrative for domestic consumption. For the Kremlin, even a favorable framework must be presented as a result of pressure, not dialogue.

In this environment, the scenarios for the next phase now appear more grounded in reality than in theory.

Ukraine’s shift – From refusal to managed engagement

Kyiv began from a stance of outright rejection. The initial 28-point document seemed like a recipe for geopolitical humiliation. For the Ukrainian leadership, accepting it publicly would have amounted to admitting the failure and collapse of the entire Ukrainian people and their multi-layered struggle of nearly four years. But Volodymyr Zelensky appears to have once again been forced in recent months to adjust his strategy — not because he suddenly agreed with the plan’s initial lines, but because American pressure has taken on an existential dimension.

Ukraine’s posture has shifted on two levels:

Linguistic – The vocabulary has moved from categorical rejection to careful conditional acceptance. The public narrative now speaks of a “framework,” not a “plan.” Of a “basis for discussion,” not “faits accomplis.”

Negotiating – Kyiv accepted the American logic of a phased agreement. First, a general document that freezes the situation on the ground. Later, a personal summit where the critical issues will be presented directly to Trump.

The cost is high. Zelensky knows that Ukraine cannot afford to turn against the U.S. at a moment when the Trump administration wants quick results — and has already shown, since last February, that it has no qualms expelling the President of Ukraine from the White House, irrespective of diplomatic impropriety. But he also knows that any agreement cementing partition without concrete compensation could ignite a domestic political crisis — one that might dangerously approach the threshold of a civil conflict in which no one today can say with certainty who controls Western medium- and long-range weapons or significant portions of Western financial aid.

This delicate balance explains why Kyiv insists on keeping Europe at the table — not because it believes Paris or Berlin can overturn American decisions, but because a trilateral mechanism offers political cover. When an agreement is painful, you want many signatures.

Moscow and the trap of “even more”

Russia knows that the new framework gives it more than it could have imagined just months ago:

• recognition of the reality on the ground in occupied territories
• stabilization of the line of contact in Donbas
• a freeze on Ukraine’s NATO trajectory
• a potentially gradual easing of sanctions
• Moscow’s return to multilateral forums

And yet, it insists that “peace” is not yet advantageous. The reason is simple: Moscow believes that the balance of power on the battlefield favors it. Attrition is slow but one-directional. Russia gains territory at a pace of a few hundred meters per day, but does not lose ground. Ukraine defends but does not retake. This dynamic creates within the Russian elite the perception that time is on Russia’s side. Hence the insistence on a rhetoric of “total victory.” It is not a military objective but a negotiation tactic: a message that “if you don’t give it to us on paper, we’ll take it on the battlefield.” The reality is more complex, but the narrative works — especially in Western societies fatigued by two years of war.

On the ground – Where the “Donbas question” is really decided

The eastern Donbas valley remains the critical line. Russia is pressuring in three main directions:

• Northern sector – Kupiansk
• Central sector – Pokrovsk
• Southern sector – Marinka – Vuhledar

The key question is whether Russia can take the eastern Donbas valley quickly. Militarily, the answer is clear: No. The current force structure, even with increased production of weapons and ammunition, does not permit a large-scale sweep. The pace of the frontline reflects the nature of the war: urban, static, incremental. To achieve full control, Russia would need months, perhaps years, and successive phases of painful attritional warfare.

But this does not weaken the negotiation threat. If Kyiv refuses an agreement that formalizes the current situation, the Kremlin can claim that “Ukraine will lose more on the battlefield than it would have on paper.” This narrative targets Western decision-makers, not military analysts.

The three scenarios

1. “Cold Peace” Scenario

A framework agreement is reached. The frontline freezes. Ukraine receives “NATO-style” security guarantees without full membership. Russia gains legitimacy for its territorial gains. Details — Crimea, borders, sanctions — are deferred to a long diplomatic process. This is the most manageable scenario for all sides. It brings no enthusiasm, but it reduces escalation risk. The one who will immediately “pay the price” is Zelensky, who will have to face elections and the weight of four years of national pain.

2. “War to the End” Scenario

Prolonged conflict – Low-intensity warfare – Incremental adjustments
No signature. Continuous talks, asymmetric pressures, or even a partial U.S. withdrawal. Ukraine slows Russian advances while continuing to bleed. Russia tries to improve its map before any final settlement. The war continues with mixed intensity. Europe acts as a regulator. Those who dismiss this scenario as unlikely — believing fatigue and yearning for security will overshadow all — are likely the same who in February 2022 predicted Russian troops would parade in Kyiv within three days.

3. “Collapse” Scenario

Breakdown of talks – Power vacuum – Return to full attrition
Moscow rejects the new document as insufficient. Trump shifts the burden onto Kyiv. Western aid shrinks. Ukraine faces the prospect of fighting a war with fewer resources. Russia tries to exploit the vacuum. It is not the most likely scenario today, but it is the most dangerous — as it could spiral into uncontrollable military and political collapse in the region. Russia’s moves elsewhere in Europe show it would not hesitate to draw major supporters of Kyiv into a new cold-war-style confrontation.

Peace before Peace — without Peace

The message from today’s landscape is clear: if peace comes, it will not be a moment but a structure — an evolving framework, a mixture of negotiation, pressure, and likely coercion.

The shift from the 28-point document to the 19-point one shows that the process is maturing — not because the sides agree, but because they recognize that the conflict has reached a stage where political, diplomatic, or military gains no longer lie primarily on the battlefield, but in shaping the framework itself.

Ukraine tries to preserve its strategic autonomy. Russia tries to turn battlefield attrition into political leverage. The U.S. tries to show it can close a war without opening a new one. Europe tries not to vanish from the equation…