The final opinion poll before the August holidays paints a political picture that is considerably more favorable for the government than one might expect given the social challenges facing the country and the steady stream of political controversies.

New Democracy (ND) remains the undisputed leading party. In the vote estimate it surpasses the symbolic 30% threshold, slightly expands its support compared with the previous June poll, and maintains a lead of nearly 14 percentage points over the second-placed party, Alexis Tsipras’s ELAS. At the same time, Kyriakos Mitsotakis continues to enjoy more than double the support of the nearest political leader in terms of suitability for the office of prime minister, while nearly two out of three citizens consider an ND victory in the next election to be virtually certain.

On the opposition side, despite the wear and tear of a long period in government, public dissatisfaction, and an overall negative assessment of the government’s performance, no strong party rival to ND has emerged. Although two new parties have been established, neither has presented a credible alternative governing proposal. ND continues to possess the most cohesive electoral base, the strongest leadership advantage, and the clearest perception that it is the likely winner.

The poll, however, leaves no room for triumphalism. The government remains well below its 2023 election performance, is nowhere near securing an outright parliamentary majority, shows significant weakness among younger and middle-aged voters, and faces a widespread public desire for political change. Its principal advantage is not that it has eliminated public dissatisfaction, but that this dissatisfaction remains fragmented and has yet to find a unified political expression.

The survey was conducted nationwide between 20 and 23 July among a sample of 1,178 voters, with a maximum statistical margin of error of ±2.9%. Consequently, small changes should primarily be interpreted as indications of trends rather than definitive shifts.

Vote Estimate: ND Above 30%

The projected election result is the strongest aspect of the poll for the government. New Democracy is estimated at 30.8%, with a range between 28.3% and 33.3%. Its average estimate places it nearly 14 percentage points ahead of ELAS, which follows with 16.8%, while PASOK ranks third with 11%.

Even if one considers the lower bound of ND’s estimate and the upper bound for the second party, the gap remains enormous. In other words, there is no plausible scenario for any significant reversal of the current balance of power.

A second conclusion is that ND has maintained the psychologically important 30% threshold. This is not merely symbolic. It indicates that despite electoral erosion, the party retains a solid core that is substantially stronger than any competitor, remaining the only political force that displays the characteristics of a major governing party.

Nevertheless, it remains far from achieving parliamentary self-sufficiency (an outright majority). Under current conditions, even the upper end of its estimated range does not by itself guarantee a parliamentary majority.

Particularly noteworthy is ELAS’s second-place showing with 16.8%. Tsipras’s new party now clearly outperforms PASOK, but it still lacks the characteristics of a party capable of immediately competing for power. That picture may become clearer in September. The fact that second place is occupied by a “new” political formation with significant—but not yet government-ready—support objectively reinforces ND’s image as the force of stability.

For PASOK, 11% constitutes a serious political problem, even though it improved slightly from the previous survey. Remaining in third place is insufficient. It trails the second-place party by about six percentage points and ND by nearly twenty, despite aiming to defeat ND “by just one vote.” The party that historically and institutionally aspired to become the main alternative governing force has failed to capitalize either on the government’s decline in popularity or on the widespread public demand for change.

Of particular political significance is the marked decline of Maria Karystianou’s Hope for Democracy party. After scoring 10.5% in the previous survey—tying PASOK—it has fallen to 7.4% in the vote estimate, losing 3.1 percentage points in a single month and dropping to fifth place, even behind Greek Solution.

This represents the largest negative shift among all parties and the first clear indication that its initially strong polling momentum is no longer developing in a linear fashion.

The party continues to enjoy notable support and remains comfortably above the threshold for parliamentary representation, but appears to be losing some of its initial momentum as social and moral protest must now evolve into a comprehensive political platform. The decline may also indicate that some voters who initially turned toward the party are reconsidering their choice or shifting toward other protest parties.

The distribution of the remaining support reflects an exceptionally fragmented political landscape. The Communist Party (KKE), Course of Freedom, and Voice of Reason follow, while MeRA25 stands just above the parliamentary threshold.

This fragmentation is a strategic advantage for ND. Opposition to the government is not concentrated within a single political force but dispersed among parties with differing—and often incompatible—ideological and political orientations. Public dissatisfaction is therefore numerically significant but politically incapable of being consolidated.

Voting Intention Before Redistribution of Undecided Voters

In raw voting intention, before reallocating undecided voters, ND records 27.3%, compared with 14.8% for ELAS and 9.5% for PASOK.

Compared with the late June survey, ND gains 0.5 percentage points, ELAS also gains 0.5 points, and PASOK improves by 0.3 points. Meanwhile, undecided voters decline slightly from 11.2% to 10.8%.

These changes are small and fall within the statistical margin of error. Nevertheless, their political direction is meaningful. ND does not experience further decline at the close of the political season but instead records a marginal recovery. After years in office and a socially difficult summer period, such resilience is noteworthy.

More important than the changes themselves is the stability of the gap. ND leads ELAS by 12.5 percentage points in raw voting intention and PASOK by 17.8 points.

The government, however, presents two distinct social profiles. Among voters aged 65 and over, ND reaches 45.6%, while among those aged 17–44 it falls to 20.5%, and among those aged 45–64 to 22.6%. Consequently, its strength depends heavily on older voters.

This age imbalance constitutes a clear strategic warning for the Prime Minister’s Office. ND enjoys a strong advantage among older age groups, who participate more consistently in elections and demonstrate greater party loyalty, but lacks comparable appeal among younger generations. Rebuilding its relationship with young people, working-age citizens, and households under pressure from the rising cost of living is essential if it wishes to transform its current lead into another strong governing mandate.

Especially favorable for ND is the level of voter certainty. Among its current supporters, 70.1% say they are “very certain” of their choice and 18.7% are “fairly certain.” Combined, nearly nine out of ten appear firmly committed.

The equivalent level of absolute certainty is lower among ELAS supporters and even lower among PASOK voters, where fewer than half describe themselves as very certain.

This largely explains ND’s resilience in the polls. Although the party has lost a significant share of the electoral support it enjoyed in 2023, those who still say they will vote for it exhibit high levels of party cohesion and a low likelihood of switching their vote.

Nonetheless, the loss of support among its 2023 voters remains substantial. ND retains 67.9% of its previous electoral base. This is the highest retention rate among the major parties, though it still falls short of full voter cohesion. Some of those losses have shifted to parties further to the right of ND, while nearly one in ten of its former voters remains undecided.

The government’s electoral strategy therefore has two parallel objectives: to win back voters who have drifted toward parties on its right without alienating centrist supporters, and to reactivate former ND voters who are currently waiting before making their final decision.

Undecided Voters

The undecided vote continues to be one of the main sources of uncertainty, although it is no longer large enough to cast doubt on New Democracy’s clear lead. Undecided voters account for 10.8%, down from 11.2% at the end of June. Including those intending to cast a blank or invalid ballot or abstain, the broader pool of politically uncommitted voters stands at 11.6%, compared with 12.7% previously.

This modest decline suggests that voter preferences are gradually becoming more settled, though the political balance is far from fixed. The pool of undecided voters is politically heterogeneous.

It is particularly large among those with no ideological affiliation, where 20.7% remain undecided, and even larger among centrist voters, where it reaches 30.7%. It is also more pronounced among people aged 45–64 and slightly higher among women.

For New Democracy, there remains room to win back former supporters, since roughly one-third of undecided voters (33.2%) voted for the party in 2023. Whether they ultimately return will depend on everyday concerns, the economy, and how convincing they find the government’s agenda.

The undecided vote could significantly affect ND’s final vote share, the battle for an outright parliamentary majority, whether smaller parties enter Parliament, and ultimately the conditions under which a government can be formed.

The poll’s findings should also be considered in light of a factor that was not measured in this survey: the public discussion surrounding a possible new party led by Antonis Samaras.

Because such a party has not been officially announced and was therefore not included in the questionnaire, it would be arbitrary to assign it any specific level of electoral support.

Nevertheless, it forms part of the broader political debate, as it could appeal to segments of the traditional conservative electorate, right-wing voters who have drifted away from ND, and citizens who currently support smaller parties to the right of the government or remain undecided.

Its potential impact would depend not only on the percentage of votes it might receive, but also on whether it would reduce ND’s ability to reclaim former supporters and increase party unity. On the other hand, the existing fragmentation among parties to the right of ND suggests that the existence of political space does not automatically produce a strong and unified electoral force.

When People Want Elections—and When They Think They Will Happen

When asked when they would like the next election to be held, public opinion is almost evenly divided.

44.9% favor early elections in September or October, while 43.7% prefer elections at the end of the government’s four-year term, in the spring of 2027. The difference of 1.2 percentage points is not statistically significant.

This finding cannot be interpreted as a clear public demand for early elections. Rather, it reveals two equally sized blocs: one seeking faster political change and another preferring the government to complete its full term.

The partisan breakdown is revealing.

Among current ND voters, only 13.1% want early elections, while 79.9% support completing the full four-year term. By contrast, the overwhelming majority of opposition party supporters favor elections this autumn.

The desire for elections therefore has a distinctly partisan character. The data do not indicate a broad, cross-party public demand to end the government’s term early, but rather reflect the opposition electorate’s wish to “get rid of Mitsotakis.”

Even more favorable for the prime minister is the response to what people believe will actually happen.

52.3% believe elections will take place at the end of the four-year term, compared with 43% who expect autumn elections.

In other words, most citizens still believe that the prime minister is likely to adhere to the institutional norm of serving a full term. This strengthens the government’s narrative of consistency and control over the political timetable.

The distinction between what people want and what they expect is significant.

More citizens want early elections than believe they will actually take place. Thus, even some of those hoping for autumn elections acknowledge that the government still holds the political initiative.

Suitability for Prime Minister

Mr. Mitsotakis remains the most preferred candidate for prime minister, with 31%, compared with 15.2% for Mr. Tsipras. All other party leaders score below 6%.

His lead of 15.8 percentage points over the runner-up—and the fact that his support is more than double that of his nearest competitor—constitutes one of the government’s strongest advantages.

The public may judge both the government and the prime minister critically, but when the question shifts from a general evaluation to choosing who should lead the country, Mr. Mitsotakis maintains a clear advantage.

Compared with the end of June, the prime minister’s rating rises slightly from 30.2% to 31%, while Mr. Tsipras slips marginally from 15.6% to 15.2%.

At the same time, the share of respondents giving no definite answer declines from 20.9% to 18.6%.

Nikos Androulakis stands at only 5.8%, trailing even Kyriakos Velopoulos, while Zoe Konstantopoulou and Maria Karystianou receive similar levels of support.

In other words, there is no single opposition leader capable of uniting the anti-Mitsotakis electorate.

Of particular interest is Mr. Mitsotakis’s appeal beyond his party’s traditional base.

He is chosen by 14.2% of those who voted for PASOK in 2023, and by 12.9% of those who either did not vote then or say they intend to vote now.

Among centrist voters, he records 29.1%, comfortably ahead of every other political leader.

This resilience among centrist voters is strategically important. While ND faces pressure from parties on its right, the prime minister continues to command personal support within the political center—the segment of the electorate that typically determines governing majorities.

Here too, however, the age profile is uneven.

Mr. Mitsotakis reaches 50.3% among voters aged 65 and over, but only 22% among those aged 17–44.

His leadership advantage remains strong overall but is considerably more pronounced among older generations.

Expectations of Who Will Win

When asked who they expect to win the next election:

• 18.8% believe New Democracy will win an outright parliamentary majority.
• 46.8% believe New Democracy will win but without an outright majority.

Overall, 65.6% expect New Democracy to win the election.

By comparison:

• 3.7% believe PASOK will win.
• 8.6% believe ELAS will win.
• 3.9% believe Hope for Democracy will win.

Perceived Likely Winner

Perceptions of who is likely to win an election are often politically more significant than simple voting intention, because they shape public expectations. They influence undecided voters, potential supporters, party activists, and perceptions of a party’s ability to govern.

The fact that nearly two out of three people expect New Democracy (ND) to win, while only about three out of ten say they intend to vote for it in the vote estimate, shows that the party’s political dominance is recognized well beyond its own electoral base.

Even among PASOK voters, 58.7% believe ND will win without an outright majority, while 9% think it will win with one. Only 21.8% of current PASOK voters believe their own party will win the election.

A similar pattern appears among supporters of other opposition parties. Large segments of them consider an ND victory—usually without an outright majority—more likely than a victory by their own party.

The government therefore retains a strong image as the country’s leading political force. The distinction between winning the election and winning an outright majority, however, is clear. Only 18.8% expect ND to secure a parliamentary majority on its own, while 46.8% expect it to win without one.

The prevailing expectation is that ND will emerge victorious but will have to navigate a more difficult post-election environment. This is both an advantage and a warning. Its victory is regarded as almost certain; a single-party government is not.

Assessment of the Government and the Prime Minister

Overall public evaluations of the government are negative.

35.6% rate the government positively or somewhat positively, while 63.7% rate it negatively or somewhat negatively.

The picture is almost identical for the prime minister, with 35.9% expressing positive opinions and 63.3% negative ones.

These figures are the main counterweight to the government’s favorable electoral position. The government does not enjoy majority public approval, and a large portion of society is dissatisfied with its performance.

The government receives roughly 36% positive evaluations, while its estimated vote share is slightly lower, at 30.8%. This suggests there is an additional group of citizens who view the government’s performance positively or somewhat positively but are not yet certain they will vote for ND.

At the same time, cohesion within the party’s current electoral base is exceptionally strong. 99.2% of respondents who currently intend to vote for ND rate the government positively, while 97.9% also rate the prime minister positively.

The government therefore faces no internal problem among its existing supporters. Its challenge lies primarily with former 2023 ND voters who have drifted away and with social groups that remain unconvinced by its policies.

Positive evaluations reach 53.1% among voters aged 65 and over, but fall below 30% among younger age groups.

Among center-right voters, the government receives highly favorable ratings, whereas among centrists, positive opinions fall to roughly one-third.

This gap reflects Mr. Mitsotakis’s central political challenge: maintaining unity on the center-right while simultaneously rebuilding support among centrist voters.

The Opposition Fails to Convince

When respondents were asked which party is providing the most meaningful opposition, the most common answer was “none in particular,” chosen by 38.9%.

PASOK comes first among the parties with 14.5%, followed by:

• ELAS: 11.6%
• Greek Solution: 7.4%
• Course of Freedom: 7.3%

Even among ND voters, 16% believe PASOK provides the most meaningful opposition, although 52.4% answer “none.”

Among PASOK’s own supporters, only 47% identify their party as providing the most substantive opposition. In other words, more than half of PASOK voters do not automatically see their own party as the obvious answer.

ELAS enjoys stronger recognition among former SYRIZA voters, but its influence remains limited outside specific voter groups.

The fragmentation of responses confirms that no unified opposition force has yet emerged.

Political Stability or Political Change?

54% of respondents say that political change, with different parties in government, is more important, while 41.1% prioritize continuity and political stability.

This finding is clearly less favorable for the government and should not be glossed over. A majority of society wants political change. After many years in office, public fatigue has set in, and a broad segment of public opinion wants either a different political direction or a different governing coalition.

However, support for “change” has not translated into a single electoral alternative.

The 54% does not mean that there is one opposition party enjoying equivalent support. Rather, it is spread across multiple parties, different leaders, and often contradictory political agendas.

Consequently, ND can argue that despite the public desire for change, 41.1% still view its own proposal as the guarantee of continuity and stability.

This is a significant figure, roughly 10 percentage points higher than the party’s estimated vote share, suggesting a broader pool of potential support.

Support for continuity is especially strong among voters aged 65 and over and among center-right voters.

By contrast, younger voters and those who identify as centrist or left-wing are overwhelmingly more likely to favor political change.

Key Takeaways for Summer Conversations

Marc’s final poll before the August holidays leaves the government in a considerably stronger position than any of its rivals.

New Democracy holds a commanding lead, exceeds 30% in the vote estimate, enjoys high voter certainty, has the only party leader who is clearly viewed as prime-ministerial, and overwhelmingly dominates expectations of victory.

However, it still falls short of an outright parliamentary majority.

The opposition, by contrast, remains fragmented.

Mr. Tsipras’s ELAS has secured second place without coming close to ND. PASOK continues to fall short of establishing itself as the government’s principal challenger, while the remaining parties each absorb only portions of public dissatisfaction. Meanwhile, Maria Karystianou’s party continues to lose ground.

The government nevertheless faces significant challenges of its own.

Negative public evaluations, widespread demand for political change, and weak support among working-age adults and younger voters remain major problems.

The autumn political season will determine whether the government can transform its current dominance—from one rooted largely in opposition weakness—into genuine momentum for winning a third consecutive term.

One additional variable for the autumn is the possible political move by Antonis Samaras. Although it has not yet been reflected in opinion polling, such a development could affect, above all, New Democracy’s ability to reunify its right-wing electorate and win back former supporters.