The significance of the Republic of Cyprus being a full member of the EU is confirmed by the move of four Turkic states to officially recognize that the so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is illegal and therefore non-existent under International Law. They also acknowledged that Turkey is an occupying force in Cyprus.

This development exposes those who persistently tried to downplay the EU’s political power, ignoring its positive impact not only on the Cyprus issue but also on various other matters that the Republic of Cyprus would struggle to address if it were not an EU member state.

UN Resolutions Recognition

The recognition of the UN resolutions on Cyprus (Resolutions 541 of 1983 and 550 of 1984) by four Turkic states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan) carries significant diplomatic, political, and geopolitical implications. These resolutions call on UN member states not to recognize the pseudo-state and confirm that the Republic of Cyprus is the only legitimate entity on the island.

End of the “Two-State” Notion

At a crucial time—one of many for Cyprus—states that Ankara considers natural allies are pulling the rug from under Erdogan and Tatar, weakening their attempt to push for a two-state solution in Cyprus. By recognizing the UN resolutions, these states bolster Nicosia’s international standing and support a solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (BBF).

Turkey remains the only country recognizing the pseudo-state, and the decision by the four Turkic states—members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS)—to support the UN resolutions is a major diplomatic blow to Turkey. Turkish diplomacy had expected some form of recognition to legitimize the 1983 declaration of the “TRNC” by Denktash.

The resolutions define the Turkish presence in Northern Cyprus as an occupation, and their recognition by these states undermines and invalidates Turkey’s “two states” narrative.

The Power of the EU

The decision by the four states is tied to the upcoming EU–Central Asia Summit, where the EU announced its readiness to offer €12 billion in investments under the Global Gateway initiative, aimed at developing four key sectors:

– €3 billion for transport, aiming to reduce the transport time of goods between Europe and Asia to two weeks or less, bypassing routes through Russia.

– €2.5 billion for the mining and processing of rare earths such as manganese, lithium, and graphite, with a commitment to strengthen local industries in the four states.

– €6.4 billion to promote green energy use and combat climate change.

– €100 million for satellite internet implementation to improve connectivity in remote areas.

In addition, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) plans €7–8 billion in further projects in critical minerals and renewable energy by 2027. Unlike other powers like China and Russia, the EU promotes the development of local industries instead of simply extracting resources, creating jobs and added value.

This financial support indicates that the EU used its diplomatic and economic influence to secure the support of these states, simultaneously strengthening Cyprus’ position and weakening Turkey, along with other countries trying to court these states.

However, the recognition of the UN resolutions by the four states also reinforces the belief that International Law can prevail when states are free to choose their international relations based on their well-understood interests. The recognition underscores the EU’s and these states’ commitment to the UN Charter, which promotes sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A Bitter Pill for Turkey

While Erdogan never missed an opportunity to emphasize Turkey’s leadership role in Central Asia, four Turkic states disrupted his plans. The decision has sparked intense reactions in Turkey and the pseudo-state, with the newspaper Cumhuriyet calling the move a “sale of the TRNC” in exchange for EU funds, implying the states were “bought” by the EU.

Turkey views the decision as a betrayal by allies within the Organization of Turkic States, weakening its regional influence at a time when it faces multiple open fronts in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially against Greece and Israel.

Meanwhile, the stance of the four states strengthens the position of the Republic of Cyprus, as it weakens Turkey’s demand for a “two-state” solution and supports the agreed framework for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

Still, we may see Turkey hardening its stance, as years of efforts seem to be unraveling. Rather than easing the so-called “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots, that isolation may actually be reinforced—even by friendly states.

This development with the four Turkic states is an undeniable success for Cypriot diplomacy, which involved intense behind-the-scenes activity from both President Christodoulides and Foreign Minister Constantinos Kombos. These diplomatic efforts linked Cyprus’ interests with the broader interests of the EU, resulting in a positive outcome for all involved.