In the coming period, Athens will focus on managing Greek-Turkish relations and finding the necessary balances to avoid disrupting sensitive ties with other regional actors, within the new framework created by the upgrade of the Greece-Cyprus-Israel Tripartite Cooperation.

The 10th tripartite meeting took place at an extremely sensitive time, as Israel remains, in terms of image, wounded from the Gaza war, while still maintaining a leading role in regional security. Meanwhile, a major and competitive regional duality is emerging in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean: Turkey versus Israel.

After the Gaza war, it is clear that the two countries compete not only to gain maximum favor and support from Donald Trump but also to impose their own red lines and spheres of influence. This confrontation unfolds between the two most militarily powerful forces in the wider region, with Turkey having made significant strides in recent years to bridge the technological gap separating it from Israel in the defense industry and production.

Competition
In this regional competition, Trump has not yet intervened. However, his vision for a “new Middle East” cannot ignore efforts to restore relations with Israel—not only among the major Arab Muslim states but also with Turkey. For now, however, this seems extremely difficult given the tension between the two leaders and the conflicting regional ambitions. Efforts are therefore limited, at least, to avoiding an armed conflict between the two close U.S. allies.

The hostility and rivalry between the two countries are now deeper and resonate with public opinion. In Turkey, Erdoğan’s hardline rhetoric has demonized Israel, while in Israel, no one forgets that the Turkish leadership continues to speak admiringly of Hamas and openly pursues neo-Ottoman ambitions in the region. Perhaps for this reason, a recent poll ranked Turkey second only to Iran as the country perceived by Israeli citizens as the greatest security threat.

Accusations
In Turkey, the government now openly accuses Israel of trying, among other things, to undermine Erdoğan’s most significant political initiative for reconciliation with the Kurds. Hakan Fidan, during his visit to Damascus, accused Israel of guiding the SDF not to integrate into Syrian forces and to continue its autonomous course—crossing Ankara’s red line by leaving an open wound in the Kurdish peace process.

Benjamin Netanyahu had warned his two guests in separate meetings with the Greek and Cypriot delegations about his intentions. In the past, he had not concealed his views on the threat posed by Turkey. He deliberately made this warning public—to record it and demonstrate that Turkey does not only target Israel for “ideological” reasons (Gaza) but also threatens other countries, such as Greece and Cyprus, which are EU members, directly raising territorial claims against them.

Netanyahu’s public intervention occurred days before his meeting at the White House for a comprehensive discussion with President Trump, both on the second phase of the Gaza peace process and broader geopolitical issues. Israel is keen to keep Iran on the agenda, seeking to draw the Americans into a potential new strike against the Iranian nuclear arsenal.

In that meeting, the Israeli prime minister will explain why Turkey’s non-participation in the Gaza peacekeeping force is a red line for Israel. In this context, he will also emphasize, as he told his interlocutors, the importance of the Tripartite in the Eastern Mediterranean and the need to upgrade it soon by reviving the 3+1 format, initially launched during Trump’s first term under Mike Pompeo at the State Department. This is something Athens and Nicosia are hoping for, as they aim to appear positively on the American president’s radar.

Strong Reactions
Although Turkey reacted strongly to the Tripartite and Netanyahu’s statements, there were no explicit references to Greece and Cyprus.

Erdoğan himself, two days later at an AKP party event, warned that “agreements can be made, but none of them binds us or changes our policy,” and that policies “promoted by these countries will not alter our stance. The actions of those with the blood of 70,000 Palestinian brothers on their hands differ little from the sound of a tin can.” He concluded that “whether it concerns the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, or anywhere else, we do not violate others’ rights, nor allow ours to be violated.” The Turkish press portrayed the Tripartite as a “sacred alliance” against Turkey.

For Ankara, any framework that could obstruct its policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and impose limits, challenging the “Blue Homeland,” is treated as a national security threat. On the other hand, leaving Turkey unchecked in the region would pose a significant obstacle to major future projects for connecting energy, data, commerce, and electricity networks. For Tel Aviv, it would close Israel’s only viable exit route, as it borders potentially hostile territories.

Netanyahu deliberately prioritized maritime security and infrastructure in the Tripartite. A Center of Excellence for Maritime Cybersecurity will be established in Nicosia, planned to operate by 2026. Securing maritime routes and infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean is essential for creating new major corridors, such as IMEC, of interest to the Americans and a topic for Netanyahu’s discussions in Washington regarding regional security.

Intentions
According to reports, during his meeting with Nikos Christodoulides, Netanyahu expressed his intention to discuss the GSI electrical interconnection with Trump, considering it part of IMEC. The Israelis have also explored the possibility of starting GSI with a first phase between Israel and Cyprus.

However, this does not preclude geopolitical complications with the other major phase of the project, the Crete-Cyprus interconnection, where Turkey insists on having a say to support and legitimize its claims against Greece and Cyprus.

After the Tripartite, discussions in Turkey focus on where the “militarization” supposedly caused by Israel’s cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, and the acquisition of Israeli weapons, might lead. It is overlooked that the militarization of the Eastern Mediterranean has primarily been Turkey’s doing, including establishing bases even in occupied Cyprus for both surveillance and offensive drones, and asserting the Turkish Navy as a de facto controller of activities in the region, to impose the “Blue Homeland” and transform the Eastern Mediterranean into a “Turkish sea.”

Next Steps
Greece, without any official feedback from Ankara, insists that planning for the next steps in Greek-Turkish relations continues. On January 20-21, the Political Dialogue and Positive Agenda will take place, followed by the Supreme Cooperation Council in Ankara in the first quarter of 2026, when the leaders of both countries will meet.

By the end of 2025, official data show that the period of avoiding Turkish provocations in the air—which lasted almost the entire 2024—has ended. According to the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, 189 violations of Greek airspace and 164 violations of air traffic regulations in the Athens FIR occurred in 2025, compared to zero airspace violations and 301 FIR violations in 2024. In 2022, statistics peaked with 11,258 airspace violations and 2,286 FIR violations.

These figures are being assessed to determine whether they were merely a signal from Turkey regarding the fragility of “quiet waters” policy, or a precursor to a change in tactics.

Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis confirmed that communication channels between the two governments remain open, noting that as long as the “big” issue of continental shelf/EEZ delimitation is unresolved, tensions may continue to arise.

Cautious Optimism
Interestingly, in his recent interview on SKAI Radio, the Foreign Minister expressed that “there appears to be political will to move toward a more definitive solution to our major issues,” while acknowledging that “the last mile is the hardest.”

So far, however, as shown in contacts with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, there has been no room for progress due to fundamental differences regarding the scope of the dispute. Greece maintains there is only one dispute—the delimitation of the continental shelf/EEZ—while Turkey insists on expanding the issue to include all claims as a “package.”

Clearly, political will limited to statements of good intent is insufficient to achieve a solution.