Donald Trump presents the emerging memorandum with Iran as the agreement that will ensure Tehran never acquires a nuclear weapon. The US President’s framing is strong, politically useful, and entirely expected in communications terms. The problem is that, for now, the agreement does not yet carry the weight of a real, fully binding nuclear settlement.

What exists—and what is crucial—is the framework: a memorandum of understanding. A promise that both sides will enter 60 days of negotiations after the scheduled signing on Friday. It is there, not now, that the difficult issues will be decided: how long enrichment will be suspended, what will happen to highly enriched uranium, what inspection regime will apply, what will happen to advanced centrifuges, and which sanctions will be lifted.

In other words, Trump is politically “selling” the outcome as a deal. In reality, what appears to have been achieved is the start of a new and extremely difficult negotiation.

The critical ambiguity of enrichment

The first major question concerns uranium enrichment. Washington wants a long suspension—ideally 20 years. Tehran reportedly seeks a much shorter horizon, no more than a decade. Trump himself left open the possibility of a compromise at 15 years. This difference is crucial and is not just about timing.

For the US and Israel, the longer the suspension, the further into the future the risk of Iran’s nuclear breakout is pushed. For Tehran, however, permanently or even long-term abandoning enrichment is equivalent to accepting the loss of a key tool of sovereignty and leverage. That is why Iran insists that even if there is a freeze period, it does not renounce the right to enrichment.

This is the core of the problem. The agreement may state that Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon. But the real issue is whether it will retain the infrastructure, expertise, and timeline to move again in that direction when it deems necessary.

Enriched uranium and the stockpile game

The second critical point is the stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%. This is a level close to weapons-relevant material, even if it is not yet at the purity required for a nuclear weapon. According to the text, Iran has agreed in principle to hand over or remove half of its 440-kilogram stockpile and dilute the remaining half to levels suitable only for civilian use. This sounds significant—and it is—but only if three conditions are met: who supervises it, where the process takes place, and which inspectors have permanent access to facilities. Without these, the measure remains a political statement, not a security mechanism.

Even more important is what happens to the remaining enriched uranium and the centrifuges. Past experience has shown that Iran does not need only material to restart a program; it needs infrastructure, scientific knowledge, and time. The first two it already has. The third is what every agreement seeks to limit.

The shadow of the 2015 deal

Trump has a political problem of his own making. In 2018, he abandoned the 2015 nuclear deal, calling it the worst agreement ever signed. Now he must present a new deal as superior, tougher, and more effective. His key argument is that this time the restrictions will be permanent—that Iran will only be allowed to enrich for non-military purposes “forever.” If this is clearly defined, with strict inspection mechanisms and no grey zones, it would indeed be stronger than the 2015 framework, which had time limits.

However, it is still unclear what enrichment level will be allowed. It is unclear whether the 3.67% cap will return. It is unclear what the inspection regime will be. It is unclear whether Iran will truly accept restrictions without an expiry date.

These ambiguities allow both sides to “sell” different versions of the same process. Trump speaks of a definitive barrier to an Iranian bomb. Tehran suggests it is entering negotiations without giving up core rights.

Tehran demands concessions first

Iran is not entering negotiations as a defeated party simply accepting terms. The message from Iran’s Foreign Ministry is clear: the 60-day negotiation period depends on US compliance. Tehran demands three things: an end to hostilities, lifting of the blockade, and release of frozen assets. These are not technical details but political prerequisites. If they are not met, Iran can claim Washington violated the framework first. This creates a classic trap: the US wants nuclear commitments before giving major concessions; Iran wants economic and political relief before deep nuclear commitments.

The Israel factor

Israel is the major absent party at the table and the most directly affected actor. Netanyahu’s government does not want a deal that temporarily limits Iran’s nuclear program while leaving its regional power intact. For Israel, the nuclear issue cannot be separated from Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iran’s regional networks. Tehran, in contrast, wants exactly that separation: to negotiate its nuclear program without giving up its long-built regional influence.

Winners and losers

The first temporary winner is Trump, who can present himself as having stopped a war and forced Iran into negotiations. Iran also gains by avoiding immediate escalation while preserving future options. Israel stands on both sides of the equation: gaining time but risking constraints from US de-escalation strategy. Europe remains a secondary observer benefiting from lower energy risks but with little influence.

The 60-day risk

The next 60 days are the real test. Iran is experienced in prolonging negotiations; the US has not always shown patience for complex verification regimes. Trust is minimal, and memories of the 2015 withdrawal and secret Iranian facilities remain fresh. Even if signed, the agreement will be fragile from day one.

The next day

If the framework moves forward, the immediate aftermath will be cautious de-escalation. Energy markets would react positively. The Strait of Hormuz would again become central, both as a shipping lane and as a tool of Iranian leverage.

Iran may promise not to close it, but retains the ability to threaten it. This is what makes the agreement politically relieving but strategically incomplete.

The memorandum may freeze a dangerous nuclear pathway and reduce the risk of immediate conflict. But in its current form, it is not yet a solution.

It is an agreement to continue negotiating.

And that changes the entire interpretation. Because what matters is not what each side declares today, but what they eventually commit to in writing, who enforces it, what happens to uranium and centrifuges, which sanctions are lifted, and how much room Iran retains to re-emerge later.

Until then, Trump has a narrative. Iran has time. Israel has concerns. And the region has another fragile pause—not a final answer.