An abundance of money to recruit people sympathetic to Russia, recruitment through Telegram, and priests who delivered anti-European messages from the pulpit for financial compensation were all part of Moscow’s extensive plan to influence Moldova’s political situation.

The Kremlin has previously used disinformation as well as illicit access to electronic networks to achieve its objectives. But the case of Moldova, according to an extensive New York Times investigation citing Western intelligence officials, went much further than other Russian attempts to destabilize Western countries.

It was an extremely expensive vote-buying operation, costing hundreds of millions of dollars and financed by Moldovan billionaire Ilan Shor. The entire program bore the imprint of Skolkovo, Russia’s equivalent of Silicon Valley.

Shor left Moldova in 2019 after being accused of defrauding banks of $1 billion. He is now based in Russia, where, according to Western intelligence officials, he reports to Sergei V. Kiriyenko, a senior Putin government official responsible for countries such as Moldova, which the Kremlin considers to lie within its sphere of influence.

While Putin was talking about the “West’s hysteria over the Russian threat,” he was simultaneously convening meetings on how to undermine NATO and the EU from within.

Moldova plays a central role in this objective. It is a small country with a population of just three million, but in the eyes of the Russian leadership it has assumed outsized importance. Strategically located Moldova could potentially become a base from which Russia could launch attacks against Ukraine and Europe.

The New York Times describes a program that is still ongoing. Its journalists spoke with people who participated in it — many of whom fear reprisals — and obtained access to court records and other documents. Some elements of the operation were already known, but the full extent of the program is only now being revealed.

Moldova’s pro-Western government under Maia Sandu has made EU membership a priority. However, every major vote — the presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as the 2024 referendum on EU membership — became a target for Kremlin influence operations.

Recruiting priests

Among other tactics, Moscow attempted to pay Orthodox priests to recruit voters and convey Russian narratives to Moldovan worshippers from the pulpit.

Hundreds of Moldovan priests traveled to Russia beginning in the summer of 2024, where they visited holy sites and senior church leaders.

Before returning home, each signed a contract for a debit card issued by the Russian bank Promsvyazbank, which has ties to Russia’s Defense Ministry and owns 49% of Ilan Shor’s financial-services company. Under the contract, they declared themselves employees of “Evrazia,” a Kremlin-linked organization that, according to Western intelligence officials, promotes pro-Russian policies in former Soviet republics.

In exchange for approximately $1,000, the priests were expected to urge their congregations to reject Moldova’s referendum on EU membership and campaign against pro-Western politicians. Hundreds accepted the money, according to Moldovan officials.

“We, the people, what do we want? Sodom and Gomorrah? Do we want God to burn us alive? He will burn us,” one of the priests said in a fiery sermon.

The camp in Serbia

In the summer of 2025, the Russians established a well-equipped camp in Serbia, ostensibly for other purposes but in reality to train people who would attempt to influence the election results. At the same time, programs were being run in Bosnia and Moscow to turn pro-Russian Moldovans into “Kremlin soldiers.”

Under the supervision of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, they were taught how to break through police cordons, trained in weapons use and even taught how to set buildings on fire. At the corresponding camp in Moscow, the training included explosives and drone operation.

Participants were paid $400 for three to four days of training, an enormous amount by Moldovan standards.

According to some testimonies, Russian trainers responded to participants who were reluctant to take part in these activities by beating those who objected.

“These operations don’t require crowds; all it takes is for a spark to be lit by a few people,” a Moldovan prosecutor said.

People working for Ilan Shor are estimated to have approached more than 150,000 Moldovans through Telegram, promising financial compensation and using 240 chatbots. Documents recording Shor’s activities show that 38,000 people were paid a total of $20 million in 2024, ahead of the referendum.

Of those recruited — after being screened to ensure, for example, that they were not police informants — 35,000 were classified as activists and another 1,200, higher up the hierarchy, as “managers.”

Election Day

On the day of the parliamentary elections, September 28, 2025, everything was reportedly ready according to the Russian plan.

Agents trained in Serbia were preparing to create chaos in Chisinau, Moldova’s capital, and elsewhere. They wore yellow and blue armbands so they could identify one another in the crowds, while some carried incendiary devices. At the same time, Russian hackers had infiltrated Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission and gained control of thousands of routers.

However, Moldovan authorities were prepared. In the weeks leading up to the election, Moldovan police raided hundreds of homes, arresting people who had participated in the camps or received money as part of Shor’s operation. When police arrested suspects accused of planning violent acts, some claimed that the incendiary devices they possessed were intended… for a baby gender-reveal party.

Meanwhile, Moldova’s cybersecurity experts, with help from Western allies, thwarted the hacking attacks.

Protests eventually broke out, but there were no serious incidents of violence. Maia Sandu’s party won just over 50% of the vote, largely thanks to support from the Moldovan diaspora.

For the Kremlin, the New York Times concludes, the outcome was not a failure at all. Moldova’s government was forced to spend a small fortune and devote enormous resources to preventing Russian interference.

Since then, the Kremlin has expanded its efforts. And in Chisinau, officials understand that Moscow is playing the long game.