The Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS), General Dimitrios Houpis, presented his own view today in Prague on mobilization and, more broadly, on the relationship between the Armed Forces and society. Among the points he raised was the philosophy of the “Citizen-Soldier,” under which conscripts would defend their home area, since, as he said, a professional military cannot create the scale of military power necessary for a long-duration conflict.

Specifically, speaking at the IISS Prague Defence Summit, at a time when Europe is reconsidering conscription models it abandoned in previous decades, the Greek Chief of the HNDGS placed a clear distinction at the heart of his intervention: professional Armed Forces and conscripts are not called upon to carry out exactly the same mission and, above all, the mobilization of a country during a crisis can no longer be treated as an issue concerning the military alone.

Mr. Houpis said that the return of high-intensity warfare to Europe and the speed at which technology is changing are forcing European states to reconsider fundamental choices made over the past three decades.

A state’s ability to sustain military operations not for a few weeks, but for months or even years, as the experience of the past four years has shown, now depends on human resources, infrastructure, technology, and also on the extent to which society as a whole is prepared to function under conditions of mobilization.

Professional Military and Conscripts in Different Roles

It was in this context that he made one of the most important references in his speech. According to the Chief of the HNDGS, professional forces are structured so that they can meet high demands for continuous readiness and expeditionary operations, while conscript forces acquire particular importance when the objective is the defense of the national territory itself and the ability of a state to mobilize human resources on a large scale. This distinction, he explained, does not arise simply from economic or numerical limitations but constitutes a strategic choice.

An exclusively professional military, no matter how well-trained and technologically advanced it may be, can hardly create on its own the scale of military power required by a generalized and prolonged conflict on the European continent. For the same reason, Mr. Houpis placed particular emphasis on the fact that mobilization cannot be considered merely a military process. It is primarily social. It requires citizens who understand that collective defense is not the exclusive responsibility of a professional military corps, but a responsibility that runs through society itself.

Citizens, according to this logic, must see themselves as part of the country’s defense architecture, and military service should not constitute an isolated period of their lives, but should be integrated into the institutional and social fabric.

The Chief of the HNDGS linked this perception to the ancient Greek tradition and the concept of the citizen who is simultaneously responsible for defending his city, referring to Homer: “There is one best omen: to defend your homeland.”

The reference was not used merely as a historical allusion. Mr. Houpis connected it to the fundamental position that defending the country is a shared responsibility and not a matter for a closed professional military elite.

The Return of Conscription to Europe

This discussion is already unfolding across Europe. Mr. Houpis noted that nine European Union member states currently maintain compulsory military service and that their number is increasing, reversing a trend of roughly two decades during which European countries moved toward smaller and fully professional militaries.

According to his analysis, this change reflects the recognition that professional forces alone cannot produce the scale of military power that would be required for Europe’s defense in a long-duration conflict. In Greece, the response is being attempted through “Agenda 2030” and the creation of a different active-reserve model, which the Chief of the HNDGS linked to the ancient Greek concept of the “Citizen-Soldier.”

The Conscripts to Defend Their Home Area

The first pillar of the new model concerns the geographical connection of the conscript, and subsequently the reservist, with their place of origin or permanent residence. The logic is that a reservist called upon to defend the geographical area in which they live, know and have personal ties has a different relationship with their mission than someone assigned to an area with no connection to their everyday life. This choice is also intended to preserve unit cohesion and create greater local defense capacity.

Military Service That Will Not Leave Technology at the Camp Gate

The second pillar concerns technology and, above all, the new generation of conscripts. Mr. Houpis acknowledged that members of Generation Z are more skeptical of military service that does not provide them with skills connected to their technological and professional reality. For this reason, under the planning he described, conscripts should have continuous contact with modern systems and acquire technological skills comparable, wherever possible, to those of professional personnel.

Military service, in this view, should not be perceived by a young person as an interruption to their professional and technological development, but as a period during which they can acquire additional knowledge and skills. Drones, cyberspace, Artificial Intelligence, and modern lethal as well as non-lethal systems are now incorporated into this process.

Operational Readiness Within 14 Weeks

He also made particular reference to the speed of training and integration into operational units. The goal, according to what he presented, is for 70% of conscripts to be able to reach operational readiness within the first 14 weeks. The logic behind this choice is that in a modern crisis, the period between training and actual operational deployment must be reduced as much as possible.

The new model therefore concerns not only how many citizens can be mobilized, but how quickly they can be transformed into genuinely usable military personnel.

Digital Mobilization and Cyber-Protected Infrastructure

The Chief of the HNDGS also linked mobilization to the digital transformation of the state. Digital platforms for notifying conscripts and reservists, personalized online training, distributed command capabilities and secure communications are, as he stressed, now basic prerequisites for a modern mobilization system. A state that does not have strong technological infrastructure protected against cyberattacks cannot carry out effective mobilization during a rapidly developing crisis. Mobilization is therefore now connected not only with camps and units but also with networks, data and the state’s ability to continue communicating and exercising command when its own digital infrastructure is under attack.

Women and Specializations the Military Cannot Maintain on Its Own

Part of the planning also involves the more systematic utilization of specialized civilians. Mr. Houpis referred to a pilot program for the recruitment of women, with the aim of employing them professionally in specific specialties, as well as to a broader model through which expertise existing in the private sector can be incorporated into the country’s defense needs.

Cybersecurity, data analysis, telecommunications and logistics are characteristic examples. Modern Armed Forces need specialists in these fields, but it is not always financially or operationally feasible for them to maintain all of this personnel permanently within their ranks. The creation of contractual relationships with specialized professionals already during peacetime can, according to the Chief of the HNDGS, create a pool of people who can be rapidly mobilized when needed.

From the Military to “Total Defense”

The same philosophy extends to infrastructure. Mr. Houpis referred to the “total defense” or “whole-of-society defense” model, according to which military and civilian structures can no longer be designed as two parallel worlds. In a prolonged war, the Armed Forces depend on civilian ports, roads, railways, telecommunications, industries and supply chains.

At the same time, these very infrastructures can become targets of cyberattacks or precision strikes. Greece, he said, is therefore moving toward a dual-use infrastructure model. Military facilities, transportation hubs, government cloud systems and industrial capabilities can serve civilian needs in peacetime and be transformed into critical elements of military mobilization during a crisis.

The Window of the Next Three to Five Years

Concluding his intervention, the Chief of the HNDGS placed the discussion within a specific time horizon. He estimated that countries that manage, over the next three to five years, to integrate new technology, active reserves, civilian infrastructure and specialized human resources into a unified defense system will have created, by 2035, much stronger overall deterrence capabilities. By contrast, those that remain attached to Cold War-era mobilization models risk having numerically large but technologically inferior forces.

For Mr. Houpis, the issue is no longer exclusively military, nor can it be addressed solely through new weapons systems. It requires changes in training, infrastructure, the Armed Forces and, above all, in the relationship of the citizen themselves with the concept of defense. In a Europe where, as he characteristically put it, “Geography produces History,” military mobilization is evolving into a test not only for armies but for the ability of societies themselves to prepare in time for a security environment that has already changed.