European Central Bank Chief Mario Draghi met with the press following the ECB Governing Council of central bankers yesterday, attended by Greece’s Bank of Greece Governor Yannis Stournaras. During press questiontime most of the conversation was dominated by interest in Greece.

Question: Mr Draghi, could you explain to us what the Governing Council means by sustained adjustment in the path of inflation? That seems to be the criteria for success of your asset purchase programme.

My second question is about Greece. The Greek government would like to be able to fund its short-term obligations by issuing more T-bills. The ECB has one of these T-bill limits in its control, namely the ceiling that is set on T-bills that can be placed as collateral. My question is, would you be willing, or would the Governing Council be willing, to raise this ceiling at some point, and under what conditions?

Draghi: The sustained improvement, it just says what it says. There is no other way to answer your first question. In other words, a material dislocation from the foreseen objective would be the criteria, but at this point in time, we see absolutely no reason to think or plan or act in any different way from what we’ve planned, namely the purchasing of €60 billion a month of securities until September 2016, or beyond, if needed.

On your second point, a quick answer to your question is the following. The ECB is a rule-based institution. It’s not a political institution. One of the rules that we comply with is contained in the Treaty, and it’s Article 123, and it’s the prohibition of monetary financing. Monetary financing is when the central bank of a country prints money to buy the government bonds in the primary market of that country, and it could be either direct or indirect, when banks bring collateral to the ECB in order to be financed in order to buy the sovereign debt of that country, and we are prohibited from doing that.

Question: There are more and more government bond yields that have turned negative in the eurozone. You said in January that negative bond yields wouldn’t prohibit you from doing QE, but is there a limit to how low, how negative these bond yields can be in order for you to purchase bonds at a negative yield?

My second question is, we’ve seen a major impact in the financial markets from the run-up to QE, the QE decision, equity prices at record highs, bond yields at record lows. Is there a danger that this policy is going to widen the wedge between the rich and the poor? People with access to financial markets are going to benefit, but the people in the eurozone who are without a job or are struggling might not see the fruits of the quantitative easing decision as much as people with access to the financial markets.

Draghi: First of all, let me say, our monetary policy decisions have worked, and it’s with a certain degree of satisfaction that the Governing Council has acknowledged this. The monetary policy decisions we are discussing today are the final set of measures of a series of decisions that have been taken starting in June last year, and we see that the objectives are gradually being attained. The market reaction to the announcement, the expectation first and the announcement second, of our asset purchase programme has also been quite effective and quite positive.

We haven’t even started, and a lively discussion about whether we’ll actually be able to do this has developed. It’s quite interesting that until a month ago, nobody had any doubt that public debt, sovereign debt in the euro area, was actually very, very big, and now some people worry that we won’t have enough bonds. Incidentally, I’m told that the very same statements were made when the US and the UK started their bond buying programme. But the bottom line of this is that there may be complexities. We think they’re not relevant. We observe that almost half of the euro bonds are outside the euro area and we also observe that the average weighted price of bonds in the 2 to 30-year maturity is well above par. It’s exactly 124%. So how negative do we go? Until the deposit rate.

The second question assumes that the improvements we see in the financial markets will never pass through to the real economy, but that’s exactly what we have not been observing over the last few months. As a matter of fact, in a more and more accelerated way, we’ve seen a decline, if not a steep fall, in the lending rates across the euro area, a significant decrease in dispersion in the lending rates. You know from previous press conferences that fragmentation on the funding side for the banking system has basically disappeared several months ago, but for quite a time, fragmentation on the lending side still remained. That has gone down a lot, and one can say now that all rates have converged quite well.

What we are seeing now is that these benefits from a very accommodative monetary policy stance are being passed in the form of lower borrowing costs to the real economy, to non-financial companies, to households. We see for example the credit flows to households have increased, and then we will see that the channels through which this asset purchase programme works will firm up, will strengthen the transmission through the usual signalling channel, confidence channel, interest rate channels, wealth effects, and exchange rate effect of course.

Question: Was there a solution in the recent past for the conditions to re-start the smooth financing of the Greek system? Could you perhaps elaborate more specifically on the conditions for the fiscal side and the type of reforms that a programme that you yourself think would be adequate guarantee, that would re-start the financing? Could you elaborate on that, please? That’s my first question.

My second question, the QE programme that you have announced pertains to purchases of sovereign bonds and also private. The four Greek systemic banks have been judged creditworthy after the stress test they went through. Does that mean that the Eurosystem could proceed to purchase securities, bonds or ABS of the Greek banks, or covered bonds, on those terms?

Draghi: Let me first say something that perhaps is not entirely known. The ECB up to today has lent to Greece €100 billion, and more exactly has doubled its lending from €50 billion to €100 billion in the last month and a half, the last two months. The lending to Greece today is 68% of the Greek GDP, which is the highest in the eurozone. In this sense, one can really say that the ECB is the central bank of Greece, but it’s also the central bank of all the other countries, and it’s a rules-based institution, as I have just recalled a moment ago. The ECB is the first to wish to re-start the financing to the Greek economy, provided the conditions are in place. And the conditions to be in place is that a process which suggests a successful completion of the review be put in place fast. That is the condition, and we will certainly welcome such development.

Going to your second question, right now, the ECB cannot buy Greek bonds. The purchase programme doesn’t foresee the purchase of private bonds. It cannot buy Greek bonds for a variety of reasons. First of all, the purchases are not supposed to take place for countries under a contract or a programme during the review period, so in this sense, we wouldn’t be able to buy Cypriot bonds either, or Greek bonds.

Secondly, we can only buy investment-grade bonds, and as such, the Greek bonds are below the threshold of investment-grade, so the waiver will have to be reinstated, and we are ready to do so, as soon as these conditions are in place.

Third, we have a limit of 33% per issuer’s bonds, so we cannot buy more than 33% of the bonds, of the total stock of bonds issued by the same sovereign, and our current SMP holdings are such that this limit is at present overcome, so we wouldn’t be able to buy these bonds. As soon as Greece repays the SMP bonds that are due, they’re coming due I believe in July or August, and if the waiver had been reinstated of course, then we would be able to buy Greek bonds via this new asset purchase programme.

Question: You’ve already outlined the financial accommodation you’ve offered to Greece. Much of it comes in the form of emergency liquidity assistance. Could you perhaps expand on the degree of willingness there would be to extend further emergency liquidity assistance towards Greece and if indeed today perhaps you’ve already decided to extend the limit beyond the current level?

Also, you talked about the need to respect the Stability and Growth Pact in the eurozone. Do you see a risk of, let’s say ill feeling in the eurozone if large countries are given additional flexibility and smaller countries on the periphery are required to stick to stricter limits in terms of spending?

Draghi: In fact, yes we’ve raised ELA today. That’s what the Governing Council has decided, by €500 million. As I said the ECB is a rules-based institution. From this viewpoint, the decision about lifting the waiver, as well as the decision not to allow monetary financing, and finally the decision about determining an ELA, are all the outcome of rules, not our political decisions.

ELA is a decision of the National Central Bank of Greece, to which the Governing Council may decide to object with a very special and demanding majority requirement, if certain conditions are not in place. One condition is that ELA can be given to solvent banks with adequate collateral. The Greek banks at the present time are solvent. Their capital levels are well above the minimum requirements, and that’s positive news. A lot has been done by Greece to strengthen its banking system. Capital has been raised. There has been restructuring. There has been consolidation. Some of the NPL, the non-performing loan problems, have been addressed so, today, the Greek banking system is solvent and is key to providing credit to the Greek economy.

It’s absolutely essential that this solvency be maintained, because that is the precondition for the ECB to be able to allow ELA, and therefore financing to the economy, financing to companies and households in Greece, and the private sector in Greece. And this is important, and I’m saying this because if there is in place a certain communication that creates volatility in the markets, this communication destroys collateral, increases the spreads and destroys collateral, undermines the solvency of the Greek banking system. Communication is absolutely essential.

That’s the most important thing that we can do today, to preserve the solvency and the robustness of the Greek banking system, and also to this extent, the ECB has asked the Eurogroup members to make sure that the recapitalisation fund of something around €10 billion be readily available to face any sudden negative contingency that might materialise. The ECB has presented this request. Some language in the last Eurogroup statement reflects this request by the ECB.

I don’t want to comment on the ill feelings, but certainly, what I would suggest is you go back to the last 15-plus years and look at which countries have been in the excessive deficit procedure most often, over the last, say, 15, 16, 17 years, and then draw a conclusion from there. But to address your point, there is a sentence here that says, full and consistent. Consistent implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact is key for confidence in our fiscal framework.

Question: I know that you have already made a statement, but still, I want to know, what would be the immediate impact or benefit for Cyprus from the QE programme? Can Cyprus benefit from the policy immediately? Of course also for Mrs. Georghadji.

Georghadji: As President Draghi explained, countries like Cyprus, which are under a programme, to get benefit from the programme, they must have a positive review by the Troika, or the institutions, whatever you like. Unfortunately, as you know, the Fifth Review of the Cyprus economy has not been concluded yet, and this is because the law for the foreclosures has not been put into effect. When there is a positive review, we will be able to start immediately and get the benefit of the programme. According to the parameters of the programme, then the Cyprus economy can benefit up to €500 million throughout the effect of the programme.

The programme, as President Draghi said in his initial statement, will start on 9 March, and it will go at least until September 2016. This programme will have a very beneficial impact for Cyprus, as it will suppress the interest rates, and suppress the interest rates downwards, and therefore, the Cypriot government will be able to borrow at lower rates. This is the big benefit from the programme, and therefore, we look forward to taking part in this programme.

Question: In the last weeks, we have seen negative yields in public debt, in some public debts. In Germany, even five-year bonds are in negative territory.. Do you think these countries, Germany in particular, should use this new fiscal space to guarantee the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism?

And a second question if I may. Did you take the decision about the Greek waiver in February based on your doubts of the successful conclusion of the programme? Why is the extension agreed by the Eurogroup, and the list of reforms sent by Mr Varoufakis, not enough?

Draghi: Let me step back. We decided to have a waiver in place at the time when there were reasonable assessments for a successful completion of the review of the programme. In other words, by and large, the programme was on track.

Let me explain why this is so. We have this rule that says we can’t accept as collateral bonds that are below a certain threshold. The Greek bonds at the present time, and were even then, below this threshold. However, if certain conditions are in place, as far as the economic policy is concerned, that would make the ECB and the Governing Council think that in some time from now these bonds will become again eligible, will be rated above the threshold. Then there are the conditions for the waiver. And that’s the decision taken at that time.

Then we assessed that these conditions were not in place. It’s quite clear that in mid-February when we decided this, the programme was not on track. It was not only an assessment that we were making; it was an assessment explicitly stated by the government. So at that point we really had no choice.

Having said that, we stand ready to reinstate the waiver as soon as we are able to make a positive assessment about the likelihood of a successful completion of the review.

On the first point, I frankly don’t want to pass judgement on specific individual countries’ fiscal policies. What I could say, however, is that the monetary policy measures that we decided in January, but also for the previous ones, to be fully effective, need first and foremost strong structural reforms. That is, otherwise we can provide as much credit as possible. We can refinance the banking system so they can lend as much money at the lowest interest rates. But if the structural conditions are not in place, there will be little incentive to use this credit.

I’m not saying that these measures are not effective. I’m saying that their effectiveness is going to be lower. And from our viewpoint, that means it’s going to take longer to get to our objective of price stability, namely an inflation that is close but below 2% in the medium term.

Question: I will speak in Greek once again, Mr. President. I would like to ask, I heard you say, and I was glad to hear you say, that you’ve approved 100 billion euros liquidity to our country. But we see that in the last 20 days, you say that you decided this based on political criteria. The question is, since the liquidity goes to the banks firsts, the Greek banks, are they safe?

And second, your decisions, up to which level are they affected by the political decisions of the ministers of the Eurogroup?

Draghi: You rightly said, you rightly reminded us that the ECB has already lent – not liquidity – just lent 100 billion euros. And I repeat, it’s 68% of Greece’s GDP, and it’s the highest in the whole euro zone. And it has doubled this amount in the last two months. So the last thing one can say is that the ECB is not supporting Greece.

Now you asked the question to what extent our decisions depend on what happens in the Eurogroup. The answer is, to an enormous extent. If there is an agreement – called contract, call it whatever you want – our underlying, our background changes completely, and we would be much better in place to take favourable, more favourable, decisions for Greece.

And you know, the reasoning really goes this way. First of all, once a country has a contract, then disbursements could take place, could be restored by the member states. Then market access could be restored. If there is market access, many of our concerns about monetary financing would disappear because if the government has the capacity to finance itself on the market then the issue of having banks financing the government would disappear.

So the ultimate result of all this is that flexibility to the Greek government economic policy would return within the contract that the Greek government would define with the other members of the Eurogroup.

Question: From what I can see from the opening statement, it seems that the inflation forecasts are based in large part on the futures market, getting it right about the direction of oil prices. But we’re still in an environment where core inflation is at an all-time low. Can you tell me a little bit about how you see the path of core inflation developing over the forecast horizon? Just a forecast for 2016, is it more a reflection of the bounce-back from oil prices? Or now that you’re more bullish on the economy, does it affect core inflation as well?

Second question to both yourself and the governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus. It’s almost two years now since the haircut and capital controls were imposed on Cypriot depositors. Knowing what’s happened since then, do you think it’s a decision you’d take again?

Draghi: I will first answer my question, and then the governor will answer the other question. You are absolutely right. Core inflation is still low, although we noticed just today that one of our measures of inflation expectations is now back to a fairly high level. I wouldn’t say an all-time high, certainly not, but a three-month or four-month high, yes, I’m pretty sure. So that is another piece of news. But I wouldn’t rely too much on point observations because as they come they also go.

What we can say safely is that our monetary policy decisions, this one but also the previous ones, have stopped a decline in inflation expectations that had started at the end of July last year, and it became more and more marked by year-end.

Now, it is true that our projections of inflation are basically, as you said, based on oil price futures, but also there are other factors which play a role for core inflation. One, of course, is again our monetary policy stance and its effects on the exchange rate. The second one is the closing of the output gap that we foresee happening gradually between now and 2017. Another factor is that real disposable income is being supported, again, not only by oil prices but also by our monetary policy stance.

And here the channel through which this may happen is the following. Our monetary policy decisions have significantly decreased the risk of second round effects coming from lower oil prices on inflation. You remember, when we discussed the effects of lower oil prices a few months ago, we said they were a good thing, but also there was a potential negative side to that if these effects produced second round effects which could have a deflationary impact. Then people will actually save more and consume less. We believe that our monetary policy decisions have avoided this risk. Therefore, we foresee a savings rate which remains what it is today, a recovery where consumption gradually strengthens and firms up. Now all these factors will have an impact on core inflation as well.

Georghadji: The decisions were taken in March 2013, two years ago, and they were very painful for the country and for its people. However, it is my view that under the then circumstances, there was no other way. We should have taken measures long before the very difficult decisions were taken.

Now the question with regard to the capital controls. Capital controls also were inevitable until the restoration of the confidence in the banking sector. But it was a decision taken by the minister of finance after consultation with the Governor of the Central Bank. And I can assure you that it is the view of the minister, of the government and of the Governor that these capital controls, the very few capital controls which are still in place, very few, only two or three measures, will be very soon lifted, before the end of the first quarter of the year.

Question: Mr Draghi, if I understood you correctly, you said that during a review no programme country could participate in the QE. But don’t you think it’s a bit suspicious on behalf of the ECB, why during those 15 days no QE would be allowed for a country under the programme?

And my second question is, you yourself last night during the dinner with the President of the Republic referred to Cyprus’ good record of programme implementation. Given this positive assessment by you, is the ECB considering approving the request submitted by the government of Cyprus for the conversion of the ELA, the emergency liquidity funding of Bank of Cyprus, to a long-term bond?

Draghi: On the first issue, it’s the same condition we have with OMT. During a review process, we don’t want to influence the review process via conditions that are special conditions for market access of the country. So it would be an element which would interfere with the negotiations. So that is a standard rule that we have in place, that we have in place with OMT as well.

On the second point, I’m not sure I know anything about that. But I’ll give the floor to the governor.

Georghadji: With regard to the first question, let me add to what President Draghi has said, that one prerequisite to participate in the programme is that you have a positive review. Therefore, during the review period you cannot participate in the programme anyway since you need to have a positive review.

With regard to the second question concerning ELA, of course President Draghi was there in the meeting with the President. And we have to remind you that, as he said twice during his opening speech, the ECB is a rules-based institution and ELA is extended under a framework and rules of the ECB. Within these rules I can assure you that both the governor, the central bank and the government is doing the best for the country.

Question: My question is this. Greece and Cyprus are the only two countries that, at this moment, cannot participate in the QE programme, despite their favourable assessment. For Cyprus, the assessment is open up to the summer. How long do you think the Cyprus economy can last for this assessment?

Georghadji: We believe, we expect, we anticipate that the obstacle that exists for the completion of the fifth review, the law on foreclosures, the obstacle that exists will be lifted and we will be able to participate in the QE programme. I hope that that will happen soon. There could not be any waiver or exception to that.