Free from the institutional “constraints” of her role as Federal Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel presented her political autobiography yesterday, titled Freedom, revealing previously unknown aspects and details of the 2009 crisis, Greece‘s retention in the eurozone, and ultimately the rescue of the common currency.

Ten years after the dramatic summer of 2015 and on the eve of the anniversary of the Greek referendum, the central figure of the “Greek drama” appeared yesterday on the stage of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center, free from the formal conduct of German politics, rested and smiling, and visibly moved—if not moving—as she spoke candidly with Kathimerini’s editor-in-chief, Alexis Papachelas, about the now-historic events of the Greek crisis and the new international order.

The “Bitter” Greek Wine

Wearing her signature blazer, though in a noticeably more relaxed and summery shade, Angela Merkel appeared to enjoy the audience’s warm applause from the moment she entered the venue—a gesture that acknowledged her role in keeping Greece within the eurozone. In a rare confessional tone, she spoke about her youth and a trip to Bulgaria, during which she saw Greece from afar for the first time. She reiterated her longstanding view of Greece as the “cradle of democracy,” shared her fondness for Greek wine, and reflected on the pivotal role Athens played during her 16-year tenure as Chancellor.

Her time at the helm of Germany was closely intertwined with the evolution of the Eurozone crisis. Merkel’s political career inevitably brought her closer to the Greek people and to everything said and written about her during the crisis, both in domestic and international media. Yet, she did not overlook the hardships endured by the Greek people—hardships she doubted the German people could have withstood, as in the case of capital controls.

Expressive and sincere—beyond the usual formal demeanor of a Chancellor—Merkel shared her current worldview. She identified herself as a proponent of Realpolitik in regard to her relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, referenced renowned international relations thinker Henry Kissinger and the containment of China during Nixon’s era, to emphasize Europe’s need to maintain communication channels even with countries like Russia. Above all, she stressed the power of a united Europe, repeating three times that EU member states must not underestimate their collective “firepower.”

Alone Among Allies

Above all, however, Europe’s “Iron Lady” recounted unknown episodes from the Greek crisis and her desperate efforts to keep Greece in the euro—even when her allies in this endeavor were few and not necessarily German. Both her Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and her Social Democrat coalition partner Sigmar Gabriel supported Grexit. On Merkel’s side stood French President François Hollande and U.S. President Barack Obama, even though the latter struggled to grasp the structural complexities of the European project.

Citing 2011 as a turning point—when she “decided” on saving Greece—Merkel admitted she only realized the true scale of the problem relatively late, in February 2010, and from that point on acted in favor of Greece staying in the eurozone, partly driven by… memory. She repeatedly referred to her experiences from the former East Germany, the “dictatorship” experienced by Eastern Bloc countries, and the collapse of the USSR—an event she considers positive, while Russian President Vladimir Putin deems it the “greatest catastrophe” of the 20th century.

The Memory of East Germany

“I knew Greece had a very tough road ahead,” Merkel said. “I knew I was anything but popular in the country,” she admitted to the Greek audience. “But I come from East Germany. That was my experience. I had a firsthand understanding of what 20–30% youth unemployment really means,” she added, noting that this awareness motivated her to help prevent a similar social crisis like the one caused by the Soviet Union’s collapse. This desire to prevent history from repeating itself proved decisive for Merkel—even though, as she admitted, “they treated me like a sick horse,” referring to her European partners, and “they called me crazy” when she insisted on a haircut of the Greek debt.

“In February 2010, it became clear that the problem was indeed serious. They told me that Greece needed money,” Merkel said, adding that due to the “no bailout clause” in the euro framework, “I couldn’t just give money.”

“I asked George Papandreou, ‘What do you want?’ and he replied, ‘Nothing.’ During the meeting, the Greek Prime Minister remained silent. We were having intense discussions, and I looked like the villain saying, ‘I can’t give money.’ Then European Council President Herman Van Rompuy interrupted the session and wrote down a few phrases: ‘Greece will do what’s necessary, we will support, and the euro is our common currency.’”

“I decided in 2011 that we had to do everything in our power to keep Greece in the eurozone,” Merkel said, also noting, “The negotiations after Alexis Tsipras’ referendum were extremely difficult.”

“Knowing that Schäuble wanted Greece out of the euro, I called him every hour to inform him of the situation because I wanted those decisions to be made jointly with my Finance Minister,” she concluded.

Referring to Antonis Samaras, she noted:
“I was the ‘bad cop’ during that period. I didn’t do anything to annoy anyone, but because I believed the country needed to get back on the right track.

We were friends on a political and party level, but we often had conflicting views.

I stood by Samaras because I believed a debt haircut was necessary (as did Schäuble), but [ECB President] Trichet said that if you do something like that, the entire financial world would lose confidence in the eurozone. I believed Greece needed to be relieved of that burden, but the other side also had arguments.”

“I saw Tsipras and said, ‘God help us’”

Referring to her impressions of Alexis Tsipras when they first met, Merkel said:
“I don’t think the first meeting was that impressive—it was in Brussels. Then I invited him to Berlin, and the atmosphere was tense. He went and greeted demonstrators outside the Chancellery, his party comrades…

I said to myself, ‘God help us!’ We hoped he would come around. Eventually, he did. As we walked toward the guard of honor, I told him, ‘That was a bold move,’ and he replied that one must engage with their supporters.

Step by step, we came closer. He viewed privatizations as evil—it wasn’t easy…”

The 17-hour negotiation

“I didn’t want Greece to leave the euro, and he (Tsipras) didn’t want a bailout. It was the most surprising phone call of my political career—and one of the quietest,” she said, referring to how Tsipras informed her of the upcoming referendum.
Just hours earlier, Tsipras had refused to accept the agreement with Greece’s creditors.
Merkel asked him what he would do, and Tsipras replied, “I’ll return to my country and speak with my government and party.”
“And what will the outcome be?” Merkel asked.
“I don’t know,” Tsipras replied.
The outcome of that conversation in Athens was the announcement of a referendum.
“What is your recommendation?” Merkel asked.
“Of course, ‘No’,” Tsipras replied.
“That’s when I lost my voice,” said Merkel.
We ended the call very quickly after that. Hollande asked me, “What now?”
If the result was ‘No’, we said that meant Greece would exit the eurozone. Greece had not agreed, and we said that one democracy could not decide for all the others.
She then referred to the events after the referendum, reiterating her appreciation for the high quality of the Greek negotiating team that agreed to the third bailout.

“I cried, I was under great pressure”

“Obama didn’t fully understand the legal aspects, the ECB’s goals. The U.S. Federal Reserve has different responsibilities. He didn’t know everything—at some point, I cried, I was under a lot of pressure.

He wanted us to tell the ECB to release more liquidity. My advisors told me I couldn’t do that; German courts wouldn’t even accept it—and I told Obama that.

[ECB President] Draghi created the ‘bazooka’ and said, ‘whatever it takes.’ He did that on his own.”

The refugee crisis in Greece was dramatic

“Every day, 10,000 new refugees arrived, so something had to be done.
We could have prevented them from entering Germany through Austria, but that wasn’t enough. That’s why I supported the EU-Turkey plan. The situation in Greece was dramatic. Turkey did nothing.
95% of the refugees weren’t entering the EU. In exchange, Turkey received funding. The pressure at the time was immense.

They invited me to Istanbul—I went to that palace, the chairs were impressive—but I had to act. Politics is realpolitik. I was obliged to speak with Erdoğan.

I’m glad that Europe has progressed and established a common asylum system. Those who haven’t been granted asylum must be returned to their countries. The goal to fight smugglers is absolutely right.”

The crisis with Turkey

“We must always talk with our neighbors.
Especially since our maritime borders can’t be protected by Frontex alone.
Was a Greek-Turkish incident avoided? Yes, there were tensions. We tried many times to mediate.
In these talks, I realized how difficult it was to find common ground.
Because relations between Greece and Turkey were often quite hostile.
I tried to contribute, but only with half-steps can we succeed.”

Putin, the USSR, and the War in Ukraine

For Putin, the dissolution of the USSR was the worst event of the 20th century, and I told him that for me, it was the happiest moment of my life. Our perspectives were completely different. Putin still has the idea that Russia must exert influence over those countries (Ukraine and Belarus). From the perspective of international law, what he did in February 2022 violated all the principles of international law.

Together with [then French President] Sarkozy, I was against the NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia — in Bucharest in 2008.

Russia is not disappearing from the map, and it remains the largest nuclear power in the world — I cannot ignore that.

We wanted a partnership with Russia, and we made that effort. With the invasion in February 2022, we entered a new era.

I have no relationship with Putin now. We always had major disagreements, but in the case of Crimea, he lied to me once or twice — and that changed our relationship.

With Trump, everything is a deal

“Trump was elected by the American people, and we have to deal with him. And we Europeans are also an entity — we must not underestimate ourselves.

Everything is a deal to him.

But the world doesn’t work that way.

It’s extremely difficult to achieve shared outcomes with Trump.

This isn’t good news — I am convinced of that.

He was always thinking of something that would grab everyone’s attention.

I made the mistake of saying: ‘Donald, we need to shake hands’ — but he didn’t do it.

He always tried to distract everyone so the spotlight would be on him.”
I was impressed by how the Greeks endured the €60 limit – Germans wouldn’t have managed

Asked, “What would you say to the average Greek today if you met them on the street?”, she replied:

“I wouldn’t apologize — I presented my motives. I would say we achieved a lot. I cannot imagine the EU without Greece.”

“I was genuinely impressed by the resilience of Greek society, especially during that most difficult time of the referendum, when people could withdraw only €60 a day from the bank. I remember thinking: Germans wouldn’t have withstood that…”