The Eastern Mediterranean is becoming an open front of geopolitical tension, with Turkey attempting to freeze critical projects of strategic importance to Greece and Cyprus. From the Crete-Cyprus-Israel (GSI) electricity interconnection to the EMC telecommunications cable, Ankara is escalating its obstruction of international infrastructure, unilaterally invoking Turkey’s continental shelf and creating conditions of direct challenge to European and transnationally agreed projects.

Following the systematic harassment of the Greece-Cyprus-Israel (GSI) energy cable, the EMC undersea fibre optic cable, which connects Saudi Arabia to Europe, has now also come under fire.

Although the two projects differ in scope – electrical interconnection the first, telecommunications cable the second – Turkey is using the same rhetoric about the “Turkish continental shelf”, attempting to block or redefine their geographical route. And it is a clear message to the Greek side, which seems to have sought to restart the submarine cable from the autumn, while casting a heavy shadow on other projects of Greek interest, focusing on the electrical interconnections in the Dodecanese and the Eastern Aegean, which are part of the large investment program of ADMIE for the interconnection of the islands with the mainland system.

The new challenge from Ankara comes at a time when the tug-of-war over the GSI is entering a critical phase, galvanising French firm Nexans, which is implementing the big €1.4 billion contract for its construction. The latter – after months of silence and support for the project – is now raising serious questions about its viability, putting forward a Plan B with great realism.

New round of harassment

The case of the €850 million East to Med Data Corridor (EMC) telecoms cable, which is being built by a consortium led by Saudi Tekecom, with PPC’s 20% stake, shows that Ankara is determined to escalate its provocations on a project intended to connect Europe to the Middle East, even putting pressure on third countries that cooperate with Athens or Nicosia (Saudi Arabia).

The Gibraltar-flagged research vessel“Fugro Gauss”, which was conducting preliminary surveys last Wednesday in the maritime zone south of Cyprus, and with a NAVTEX from the Ministry of Maritime Affairs, was confronted with a Turkish anti-NAVTEX and the deployment of naval and air forces from the Turkish side. The episode evokes memories of a similar escalation against GSI’s seabed surveys last summer in the sensitive area between Kasos and Karpathos, where Ankara is unilaterally asserting sovereign rights, challenging the median line between the islands and Anatolia.

Behind the rhetoric about the “Turkish continental shelf” lies a consistent strategy of preventing the implementation of international projects that strengthen the strategic footprint of Greece, Cyprus and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, projects that bypass Turkey and threaten to establish a different security and interconnectivity architecture. It is no coincidence, after all, that Agyra is rapidly rushing to connect the country to the occupied territories of Cyprus, planning the electrical interconnection of the two sides at a time when the Republic of Cyprus is raising continuous obstacles to the major electrical interconnection with Crete that will lift its energy isolation.

In a recent interview, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis said the projects would start “when the geopolitical conditions are right and when the final outstanding issues with Cyprus are closed”. However, Turkey’s undermining attitude to major infrastructure projects – requiring them to have its approval – raises serious doubts about how feasible this approach can be. All the more so as both projects show almost parallel paths since they follow a similar route (through the waters of Kasos) and have the same builder. GSI has Nexans, and EMC has Alcatel and Submarine Networks, which is part of the Nexans group.

GSI: Pending decisions

Construction of the Great Sea Interconnector has partially started, mainly on the undersea cable between Crete and Cyprus. According to Nexans’ assurances, work has been progressing normally until recently, although marine exploration has been frozen since July 2024, when Turkey intervened in the Karpathos area.

ADMIE, the official developer of the project since October 2023, has spent around €300 million on the construction of the cable and the acquisition of the project from the Cypriot company Euroasia Interconnector, which was the previous owner. Most of it comes from European Commission funding (€657 million in total).

The majority of the funding is from the European Commission.

However, the continuation of the project is uncertain due to both geopolitical instability and successive obstacles put up by Turkey and the absence of regulatory approvals from the Cypriot RAEK. Four teleconferences had to be convened by the EU in the last two months to convince Nicosia to implement the intergovernmental agreement with Greece signed last September, which provided for its participation in the project with €25 million per year for the next five years during its construction.

Three times the Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority has refused to give a positive signal on the payment of the revenue, citing GSI’s reservations and geopolitical risks. At the fourth teleconference held in late July, the PAC gave the green light but when the decision was made known to Cyprus, Finance Minister Makis Kerianos railed against the project, saying the Republic of Cyprus was preparing to throw 125 million in the wastebasket at a time when the country was plagued by the worst fires in its history.

Nexans

The loudest indication that the GSI is teetering dangerously on a thin rope and is in danger of permanent cancellation came from France’s own Nexans. In a recent statement, the company makes it clear that all the high-voltage direct current (HVDC) cables it has already built for the project have been paid for in full, which exempts it from any financial exposure in the event of delays, modifications or even cancellation of the project.

At the same time, Nexans is putting its cards on the table and stressing that its HVDC technology remains in strong international demand, allowing for the immediate redirection of its production capacity to other projects already underway or planned – in Northern Europe, the Middle East, the US, etc. The company’s management took a similar stance in front of analysts a few days ago, during the presentation of the half-year financial results, saying that the landscape will clear before September, so that the company can put the implementation of alternatives on the table.

Nexans’ statement attempts to dispel any doubts about the strategic and financial nature of its participation in GSI, implicitly responding to rumors or concerns about the project’s progress. Behind the careful wording of the French, the markets read the message clearly: Nexans leaves open the possibility of releasing the GSI materials and transferring them to other projects.

Nexans’ stance is sharp, but not unjustified. The GSI project represents 20% of the company’s backlog, which is under pressure from shareholders to ensure predictability in its revenues. Repeated delays, back and forth on the Cypriot side, and uncertainty over regulatory approvals have led Nexans into a “wait and see” mod,e but not for much longer. And that’s one reading for the project.

The other is that even if this route is chosen (of carrying the cable), its implementation will not be easy. It requires actions and understandings on the ways of repayment of costs on the part of the ADMIE and possibly triggering clauses for breach of contract that will likely add additional costs. It should also be noted that in order to share the cost of the project between the two countries, as provided for in last year’s agreement between Greece and Cyprus, there needs to be a formal recognition that there is geopolitical unrest, an admission that, for obvious reasons, is not easy to make.

At the same time, the lack of geopolitical stability has discouraged key project partners. The US has expressed general and vague support for the cable, something that was reportedly expressed during a recent meeting between Environment Minister Stavros Papastavrou and US Embassy staffer Josh Huck. To date, however, the US side has discreetly avoided any public reference to the project. On the other hand, Israel too, which appears to be an ally of the project – the other GSI player – seems to be looking for other solutions by promoting bilateral interconnection with Cyprus as part of the IMEC (India – Middle East – Europe Corridor), a new strategic infrastructure with an American stamp that competes with the Chinese Silk Road.

What’s next

The future of the GSI hangs on a delicate balance of political decisions, regulatory approvals and geopolitical will. GSI has made it clear that without an approved revenue stream it will not make any new disbursements. Nexans says it is ready to abandon the project, Cyprus appears ambivalent and Turkey is stepping up its provocations.

As competent sources observe, the fate of both projects (GSI and EMC) no longer depends not only on technical or economic factors, but primarily on the will of the governments to defend their strategic planning against revisionist pressures and diplomatic manoeuvres.

Turkey’s constant interventions reveal that these projects go beyond the boundaries of infrastructure and turn into symbolic and substantial breakthroughs in the geopolitical game of the Eastern Mediterranean. Europe is called upon to give practical support to energy and digital interconnectivity in the region, not only as an energy security option but as a statement of sovereignty and strategic autonomy. If decisions are not taken in time, the window of opportunity may close for good at a cost that will not only be economic.