Greek-Turkish relations are operating in the vacuum left by the cancellation of the planned Mitsotakis–Erdogan meeting, with the next steps expected to reveal whether this was an isolated incident—reflecting Ankara’s lack of real interest in Greek-Turkish matters—or a move signaling a shift in Turkey’s stance after Erdogan secured an invitation to the White House.

Athens notes that Trump’s praise of Erdogan did not come with anything tangible for Turkey. There was no joint statement indicating Erdogan had won more than compliments for his “personality.” Erdogan himself appeared notably reserved when briefing on the meeting, not even mentioning Turkey’s return to the F-35 program.

At the same time, Athens believes a Trump–Mitsotakis meeting won’t be far off, given the Greek prime minister’s good communication with the U.S. president.

Athens downplays the cancellation of the Mitsotakis–Erdogan meeting—acknowledging that Erdogan’s reason was genuine, not a pretext, as it related to his participation in Trump’s meeting with Muslim leaders of the Middle East. For the same reason, Erdogan also canceled a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.

Expectations for the Mitsotakis–Erdogan meeting were low anyway, given the limited scope for rapprochement in recent months. The goal was simply a calming encounter between the two leaders amid rising tensions. Mitsotakis planned to raise the demand for Turkey to revoke its casus belli in order to join the SAFE program, and he had no interest in a meeting that would end as a mere photo opportunity.

Ankara has also indicated Erdogan will not attend the informal EU summit in Copenhagen, so the rescheduled meeting is not yet on the table.

The Trump–Erdogan Meeting

The turning point for Turkey seems to have been Erdogan’s invitation to the White House and, importantly, his inclusion in the group of Arab and Muslim countries negotiating with Trump over the Gaza war. Sources say Turkey even proposed a new meeting with Mitsotakis the next day, but the Greek prime minister’s schedule was already full.

At the UN General Assembly, Erdogan’s top priority was to present himself and Turkey as the protector of Palestinian and Muslim interests, showing that even Israel’s strongest backer—Trump—was willing to accept that role.

This framed Erdogan’s entire New York presence, just before his long-anticipated return to the White House after six years. Though criticized by the opposition for “buying” his invitation through major trade deals, neither he nor Trump seemed concerned. Erdogan’s goals are now clear: lift restrictions on defense sales and secure U.S. guarantees to restrain Israel in Syria, avoiding direct confrontation between Ankara and Tel Aviv.

Despite Trump’s warm words, the meeting left Ankara with many questions over whether the positive atmosphere would translate into concrete results.

At Trump’s Side

As significant as the Oval Office photo-op was Erdogan’s appearance beside Trump two days earlier in a meeting with Arab and Muslim leaders on Gaza—symbolically casting him as a co-chair. This was a last-minute shift, as Qatar was initially supposed to fill that role. This meeting broke the ice with Trump, smoothing the way for their White House encounter.

Notably, after railing against Israel at the UNGA, Erdogan avoided any anti-Israel rhetoric at the Oval Office, aware such remarks would provoke Trump.

Meanwhile, Trump is hosting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House today, where his Gaza peace initiative will take shape—with Israel’s role central, despite Trump’s earlier warning to Netanyahu not to annex the West Bank.

A Test of Manipulation

The White House meeting allowed Trump to showcase his ability to handle and control a difficult foreign leader often at odds with the West.

Erdogan arrived bearing “gifts”: pledges to buy 200 civilian aircraft, U.S. LNG, modular nuclear reactors, and defense equipment. Yet this wasn’t enough. Trump repeated that F-35 sales depend on specific conditions, with the S-400 missile issue still unresolved. He even suggested Patriot missile sales, but only if Turkey withdraws its S-400s—an extremely difficult choice for Erdogan, given the costs and diplomatic risks of abandoning Moscow.

Trump also pressed Turkey to stop buying Russian oil and gas, critical to its energy needs and Erdogan’s ties with Putin. Even the nuclear cooperation offer was framed as a counterweight to Turkey’s dependence on Russia for the Akkuyu plant.

Erdogan thus realized that flattery alone would not suffice with Trump: every small concession required major trade-offs, and any double game with Russia, China, or Hamas would be dangerous.

Still, Erdogan may claim he withstood the pressure, ended his isolation under Biden, and reestablished Turkey’s role—now with Trump’s approval—in shaping Middle East security.

Greek-Turkish Angle

Against this volatile backdrop, Greek-Turkish relations remain precarious. Erdogan’s UNGA speech made clear: no project excluding Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean will be implemented; Turkey has rights west of Cyprus; and the two-state solution—not federation—is the only option for Cyprus.

This statement signaled that Turkey’s focus on Gaza does not mean reduced interest in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The key pending issue is the Cyprus–Crete electricity interconnection—a major test for maintaining calm. Mitsotakis and Cypriot President Christodoulides have aligned on continuing the project, but tensions remain.

Cyprus has set aside €50 million for the project but wants exploratory surveys to resume, which Turkey blocked in July 2024. Greece is ready for this, with plans for the research vessel to notify all coastal states—implicitly including Turkey, which could respond with its own NAVTEX. This could spark a dangerous escalation despite efforts to keep tensions under control.

Cypriot sources say Nicosia even raised the possibility of delimiting an EEZ with Greece to unblock progress—an idea Athens rejected as too provocative toward Turkey.

Halki Seminary

Athens cautiously welcomed Trump’s reported request to Erdogan to reopen the Halki Theological Seminary, closed since 1971. Erdogan has repeatedly promised this but tied it to concessions in Thrace—an unacceptable linkage for Greece.

Despite Turkish statements that a legal framework for reopening has been found, only a political decision remains. Erdogan now faces the test of proving his Oval Office remark—that he will “do his part” for Halki—was sincere.