The “encirclement syndrome” is once again hovering over Turkey, triggered by the new strategic environment taking shape through the deepening cooperation between Greece, Cyprus and Israel—with the blessing of the United States—as well as by efforts to improve relations between Tel Aviv and Cairo, influencing Ankara’s overall strategic choices.

Turkey, by its own responsibility, has ruptured relations with both Israel and Egypt and, by maintaining its revisionist policy toward Greece and Cyprus, remains outside major realignments in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, in Libya it sees the absolute influence it once exercised beginning to wane.

Meanwhile, significant developments following the Zappeion Agreements on the Vertical Corridor—with Greece assuming a pivotal role in supplying Eastern Europe and Ukraine with U.S. LNG—are challenging the role Turkey had and sought to expand as a key hub for transporting energy from Russia and the Caspian to Europe.

The new landscape taking shape does not, of course, neutralize Turkey’s ability to react. Ankara clearly means what it declares at all levels: that “plans to bypass Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean will fail” and that it will not allow the implementation of projects that ignore and marginalize it.

The Greece–Israel agreement for the procurement of PULS missiles marks the first step in building the “Achilles’ Shield.”

The Greece–Cyprus–Israel Trilateral, taking place tomorrow, Monday, in Jerusalem, demonstrates the strategic resilience of this cooperation. It is the first such meeting after October 7 and confirms the depth this relationship has acquired as a factor of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The electricity interconnection

The Trilateral, which enjoys strong U.S. support—evidenced by the recent 3+1 meeting of energy ministers at the Zappeion—now expands into an extremely sensitive yet crucial chapter: cooperation in defense and armaments.

Closing

At a time of extremely delicate balances in the region, messages will also be sent to Ankara, which consistently adopts anti-Israeli rhetoric and seeks to gain a foothold in Gaza through an international stabilization force, while also aiming to legitimize its military presence in Syria.

Of particular interest are the discussions at the Trilateral regarding the continuation of energy cooperation among the three countries. At the very least, the GSI electricity interconnection has the support of all three countries and the EU. However, potential investors must now be convinced that there is no geopolitical risk stemming from Ankara’s threats, so that new capital can be secured for the project and a positive viability report produced—something announced by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides.

PULS and diplomacy

Athens is moving toward building the “Achilles’ Shield,” with a core of Israeli-made armaments—the first such procurement being the agreement for Elbit’s PULS missile systems. Joint training exercises between Greek and Israeli forces are frequent, including in areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, as are exercises between Israeli and Cypriot forces. As revealed by Israel’s Kan network, a meeting was held in Cyprus last week between the Chiefs of the Air Force of Greece and Israel and a representative of the National Guard, where cooperation and security threats in the Eastern Mediterranean were discussed.

Cyprus has already equipped itself with Israel’s Barak MX air-defense systems, strengthening its air defense for the first time since the failed 1998 attempt to acquire the S-300s, which ultimately ended up in Crete due to Turkish threats and U.S. pressure. The decision to lift the embargo on U.S. arms sales has also been renewed.

On the diplomatic front, Cyprus made a decisive move by completing and signing the agreement on the delimitation of maritime zones with Lebanon, a development that strongly irritated Ankara.

According to reports in the Turkish press, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with the Lebanese prime minister on the sidelines of the Doha Forum and conveyed Ankara’s view that this move constitutes an unfair violation of regional balances and a disregard for countries that believe they are directly involved in determining maritime boundaries in the region, such as Turkey.

Over the past week, the Cypriot government and President Christodoulides—who will assume the EU presidency for the first half of 2026 in 11 days—hosted the president of the United Arab Emirates, upgrading the strategic cooperation between the two countries. In Paris, Christodoulides also signed an agreement with French President Emmanuel Macron to upgrade Cyprus’s strategic relationship with France, moves that strengthen Nicosia’s diplomatic arsenal.

Israel–Egypt agreement

In the same context, it is of great interest that Israel gave the green light for the signing of the largest natural gas export agreement to date, worth $34.7 billion, with Egypt. This agreement, pushed by Washington, is believed to have been one of the major obstacles prior to arranging a Netanyahu–Sisi meeting, with U.S. mediation and presence—an event expected to reshape the landscape and have decisive consequences for the implementation of the second phase of the Trump Plan for Gaza.

Blow to the Turkey–Libya memorandum

Further west, Turkey—having just renewed the presence of its military forces in Libya under agreements with Tripoli—viewed as a negative development the statement by House Speaker Aguila Saleh that the Turkey–Libya Memorandum is invalid, not binding on the country, and therefore not subject to parliamentary ratification. Eastern Libya’s opposition to the memorandum has been known since 2019, arguing that the al-Sarraj government lacked legitimacy to sign such an agreement. However, Saleh’s statement is particularly significant given Turkey’s recent intense efforts in Benghazi—toward both parliament and General Khalifa Haftar—to secure ratification of the memorandum.

While the seasoned Libyan politician does not entirely close the door to Turkey—proposing dialogue between Libya, Greece, Egypt and Turkey on maritime delimitation, even adopting Turkish positions on delimitation between opposing continental coasts and ignoring islands—the renewed repudiation of the memorandum nonetheless dealt a blow to Ankara’s regional policy.

Energy losses

In Turkey, alarm bells are also ringing over the push by the Americans for the Vertical Corridor, which turns Greece into an energy transport hub along a route that bypasses the Black Sea and weakens Turkey’s former monopolistic role in transporting natural gas from Russia and the Caspian.

Although Turkey has developed a strong network with five LNG terminals and has already signed agreements to purchase U.S. LNG, it sees that the U.S. has made a clear strategic choice in favor of the Vertical Corridor—not only for natural gas transport, but also for goods and for supplying NATO forces in Central and Eastern Europe—something of particular importance given developments in Ukraine.

All these developments have created a heavy atmosphere, as the Turkish press rushes to magnify any news, such as the recent “report” about the formation of a joint rapid reaction brigade by Greece, Cyprus and Israel. Despite informal denials by the Greek side and an official denial by Cyprus via Defense Minister Vasilis Palmas, the story provided fodder for hysterical coverage in Turkey, further inflaming government sensitivities.

Athens is closely monitoring this accumulation of pressure, especially given the lack of active communication channels in recent months. Seeking de-escalation, it is pushing to renew the dialogue process. Proposals include resuming the Political Dialogue and the Positive Agenda in early 2026—possibly in January—followed by convening the High-Level Cooperation Council in Turkey and a Mitsotakis–Erdoğan meeting within the first quarter of the new year. These plans remain at the scheduling stage, however, noting that the Council had originally been planned for late 2024 and has since faced repeated postponements.

Behind the scenes on the F-35s

It is clear that removing the S-400s is a sine qua non for lifting CAATSA sanctions, forcing Erdoğan to seek alternatives. Even the latest scenario—returning the S-400s to Russia—would be extremely difficult for him, as it would confirm that purchasing them was a mistake, make it unlikely that the $2.5 billion paid would be recovered, and damage his credibility as a partner of Putin.

Israel has placed a veto on the sale of F-35s to Turkey, warning that such a move would undermine the U.S. commitment to maintaining Israel’s so-called “qualitative military edge” in the region. However, in the event of sanctions being lifted, reports suggest Israel has already prepared alternatives, asking the U.S. for additional advanced munitions and two squadrons of fighter jets—one with F-35s and one with F-15Is.

As Greece has already acquired Rafales, awaits its first F-35 deliveries, and strengthens its air defense—along with Cyprus—using advanced Israeli systems, Turkey remains excluded from the F-35 program. This reinforces a sense of isolation in the Eastern Mediterranean vis-à-vis a web of interlinked relationships among Greece, Israel and Cyprus, also connected to Lebanon, Egypt and Libya, creating an increasingly charged environment.

For now, Turkey is opting for a mild handling of the situation. However, Athens must be prepared for the moment when the Turkish leadership decides to act to prevent what it perceives as a reversal of balances in its vital space.

Photo: EUROKINISSI