New data and balances are also being shaped across the Aegean–Eastern Mediterranean arc by the crisis in Iran, as Greece and Cyprus strengthen their positions, while Ankara worries about Iran’s fate, the upgrading of the region’s strategic importance for Americans and Europeans, and at the same time it becomes clear that, despite the “miracle” of Turkey’s defense industry, the country was left “exposed” to missile threats.

The major challenges Turkey faces due to the war in Iran do not mean its attention will shift away from the Aegean. On the contrary, there is strong interest in how it will reshape its strategy to “correct” the failures and weaknesses of its defense policy so far, which place it at a disadvantage compared to its main regional rival, Israel.

This does not rule out that Turkey may soon covertly pursue nuclear deterrence. In relation to our region, it will likely attempt to prevent or overturn moves that Ankara considers efforts to impose faits accomplis against it.

Although the outcome and duration of the war in Iran remain unpredictable, Turkey realizes that its stance—no longer that of the “clever neutral,” since Erdogan himself clearly opposed the U.S.–Israeli operation against Iran—is not paying off, even though it will continue trying to present itself as a last-minute “mediator.”

Entrapment

However, the ideology of the Turkish leadership, and especially its projection of future regional competition with Israel, traps it in a passive waiting stance.

For Ankara, which had invested heavily in the second term of Donald Trump, the clear choice of the American president to side with Israel in a war like that in Iran is a serious blow—especially as signals suggest Washington aims to redesign the map from India to the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean, an area Turkey sees as its sphere of regional influence.

Security threats for Turkey are not limited to defense. The operation against Iran has brought the Kurdish issue back to the forefront. Ankara had believed that, after changes in Syria and Trump’s directive to reintegrate the autonomous Kurdish entity into Syria’s central state structure, a major problem was closing—alongside internal reconciliation efforts with the PKK.

Now, Iranian Kurds are gaining an upgraded role, especially if the campaign leads to regime change—creating nightmare scenarios for Turkey. The biggest issue for Ankara, however, is the strategic vacuum that would arise if Iran is defeated, allowing Israel to focus fully on other regional threats and rivalries. If Iran destabilizes, Turkey could face uncontrolled refugee flows and the “export” of instability.

At the same time, in the new regional landscape after the war, despite the ongoing Palestinian issue, Turkey sees itself becoming more isolated and losing prestige among some Gulf countries due to its support for Tehran.

Serious blow

One of the most significant blows to Turkey’s credibility was the painful realization that its ballistic missile defense is inadequate. Despite Erdoğan promoting the defense industry as a major achievement—with exports rising sharply in 2025—the country’s inability to intercept two missiles launched from Iran damaged its reliability.

Both missiles were neutralized by NATO forces, while Turkey had to request the deployment of German Patriot systems to Malatya to protect NATO radar and installations. Following Erdoğan’s 2019 decision to purchase Russian S-400 systems, Turkey was excluded from the F-35 program. As a result, it possesses a powerful system that cost $2.5 billion but cannot effectively use it—both for political reasons and because it is incompatible with NATO systems.

This episode highlights Erdoğan’s problematic decision and may push him to persuade the U.S. to reintegrate Turkey into the F-35 program or supply Patriot systems—though that would require the humiliating withdrawal of the S-400s. In any case, Turkey will likely invest heavily in developing its own “Iron Dome”-style system.

Eastern Mediterranean front

The war also opens a front in the Eastern Mediterranean. Developments have highlighted the region’s strategic importance, from which Turkey is effectively excluded. Meanwhile, Cyprus’s upgraded role—especially in U.S. strategic planning—has been confirmed.

After strong Turkish diplomatic protests over Cyprus’s defense agreements with the U.S. and France, the war in Iran accelerated their implementation. At the same time, Greece—under Kyriakos Mitsotakis—is returning forces to Cyprus at the invitation of the Cypriot government, for the first time in decades.

The mobilization of European countries, led by France, sends a message to Ankara that European solidarity can now take the form of a “coalition of the willing.”

Greece’s stance

Athens’ initial assessment is positive. Greece demonstrated a “show of strength,” reinforcing its reliability as an ally and a regional security factor while gaining new partners through diplomatic outreach.

Unlike Turkey, Greece took a clear stance from the start of the crisis, making decisive moves such as deploying forces to Cyprus, restructuring its defense, and assisting Bulgaria. Military deployments—including Patriots and F-16s—strengthen both national defense and its position against Turkish claims about demilitarization of the islands.

Turkey, beyond formal statements, has avoided escalation, as that would bring it into direct confrontation with allies and the U.S. This strengthens Greece’s long-standing argument that its defense is indivisible and justified under international law, including the UN Charter and NATO obligations.

Low tones

It is notable that in talks between Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis and his Turkish counterpart, no issue was raised regarding these developments, reflecting Ankara’s cautious approach.

In recent months, Turkey has seen faits accomplis emerge—such as energy developments south of Crete and the rise of Alexandroupoli as a key LNG hub—while new East–West corridors bypass it.

Athens is closely monitoring Ankara’s moves, as Turkey may attempt to react in order to demonstrate it does not accept these developments. A recent incident involved a Turkish warship harassing a vessel laying cables in the Aegean.

In the coming period, multiple projects are planned, including research and cable-laying operations. Greece is preparing for all scenarios in case Turkey attempts more assertive intervention, particularly in the northern Aegean, where distances are greater and operations extend into international waters.