The countdown has begun for the resumption of maritime surveys for the Greece–Cyprus electricity interconnection, with a Navtex maritime notice expected to be issued over the weekend, potentially ending a prolonged impasse surrounding the strategically important project.

The development represents a significant step forward for the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), which aims to connect the electricity grids of Crete and Cyprus. It also carries broader geopolitical implications for Greece’s exercise of its sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Turkish objections have previously disrupted survey operations.

According to information obtained by Protothema, the relevant Greek authorities are completing the final administrative procedures ahead of the expected announcement, which will take immediate effect.

Final approvals before French vessel departs

Members of the special interministerial committee, known as EXAETH, operating under the auspices of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were briefed on 2 November and instructed to submit their recommendations on the project’s licensing by Friday, 6 November.

Provided the committee delivers the anticipated positive recommendation, the Hellenic Coast Guard will issue the necessary exemption permit for the French-flagged vessel Abeille Marengo.

The company managing the interconnection project will then submit a formal request for a Navtex, which will be forwarded to the Ministry of National Defence.

The Hydrographic Service of the Hellenic Navy will subsequently issue the maritime notice, authorising the resumption of survey activities.

According to the same sources, the Navtex will take effect immediately upon publication.

This would allow the Abeille Marengo, currently stationed at the port of Heraklion in Crete, to depart without delay for the designated survey area.

US midterm results reshape calculations over Turkey

Well-informed sources believe the political environment following the US midterm elections has created more favourable conditions for restarting the surveys.

The assessment is that the likelihood of a repeat of the 2024 confrontation, when Turkish naval vessels intervened and forced survey operations to be suspended, has diminished.

Diplomatic contacts between France and Turkey are also understood to have contributed to the more favourable outlook.

According to these assessments, Ankara may choose not to respond to the renewed activities or could limit its reaction to what has increasingly become a familiar practice: radio challenges and harassment, commonly referred to as “hailing”.

The Democrats’ victory in the US congressional elections is regarded as another factor potentially influencing Ankara’s calculations.

With the Democratic Party now controlling Congress, US President Donald Trump’s ability to accommodate Turkish demands is expected to face greater constraints.

One of Ankara’s principal objectives remains its return to the F-35 fighter jet programme, from which Turkey was excluded following its acquisition of Russia’s S-400 air defence system.

Against this backdrop, a serious escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean could attract congressional scrutiny and complicate Turkish efforts to secure Washington’s support on the issue.

Sources therefore believe Ankara may be reluctant to initiate a confrontation that could place it directly under the political spotlight in Washington.

The Israel factor and Ankara’s regional strategy

Another consideration is Turkey’s assessment of the changing position of Israel in American politics.

Ankara has been closely following the weakening of Israel’s political influence in the United States, particularly amid growing criticism of its conduct during the war with Iran.

The economic consequences of that conflict are widely regarded, in the assessments cited by the sources, as having contributed significantly to the financial pressures that shaped the outcome of the US midterm elections.

Turkey has sought to portray Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel as the principal destabilising forces in the region.

Under these circumstances, provoking a fresh confrontation in the Eastern Mediterranean would carry considerable political risks for Ankara.

Such a move could undermine Turkey’s own narrative about regional instability and expose it to precisely the international scrutiny it has sought to direct towards Israel.

Nevertheless, the more favourable diplomatic environment does not necessarily mean that Ankara is prepared to abandon its longstanding claims and objections.

Turkish authorities have repeatedly warned that they will “protect their rights” and will not permit “unauthorised surveys in the area of the Turkish continental shelf”.

French diplomatic formula offers possible way forward

At the centre of the diplomatic arrangements is a French proposal involving the “notification” of Turkish authorities about the planned survey operations.

According to available information, Ankara appears to have accepted this formula, which provides a face-saving mechanism for allowing the work to proceed without a direct confrontation.

The arrangement would enable Turkey to maintain its established positions while avoiding the political and military consequences of attempting to obstruct the French vessel.

However, concerns have been raised about the implications of the formula.

Some observers argue that the notification arrangement contains “grey areas”, particularly because there is no obligation to notify a third country other than the coastal state exercising the relevant continental shelf rights, which receives the application for authorisation and issues the corresponding Navtex.

In this case, the Greek position is that the surveys are taking place within Greece’s continental shelf and therefore fall under Greek jurisdiction.

The concern is that Ankara could attempt to interpret the notification procedure as recognition of its own claims in the area.

Turkey could issue competing Navtex

One possible scenario is that Turkish authorities will present the notification as a request for permission to conduct the surveys.

Ankara could subsequently issue its own Navtex covering the planned operations, seeking to reinforce its jurisdictional claims.

Should this happen, Greece is expected to respond through the established procedure.

The Heraklion maritime station would issue a counter-Navtex, formally stating that the surveys are being conducted within the Greek continental shelf.

The Greek notice would also clarify that the original Navtex was issued by the maritime station with the relevant authority.

This approach would reaffirm Athens’ position that authorisation of the survey operations falls within Greek competence, notwithstanding any competing Turkish announcement.

The coming days will therefore be crucial not only for the future of the Great Sea Interconnector but also for the diplomatic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

With the French vessel ready to sail, the administrative process nearing completion and the international political environment considered more favourable, Athens is preparing to restart a strategically important energy project while seeking to avoid another confrontation with Ankara.