When a country such as Greece is preparing to spend €30 billion on defense procurement programs, the question is not only what weapons it will buy. It is also how much of that spending can be converted into production, know-how, and business opportunities for Greek companies.

And the “Achilles Shield” program is expected to be one of the first major tests of this new approach.

The approximately €3 billion Greek Dome program provides for significant Greek industrial participation, with a target of at least 25%, meaning €700–750 million. The objective, however, is for this percentage not to be treated as merely an accounting figure, but as the starting point for creating a genuine Greek supply chain.

Because the value, as many executives in the Greek defense industry have pointed out, lies not only in how many millions Greek companies receive from a program. It lies in whether they acquire know-how, certifications, production experience, and access to international supply chains—and whether they build on these assets so that they can participate in the next program as well.

The example of the FDI frigates, which Greece was the first to select, is characteristic.

Greece was Naval Group’s first international customer for the FDI. Today, the same program is entering a new phase of international expansion. On August 31, Sweden signed a €4.3 billion contract to acquire four FDIs, creating another major export program for Naval Group.

The Greek choice, therefore, is no longer only about the frigates entering service with the Hellenic Navy. It concerns an international platform that is gaining new customers and, together with them, potentially creating new opportunities for Greek companies that have managed to enter its production chain.

And this is where the major opportunity lies—one that should provide a lesson for future defense procurement programs.

Greek industrial participation in the FDI program started at a lower level, approximately 12%, according to figures from the Ministry of National Defence.

Over time, however, Naval Group developed partnerships with the domestic defense industry, and today more than 70 Greek companies have joined its supply chain. More importantly, as early as 2022, the French group had highlighted the possibility for Greek companies to participate not only in the Greek program but also in future international and export programs.

The Swedish order makes the value of this participation even more apparent today. For Greek companies that have already obtained certification and joined Naval Group’s supply chain, the real challenge is whether their participation can extend beyond the boundaries of the Greek program and translate into work on the next FDIs to be built for foreign customers.

This, ultimately, is the real dividend of domestic participation: not merely a percentage of the Greek order, but a position within the international production chain.

This is precisely the model Greece should pursue if it wants to develop a genuine and competitive defense ecosystem.

It should therefore be emphasized that if a higher and clearly agreed target for Greek participation had been established from the outset of the FDI agreement, together with specific technology-transfer obligations, potentially even more Greek companies could have been incorporated into the production chain.

And if these companies had acquired certifications and know-how for specific FDI systems or subsystems, they would have had the opportunity to bid for work on subsequent frigates being built for other customers.

The Swedish order demonstrates exactly why this matters: a country’s defense procurement program can become a ticket to another country’s market.

The Negative Example of the Rafale

The same question can be raised regarding the 24 Rafale aircraft. In the initial procurement, the Greek side did not require a Greek industrial participation package of a comparable scale from the manufacturer, Dassault Aviation. The only subsequent development was the signing, in April 2026, of an Executive Agreement between the General Directorate for Defence Investments and Armaments (GDDIA) and Dassault Aviation for Greek Industrial Cooperation programs concerning Rafale support.

The example, however, highlights precisely the importance of planning domestic participation at an early stage.

Greece has spent approximately €3.3 billion to acquire the aircraft, while the total cost, including weapons and technical support, has been estimated at around €3.5 billion.

What would it have meant, for example, if the initial purchase had already incorporated a broader and binding Greek industrial participation program covering not only support but also production work, subsystems, electronics, software, and certifications for Greek companies?

Purely by way of illustration, a hypothetical 25% share of approximately €3.5 billion would correspond to €875 million in potential industrial work. This certainly does not mean that a corresponding amount would have returned directly to the Greek economy. It does, however, illustrate the scale of the industrial activity that can be associated with a major defense procurement when industrial participation is designed from the outset.

And even more importantly, if such participation had been accompanied by technology transfer and international certifications, the benefit would not have stopped with Greece’s 24 Rafales.

Greek companies could potentially have claimed a larger role in the broader Rafale supply chain, for a fighter aircraft that in recent years has recorded significant export success and orders from a number of countries.

The Major Challenge of the “Achilles Shield”

This is also the major challenge for the “Achilles Shield.”

The 25% should not simply become a figure to be confirmed at the end of the program. From day one, it must be translated into specific companies, specific production work, technology transfer, certifications, and access to international markets.

The first positive sign is that Defence Minister Nikos Dendias stated on the day the contracts were signed that an agreement had already been reached for 19 Greek companies to participate in the program.

Because in a defense procurement program worth approximately €3 billion, 25% theoretically corresponds to industrial work worth around €750 million. The real benefit, however, could prove to be much greater if Greek companies acquire through this work technology and certifications that subsequently enable them to participate in the international supply chains of the manufacturers.

As Tasos Rozolis, president of the Association of Greek Manufacturers of Defence Material (SEKPY), also told newmoney.gr, the major challenge for Greece is not merely to implement a major defense procurement program, but to use it to create a strong and competitive defense industry.

“Domestic participation must be designed from the first day of every program, with clear rules, meaningful technology transfer, and the participation of Greek companies in supply chains. The 25% cannot remain merely a declaratory target; it must acquire institutional status and be measured according to specific criteria. The Belharra experience shows that when Greek companies are integrated into international supply chains, they can acquire know-how and an outward-looking orientation. The billions spent on defense procurement must leave behind production, technology, jobs and, above all, Greek companies capable of competing for contracts in international markets,” he stressed.