Former President of the Hellenic Republic, Prokopis Pavlopoulos, reflected yesterday on the historic events of the 2015 referendum, marking ten years since that pivotal summer.

Speaking on the show “Enopios Enopio”, Mr. Pavlopoulos explained that he indirectly played a decisive role in keeping Greece in the eurozone, maintaining the status quo, and helping to restore the country’s credibility with its European partners during those critical hours.

Describing the events of the night between July 5th and 6th, 2015, for the first time, Mr. Pavlopoulos pointedly recalled: “I had been elected President by a pro-European majority,” and added that the referendum “was a surprise to me, I wasn’t expecting it.” He noted that he had a conversation with then-Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, during which he told him, “I will not become the President of the drachma,” and that “I was hearing analyses from the economic team that left me speechless.” He said he had “no communication” with the government, and recounted that on the afternoon of June 26th, “the program was ending on Monday, and we would no longer have ELA, meaning no liquidity in the banks.”

“I spoke with Merkel and Hollande, who were also taken by surprise. I told Alexis, ‘I don’t understand why you’re making this choice,’ and I explained to him that because of my legal background, I know what Article 43, paragraph 2 of the Constitution says. I can’t deny you the referendum because I don’t have the authority to do so. But I pointed out to him that the time frame for holding the referendum was very short and also highlighted the formulation of the question.”

According to Prokopis Pavlopoulos, Alexis Tsipras “told me the question would be whether the people approve a proposal that he himself had rejected. I then told him, ‘So you’re telling me this is not a referendum on whether to stay in or leave the eurozone. If the question is about that, I can’t accept it, and if that’s the case and a “leave” vote wins, I will resign as President. Right now, you’ll say that the referendum is on the proposal, but it’s not about leaving the eurozone. If the result is negative, you must immediately declare that this outcome will be used as a negotiation tool and should not be interpreted as a mandate to exit the euro.’ We agreed, the debate happened in Parliament, I received the Presidential Decree, and I signed it.”

He also described how Jean-Claude Juncker “had been caught off guard because he had stayed to continue the negotiations. When he saw what had happened, on Sunday night he sent me a message saying, ‘I’m sending you a new proposal—give it to the Prime Minister and make a new request to join the program,’ because we knew there would be no ELA the next day. I gave it to Mr. Tsipras, he told me ‘I find it interesting,’ and two rounds of talks were held between the Maximos Mansion team and Eurogroup officials. You may remember on Monday night, Mr. Dragasakis, during that meeting, when asked about the referendum, said, ‘Let’s wait and see if it even happens.’ Unfortunately, the talks collapsed on Tuesday, and by Wednesday we had capital controls.”

Lafazanis’ intrusion

Prokopis Pavlopoulos also confirmed that about two hours after the Council of Political Leaders had begun, Panagiotis Lafazanis arrived at the Presidential Mansion and asked to see Alexis Tsipras.

“The door opened, and they told me Lafazanis was here and wanted to speak with Tsipras, who asked for a break to see what was going on. I saw the meeting was taking a while. As I later learned, Lafazanis told Tsipras that with this maneuver, the ‘no’ vote would become a ‘yes’, and he mentioned a proposal from Russia. He claimed that Putin wanted to help Greece financially and, if necessary, would back a currency switch to allow Greece to leave the eurozone,” Pavlopoulos recounted.

As Pavlopoulos explained, “I told Tsipras he had to make contact. Lafazanis was handling matters I was unaware of and couldn’t have imagined. The two of them went to the office of the Secretary General of the Presidency, and Tsipras contacted Putin, who declared he had no knowledge of the matter. And this is not just my account—Hollande describes it in his book. He writes that a day or two later, Putin told him, ‘In case you’ve heard that I’m involved in Greece, I don’t know who’s invoking my name, but I’ve told them to stay in Europe.’”

When asked about the minutes of the Council, the then-President replied, “Of course minutes were kept,” adding that Alexis Tsipras and Zoe Konstantopoulou, who had requested their release, “received institutional responses from Ms. Sakellaropoulou and Mr. Tasoulas.”

The call with ECB bankers

On July 10 and 11, a marathon discussion took place in Brussels to reach an agreement, which was subsequently approved by the Greek Parliament on July 15.

Speaking about the emotionally charged debate in Parliament over approving the agreement Tsipras had reached after lengthy negotiations in Brussels, Prokopis Pavlopoulos recalled: “The night of the debate in Parliament, I received a call from the ECB, where bankers were meeting because the Eurogroup was scheduled to convene the next day. They were following the uproar in Parliament, with SYRIZA splitting and the Speaker (Zoe Konstantopoulou) stepping down from the podium, and they thought there was a serious problem. I told Yannis Stournaras, ‘Tell them I personally guarantee that I believe there will be more than 210 positive votes.’ A little later, he called me again and said, ‘Shall I put you on speakerphone so you can tell the bankers yourself?’”

Tsipras: Pavlopoulos was an excellent President of the Republic

Speaking about the former President, ex-Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras referred to those days and said, “Choosing Prokopis was a one-way street for me, and I don’t regret it.” Regarding their collaboration, he added: “Prokopis Pavlopoulos was an excellent President of the Republic,” noting that “his defining trait was patriotism, his commitment to the national interest, as well as his tireless productivity and creativity.” He concluded: “Every time the phone rang at home after midnight, we all knew it was the President.”

At the same time, the former President of the Hellenic Republic pointed to Chancellor Angela Merkel as the mastermind behind the IMF’s involvement in Greece’s first bailout program, explaining that “I heard Ms. Merkel myself. That’s only half the truth,” Mr. Pavlopoulos emphasized. He went on to say that Mr. Schäuble had favored a European solution (without the IMF). However, at the time, the Chancellor allegedly told Mr. Schäuble, “If we form a European mechanism, the Europeans are too lenient with their partners.” In this direction, “she saddled us with the IMF,” Pavlopoulos stressed, referring to Angela Merkel and the first memorandum, adding that “it was a kind of Procrustean bed imposed on us by Ms. Merkel.”

Speaking further about Prokopis Pavlopoulos, Kostas Karamanlis emphasized that “he experienced extremely critical moments for the nation as President of the Republic, demonstrated a supreme sense of responsibility in practice, and played a decisive role in safeguarding political stability and the country’s European orientation. Today, his knowledge, his social and democratic sensitivity, and his concern for national issues are a meaningful and valuable contribution to our public life. And I want to underline that working with him, our friendship, and exchanging views with him is a special privilege for me,” Karamanlis concluded.

In response, Pavlopoulos stated:
“On these issues, especially on national ones—as we commonly call them—and on European issues in general, I want to say that Mr. Karamanlis’s views and mine align completely, you know. And you’ll notice this—why? Because we experienced these things together in the Karamanlis government, and our views are in complete agreement. It’s not simply a matter of friendship. It’s not just because we belong to the same political party.”

He also issued stern warnings toward Turkey.

Speaking about Angela Merkel again, Pavlopoulos said, “They should look at the kind of program they burdened us with,” and further revealed regarding the Prespa Agreement that “when I saw it for the first time, I said I will not sign it.”

Finally, Pavlopoulos reiterated Turkey’s three long-standing strategic objectives, which he identified as: Control over all of Cyprus, sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea, and autonomization of Thrace and the creation of a Turkish minority there.