A 37-year-old former artistic gymnast, who once competed in major events and won medals, is among the 44 members of a criminal organization arrested for large-scale phone scams.

According to ERT, she played a supporting role in laundering money for members of the ring, in which her brother was also involved. He acted as the organization’s “collector,” taking money or valuables from victims while posing as an accountant. An arrest warrant for him is expected to be issued.

The same reports say there are recorded conversations between the 37-year-old, her brother, and others, discussing money transfers to her bank cards.

How the Ring Operated

The investigation revealed the group’s modus operandi. According to the Hellenic Police (ELAS), the organization had its headquarters—functioning as a call center—in Zevgolatio, Corinthia. Its location allowed members to escape quickly and to conceal stolen money and valuables.

The call center consisted of at least one assistant manager and a small number of trusted members who spoke fluent Greek, were technically skilled in electronic devices, and had excellent knowledge of online banking systems. These call centers were mainly in Zevgolatio and the wider Corinth area (Vrachati, Assos, Examilia, etc.).

They had also set up additional operational hubs in Agia Varvara and Acharnes–Fyli (Ano Liosia, Zephyri), so that the leaders would not be detected and to avoid linking these hubs to the main headquarters.

Exploiting friendships and family ties with people in rural areas, they paid individuals to travel across the country as collectors for the organization—making it even harder for authorities to trace the leadership.

The group operated with extensive reach, high organization, and strong adaptability. They had developed expertise in technical details and other methods used to deceive their victims.

Scale of Operations

Every day, around 40 phone operators made calls aimed at scamming potential victims. The group had at least 150 operational mobile phones for calls, money transfers, and coordination during the illegal activities. These phones were regularly deactivated and replaced to avoid detection.

Their tactics evolved depending on market conditions, subsidies, benefits, and government announcements.

The Roles and Tactics

Members posed as:

• Employees of public agencies, claiming refunds or payment adjustments and exploiting victims’ lack of knowledge about banking procedures to guide them into sending money to accounts controlled by the ring.
• Accountants or tax consultants, convincing victims they were eligible for state subsidies or refunds. They often gained direct access to victims’ bank accounts, transferring funds to the organization or withdrawing cash immediately. To seem credible, a second member would join the call pretending to be a supervisor or specialist.
• Accountants or assistants targeting the elderly, persuading them to hand over cash or valuables to accomplices under false pretenses—such as submitting tax declarations or “insuring” cash and valuables.

If the accountant ruse failed, they called back pretending to be police officers, instructing the victims to throw money or jewelry off the balcony so they could “catch the fraudsters in the act.”

• Vehicle or heavy-machinery sellers, posting fake ads on popular platforms with enticing prices. They demanded advance payments to “reserve” the vehicle, citing high demand, and once they received the money, they vanished without delivering anything.

To avoid detection, they used coded language, technological tools, and methods to hide their identity.

Organizational Structure

At the top were the leader and their assistants—mostly close family members—who set the methods and strategy. They coordinated the operation and managed the financial flows.

The mid-level consisted of the heads of operational centers, their assistants, phone operators, bank-detail recruiters, collectors, and support members.

At the bottom were the “money mules,” who provided their bank cards, online banking credentials (username and password), and the phone numbers linked to their bank accounts for receiving one-time passwords (OTPs).
These details—purchased for €300 to €800—were used to move money and hide the identity of the higher-level members.

Scale of Fraud

So far, police have solved 1,089 cases of fraud, with the organization’s illegal profits estimated at at least €7.6 million.