The press conference at Mar-a-Lago was not a moment of reconciliation. While it was not an outright confrontation like the one last February, hospitality alone does not end wars of the scale of the conflict that has raged in Ukraine for almost four years. Donald Trump spoke not as a president seeking balance, but as a negotiator controlling the timing, sequencing, and public language of “peace.” The choice of venue, style, and timing was not intended to bring Moscow and Kyiv closer together. Its primary purpose was to redefine and control the narrative.

The “95% ready” formulation presented by Volodymyr Zelensky and the U.S. president functions essentially as a double trap. Outwardly, it signals progress. Inwardly, it transforms real deadlocks into “loose ends.” And those loose ends are not technical. In Ukraine’s case, they are existential.

Territory: no peace has ever been built on the silent loss of land

Donbas is not a paragraph in an agreement. It is a border, a memory, and a precedent. The territorial issue is treated by some mediators as a mapping problem. In reality, it is a question of legitimacy. Any formula that “freezes” the situation on the ground without the explicit and freely given consent of the Ukrainian people creates a fragile peace with an expiration date. The idea of a demilitarized zone in Donbas, however technocratically logical it may sound, leaves the fundamental question unanswered: who guarantees that the temporary will not become permanent?

European history is full of “temporary lines” that hardened into borders through fatigue and international indifference. For Kyiv, territory is not a bargaining chip; it is a red line tied to political survival. For Moscow, it is the only tangible gain it can present domestically. These two realities do not easily coexist on the same page, and no amount of data—however “minor” it is portrayed—can reconcile them.

Zaporizhzhia: the nuclear facility as the ultimate test of gravity

This is where diplomacy ends and physical danger begins. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is the most revealing point in the negotiations—not because it is an energy hub, but because it exposes the limits of “creative ambiguity.” There is no gray zone when it comes to a nuclear facility. There is control, or there is chaos.

Proposals for joint operation or international supervision may sound reassuring, but they stumble over a fundamental problem: the plant is located in occupied territory. Any arrangement that does not clearly define sovereignty, security, chains of responsibility, and enforcement mechanisms is inherently dangerous.

Zaporizhzhia cannot be a “trade-off” for peace. It is a test of credibility. Without a clear, binding, and verifiable solution, no other provision of an agreement can be considered secure. The U.S. narrative that “Putin wants to work with Ukraine on the nuclear power plant” represents too dramatic a shift in Russia’s posture to be fully credible to a Western audience that has learned—at great cost—that the Kremlin will not stop, even at severe self-inflicted losses, until it reaches the objectives it set out in February 2022.

Referendum: democracy as both shield and risk

The reference to a referendum is not rhetorical evasion on Zelensky’s part; it is an institutional necessity. The Ukrainian constitution prohibits electoral processes during wartime. Altering this framework requires political consensus, time, and social stability—three elements in short supply in a country at war.

A referendum conducted under international pressure carries serious risks. Approval by a narrow margin would deepen internal divisions. Rejection would derail the entire process. A rushed vote would undermine the very legitimacy it is meant to provide. Peace cannot rest solely on popular approval unless it is accompanied by robust security guarantees. Otherwise, the referendum becomes a mechanism for shifting responsibility rather than resolving conflict.

Equally critical is the issue of millions of Ukrainian refugees. Beyond logistical challenges, their participation would require amnesty from Ukraine itself to prevent criminal or other legal consequences, including detention or forced redeployment to the eastern front.

The illusion of percentages

The history of conflict is unforgiving. No war has ever ended because there was agreement on “most issues.” Even comprehensive agreements have collapsed when they lacked signatures, implementation mechanisms, and enforcement power.

“95%” is a communicative figure. It is not legal. It is not military. It is not a guarantee. Wars end when:

• borders are clearly defined,
• all parties sign binding agreements,
• monitoring mechanisms exist, and
• violations carry tangible costs.

Without these elements, peace is temporary.

Mar-a-Lago did not produce a solution. It produced a framework. And a framework—no matter how carefully constructed—does not stop a war. The thorns remain where they always were: territory, energy, and legitimacy. Until these are translated into binding commitments backed by international guarantees, any declared progress will remain just a number cited at a press conference.

Donald Trump has been called many things, for many reasons. Regarding the war in Ukraine—and specifically its end—he should be credited with one undeniable fact, regardless of whether that judgment ultimately belongs to historians rather than journalists. Over roughly a year, the American president has made a sustained effort to find a real solution to the largest war Europe has seen since World War II. His methods have been extensively analyzed worldwide. What is increasingly evident, however, is that his approach appears to be undermining itself, particularly through the implicit threat of “end it or the U.S. walks away.”

The clearest evidence lies in the number of in-person meetings between the current U.S. president and his Ukrainian counterpart, compared with those held by his predecessor from February 2022 through the end of 2024.

Trump–Zelensky meetings within one year

• February 28, 2025 – White House, Washington, D.C. (Oval Office)
• April 26, 2025 – Vatican, Rome (St. Peter’s), private meeting (~15 minutes) on the sidelines of the Pope’s funeral
• August 18, 2025 – White House, Washington, D.C., multilateral meeting with European leaders
• October 17–18, 2025 – Washington, D.C., meeting as part of the “Alliance of the Willing” / broader European mobilization (the meeting at which the Tomahawk issue resurfaced and Trump “hit the brakes”)
• December 28, 2025 – Mar-a-Lago, Florida, meeting/working lunch

Biden–Zelensky meetings after February 2022

1. December 21, 2022 – Washington, D.C.
   Zelensky’s first visit to the White House since the invasion; a symbolic and politically significant meeting with announcements of military aid.
2. February 20, 2023 – Kyiv
   Biden’s historic visit to the Ukrainian capital during wartime, sending a powerful message of support.
3. July 12, 2023 – Vilnius (NATO Summit)
   Meeting focused on security guarantees and Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO.
4. September 21, 2023 – Washington, D.C.
   Talks centered on continued military and economic assistance.
5. December 12, 2023 – Washington, D.C.
   Meeting amid congressional deadlock over Ukraine funding.
6. July 9, 2024 – Washington, D.C. (NATO Summit)
   Bilateral meeting during the NATO summit.
7. September 26, 2024 – New York
   Meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly.