In the coming period, a decision is expected on resuming the seabed surveys for laying the Cyprus-Crete electricity interconnector cable, as all the technical arrangements are being finalised in the coming days, according to sources, by the project’s managing company Meridiam, Greece’s power grid operator ADMIE, and Nexans, who are handling the critical energy and geostrategic Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) project.

In the coming days, the availability of the research vessel or vessels will be secured, leaving only the final decision, taken in coordination with the political leadership, on resuming the surveys. According to our information, this could happen as early as October and in any case within 2026, against a backdrop that has been considerably strained by the rhetorical escalation Ankara has driven in Greek-Turkish relations.

The GSI issue has become a difficult but highly significant crash test for Greek-Turkish relations in the post “calm waters” era. For Greece, it is a critical matter of exercising sovereign rights while also defending the Exclusive Economic Zone declared under the Greece-Egypt agreement. For Turkey, it is a test of the entire “Blue Homeland” doctrine, as well as the supposed validity of the Turkey-Libya memorandum.

Following the latest exchange of diplomatic notes with Athens, and statements from Erdogan, Turkey is sending the message that its position has not changed, with the Turkish president declaring in threatening tones that “Turkey’s rights will not be allowed to be violated.”

No compromise solution currently appears to have been found that would allow the surveys to proceed unimpeded, as Turkey insists it has a say over projects and surveys carried out anywhere within the area of the illegal Turkey-Libya memorandum (which overlaps with the Greek EEZ established under the Greece-Egypt agreement), and that it should be responsible for issuing NAVTEX notices.

This Turkish demand cannot and will not be accepted by Greece, since it would not only amount to a de facto acceptance of the illegal Turkey-Libya memorandum, but would also fully legitimise the “Blue Homeland” doctrine. Still less could Greece accept Turkish demands within the delimited Greek EEZ, where the country lawfully and fully exercises the sovereign rights and jurisdiction provided for under international law.

Proposals to reroute the cable, whether south through Egyptian EEZ waters or north through areas under Turkish jurisdiction so that Turkey could formally issue its own NAVTEX, are losing traction, both because of the excessive additional cost such a move would add to an already expensive project, and because of the wrong signal it would send. In any case, those implementing the project have no rerouting scenario in their plans, though the original route may see some minor adjustments once the results of the seabed surveys are in.

For Greece, it is critical that the survey work be carried out without a Turkish NAVTEX being issued, and it will fall to the country’s political leadership, in coordination with the GSI, to resolve this difficult puzzle so that this major project can once again move forward.

As for the idea of a general notification of the surveys to all coastal states, that is precisely the purpose served by the NAVTEX issued by the authority with international jurisdiction over the area in question, namely the Heraklion station, a jurisdiction Turkey disputes as part of its effort to entrench the “Blue Homeland” doctrine.

Beyond the GSI, another process is expected to unfold very soon that will show how far Ankara’s rhetorical escalation can go. Since 27 August, approval has been granted for repair works by the cable-laying vessel Ocean Link on the existing Chios-Lesvos undersea fibre-optic link operated by Greek telecoms operator OTE, with the relevant NAVTEX now expected from the Limnos station.

The area through which the fibre-optic cable runs also includes international waters within an undelimited Greek continental shelf, a status Turkey disputes, while also illegally claiming NAVTEX jurisdiction as far as the middle of the Aegean.

According to sources, Ankara had previously lodged a démarche over works in this specific area, which Athens rejected, making clear that no project connecting the Greek islands was up for discussion.

At that time, as in other similar recent projects, Turkey limited itself to radio harassment. Since the climate has worsened in recent weeks, the matter is now being watched closely, since although the assessment is that even Ankara would not want a serious crisis, at least for now, direct intervention on the ground cannot be ruled out. And no one can ever guarantee that tension will not develop into crisis.

Following Erdogan’s latest threats, Athens now has to draw up, from this point on, an operational plan for the security of the new Israeli weapons systems due to start arriving in the country over the coming months, as well as for their smooth deployment in the locations chosen by the country’s military leadership.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan has effectively set an unofficial casus belli over the implementation of the Greece-Israel defence agreement and over the defensive reinforcement of the Greek islands, an issue that has been high on the agenda of the Turkish leadership, and of Turkish media, for days.

For Ankara, Greece’s reinforcement with Israeli systems such as David’s Sling, Barak MX and SPYDER, along with advanced radar systems capable of tracking threats hundreds of kilometres away, represents a serious blow.

Operationally, since Greece, combined with its Patriot systems, is now acquiring strong deterrence even against ballistic threats and the threat of drone attack, this significantly offsets the advantage Turkey had been building up in the Aegean on this front. In terms of air power, the balance in Greece’s favour remains, with the acquisition of the Rafale and, soon, the F-35.

Diplomatically, too, Turkey sees its plan for the total isolation of Israel in the region, which is not limited to reactions over Israel’s stance in Gaza and Lebanon but has deeper roots, running up against the fact that two countries, close US allies and EU members, Greece and Cyprus, are maintaining and strengthening their ties with Israel, despite reservations over some choices made by the Netanyahu government.

Strategically, Ankara also views Greece-Israel cooperation at the defence level as a serious national security threat. The regional power rivalry between Turkey and Israel has largely played out in Lebanon and Syria. There, Turkey tested Israel’s intentions, and Israel, by bombing a Syrian air base seventy kilometres from the Turkish-Syrian border, showed it will not tolerate any expansion of Turkish military influence and presence near its borders.

Turkey has been forced to fall into line within this framework, at a cost to the credibility of its Middle East policy and with its ability to confront Israel now in question.

Amid the siege mentality prevailing among the Turkish elite, Israel’s cooperation with Greece and Cyprus is viewed as an attempt to widen the “front” on its southern and western borders, where even an indirect Israeli presence, through advanced Israeli anti-missile systems and state-of-the-art radar, would place constraints on its revisionist policy.

This explains the anger and intensity of Erdogan’s statements, which once again, after years, revived the menacing quip that if someone shouts from Kaş they will be heard on Kastellorizo, and that Greece should abandon its programme to defensively reinforce the islands, invoking the “lessons of history.” Turkey wants to pre-empt Greece’s defensive build-up and, above all, to prevent the transfer of Israeli and other defence systems to the islands.

Ankara’s elevation of strategic cooperation with Israel and the prospect of measures to defend the islands has, in recent months, been combined with its systematic prioritisation of the so-called “Grey Zones” issue.

In all of Turkey’s statements and reactions, whether over Greece’s Maritime Spatial Planning, Marine Parks, or the special spatial plans for tourism, renewables and industry, the recurring claim is that these include “geographical formations whose ownership has not passed to Greece through international treaties.”

The agenda Turkey is shaping clearly limits any scope for understanding between the two countries and creates obstacles even to basic diplomatic channels of communication, which are currently reduced to the exchange of diplomatic notes.

It remains unclear whether the visit to Athens of MIT chief and close Erdogan associate İbrahim Kalın, and his meeting with his Greek counterpart, EYP chief Themistoklis Demiris, an experienced diplomat well versed in Greek-Turkish affairs, could create an informal but reliable communication channel between the two countries to help avoid a dangerous hot escalation in the period ahead.

Athens, meanwhile, through Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis himself, has repeatedly sent the message in recent days that Greece will not accept restrictions on the exercise of its sovereign rights, and that it will not subordinate matters concerning its defensive reinforcement and the development of its defence capabilities on Greek territory to third parties.

The period ahead will be a time of severe testing in Athens-Ankara relations, as the confrontation will no longer be rhetorical and theoretical but will play out on the ground, in an environment where, although neither side wants serious escalation, neither side can back down either: Greece from the exercise of its sovereign rights and the protection of its sovereignty, and Turkey from the “Blue Homeland” doctrine and from the “fear” of finding its great regional rival, Israel, ranged against it in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.