It is called Pelican and within a few hours found itself at the centre of the war in Ukraine. Not because it was officially presented at a defence exhibition, but because its name was included by Volodymyr Zelensky himself among the long-range weapons used in the massive Ukrainian attack of 20 September 2026 in the Moscow region.

The initial impression was that it was a new Ukrainian ballistic missile. The latest information, however, points in a different direction: Pelican is reportedly a long-range unmanned aircraft, of the aircraft type, that is, a drone with an aerodynamic aircraft configuration rather than a ballistic weapon. Ukrainian outlet RBC-Ukraine, citing its sources, was the first to make this distinction, although no full technical specifications have so far been made public.

And the most important point is that the new weapon has appeared at a time when Ukrainian strikes are no longer confined to the front line of the war. They are targeting areas hundreds or even more than 1,000 kilometres deep inside Russia, with particular emphasis on energy facilities, refineries and logistics infrastructure.

What is Pelican and what happened at the Moscow refinery

Zelensky announced that the attack involved, among other systems, the FP-1, RZ-100, MICH-2000, Palianytsia, Vendetta, Liutyi, Bars, Flamingo, Sichen and Pelican. The Ukrainian side said that a major facility of the Russian oil industry and logistics infrastructure had been hit.

Initially, Pelican was linked to the FP-7 ballistic missile under development by Ukraine’s Fire Point. The connection was not accidental. The same company, which is behind the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile and Ukrainian drones, had already filed an application in 2026 to register the Pelican trade name.

However, to date there has been no official identification of Pelican with the FP-7. Instead, the latest Ukrainian reports describe it as a drone. In practical terms, this means that Kyiv appears to have yet another type of domestically developed, long-range unmanned system, while keeping most of its technical details secret.

The true scale of the strike became more apparent in the following hours.

According to oil industry sources cited by Reuters, Gazprom Neft’s Moscow refinery halted crude oil processing after fires caused at its key facilities by the 20 September attack.

The damage affects the two main primary processing units.

The AVT-6 unit has a capacity of approximately 21,400 tonnes per day and accounts for more than half of the refinery’s processing capacity. The EURO+ unit can process approximately 18,800 tonnes per day.

The two units were affected by the fires and, according to the same sources, their full restoration could take several weeks. As of 21 September, fuels from the refinery were not being offered for sale on the St Petersburg Commodity Exchange.

The size of the facility also illustrates the significance of the strike. In 2024, the refinery processed approximately 11.6 million tonnes of crude, or around 230,000 barrels per day. This production process yielded approximately 2.9 million tonnes of petrol, 3.2 million tonnes of diesel and 1.3 million tonnes of bitumen.

The attack was part of an extremely large-scale aerial operation against Russian territory. Russian authorities reported hundreds of drones around Moscow and a large number of interceptions. Despite the scale of Russian air defences, some of the Ukrainian systems managed to reach critical facilities.

This is perhaps the most important military lesson from the particular attack. In modern warfare, a hugely expensive missile is not necessarily required to cause a serious economic impact. Large numbers of relatively small, different and often cheaper systems can put pressure on air defences, forcing them to deal simultaneously with threats travelling at different speeds, altitudes and along different routes.

And Ukraine appears to be investing precisely in this philosophy: many different types of drones and missiles in the same operation, so that the defence does not have to deal with a single weapon with a predictable profile.

Why Pelican and the “drone war” directly concern Greece

The development is also of particular interest to Greece, not because the specific Ukrainian weapon is linked to any Greek threat, but because it accurately describes the environment for which Greece’s entire air-defence architecture is now changing.

On 31 August 2026, Greece and Israel signed an intergovernmental agreement for the development of the “Achilles Shield”, the new multi-layered Greek defence umbrella, which will be simultaneously anti-aircraft, anti-ballistic and anti-drone and will operate through an integrated command-and-control system. The agreement provides for the programme’s immediate implementation.

The philosophy is precisely the one confirmed daily by the war in Ukraine: a country no longer needs only systems capable of intercepting fighter aircraft or ballistic missiles. It must also be able to detect and counter small drones, long-range UAVs, loitering munitions and cruise missiles at the same time.

The Greek KENTAVROS is moving in the same direction, the domestically developed anti-drone system which, according to the Ministry of National Defence, has already been tested under real operational conditions in the Red Sea and is in production. The Greek design envisages its deployment on frigates, as well as the development of land-based versions and smaller systems, such as Orion and Telemachus.

At the same time, in June the foundation stone was laid at Malakasa for the new 309th Drone Manufacturing Factory of the Armed Forces, indicating that the Greek approach is not limited to countering UAVs but also extends to their domestic production.

The protection of critical infrastructure is also acquiring a different dimension. Refineries, energy facilities, ports, airports and logistics centres are now strategic targets even far from a line of confrontation. A drone’s ability to travel hundreds of kilometres means that distance itself is a much weaker guarantee of security than it was in the past.

There is also a second, purely economic link with Greece: fuel. Continuous attacks on Russian refineries have contributed to reducing the available production of petroleum products, while the international diesel market is already under considerable pressure because of simultaneous geopolitical disruptions in Russia, Ukraine and the Middle East. Reuters has recorded historically high international diesel prices, with the refined products market having much smaller margins for absorbing further production disruptions.

In Greece, the situation has already reached petrol stations. The latest nationwide data from the Liquid Fuel Price Observatory show that on 21 September the average price of 95-octane unleaded petrol had reached €2.196 per litre, up from €2.079 on 4 September.

For road diesel, the average price similarly reached €2.227 per litre, up from €2.039 on 4 September.

This is, of course, not a price movement caused exclusively by the strike on Moscow. It does, however, show how vulnerable the global refining market has become when major production centres are taken offline while supply is already under pressure.

And this is perhaps the real significance of Pelican. The new Ukrainian drone remains a weapon with very few known technical characteristics. But the attack in which it was used demonstrated something much greater: that a system without the cost and complexity of a traditional ballistic missile can, when integrated into a massive and coordinated operation, reach the heart of a major country and affect a facility worth billions.

The drone war has now moved from the trenches to energy infrastructure and from the military battlefield to international market prices.

And this is a lesson that Europe —and Greece along with it— now faces as a matter of defence, economics and the protection of critical infrastructure.