From the cockpit of an aircraft bound for Tel Aviv to the ballot boxes of Israel and the United States, the political distance is shorter than it seems. The Flydubai incident of 30 September brutally revived a sense of insecurity in everyday Israeli life, less than a month before the elections of 27 October.

A week after the Israeli vote, on 3 November, Americans will decide who controls Congress. If Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu secures the ability to govern again, the aftermath of these two elections could prove particularly dangerous for Gaza and Iran. The prospect of fresh escalation remains a scenario. However, US President Donald Trump himself has now left open the possibility of stepping up the bombing of Iran after the US elections.

The questions

According to the Israeli account of events, the first officer on the Dubai to Tel Aviv flight attacked the captain with a knife and tried to bring the aircraft down with some 170 people on board, most of them of Israeli origin. Passengers and crew stepped in to overpower him, allowing the plane to land at Tabuk in Saudi Arabia. Flydubai has cautioned against jumping to conclusions about the cause.

On 1 October, Netanyahu said there were signs of Islamist radicalisation in the first officer, while acknowledging that it was too early to link him to Iran or any other actor. That distinction matters. Investigating an attack with a possible ideological motive is one thing; establishing an organised operation backed by a state is quite another. Until evidence emerges, a link to Tehran cannot be treated as fact.

The political impact of such an incident, however, does not wait for the investigation to conclude. The sense that an ordinary return flight can turn into a threat of mass death revives the question of who is able to protect citizens. For Netanyahu, the shift of the debate towards security offers an opportunity to reclaim the role of the experienced leader facing persistent threats. For his opponents, the same question leads to his government’s responsibility for everything that preceded and followed 7 October 2023. Fear does not automatically translate into electoral gain. What it does produce is a campaign debate in which every new security incident can overshadow the economy, social divisions and the government’s record.

The comeback

The latest polls capture precisely this fluidity, without allowing a safe prediction of the winner. The Maariv survey published on 2 October gives Netanyahu’s camp 51 seats, two more than in the previous poll, against 53 for the Jewish opposition parties. Arab parties take 12 and the Reservists and Economic Party grouping four. On suitability for prime minister, Gadi Eisenkot leads with 47% against Netanyahu’s 41%. A poll for the Zman Yisrael website, presented on 1 October in the Times of Israel, gives a different ranking: 53 seats for the prime minister’s allies and 49 for the Jewish parties opposing him, with 13 seats for Arab parties and five for the grouping of Yoaz Hendel and Yaron Zelekha, which is aligned with neither camp.

The common finding matters more than the gap between the two surveys: neither main camp reaches the 61 seats needed for a majority in the Knesset. Netanyahu remains competitive, but his recovery does not amount to a guaranteed hold on power. The opposition, meanwhile, may win more seats without having an agreement to form a government. The decisive outcome on 27 October will therefore be the ability to build a coalition. Finishing first is not enough. Nor is it certain that negotiations on the new Israeli government will be complete by the time of the US elections, just seven days later. The make-up of the coalition and the demands of its partners will also shape the next prime minister’s room for manoeuvre in Gaza.

Trump feels the strain

In Washington, the president faces a different problem. Military power does not easily translate into political advantage when voters feel they are paying the price for the administration’s choices. In the AP-NORC poll, conducted on 24 to 28 September among 2,140 adults and published on 1 October, only 31% approve of Trump’s overall performance, while 69% disapprove. Approval of his handling of the economy stands at 26% and of the cost of living at 17%.

In addition, 71% disapprove of his handling of Iran and 69% believe the war was not worth the risk. This is a measure of public opinion, not a forecast of how seats in Congress will be divided. But it captures the political burden with which Republicans are heading to the polls.

For Trump, then, a major new military operation before 3 November could add to the cost of an already difficult electoral battle. Pursuing a deal that could be presented as an American success has obvious political value. So does a period of limited tension, provided it does not look like a retreat in the face of Tehran. This points to a key difference with the Israeli contest. Emphasis on the threat can strengthen Netanyahu’s case for continuity in leadership. In the US, a prolonged conflict obliges Trump to explain why the war continues and what the ultimate benefit will be for the American citizen.

The differences

The close relationship between the two leaders does not erase these differences. In his interview with TIME, published on 1 October, Trump avoided giving Netanyahu a clear endorsement for the election, although he referred to his political resilience. This distance does not amount to a rift, but it limits the Israeli prime minister’s ability to present American backing as personally guaranteed. For Washington, a deal may be judged on the reduction of its military and financial burden. For an Israeli government that depends on partners who reject concessions, the same deal may threaten the cohesion of the coalition. The next phase will depend on whether the two leaders can agree on aims, limits and costs.

In Gaza, disagreement over the sequence of moves keeps open the possibility of a return to wide-scale military action. In August, Netanyahu rejected the American 15-point plan, insisting that an Israeli withdrawal cannot precede the full disarmament of Hamas. The organisation, for its part, has tied the implementation of its commitments to an Israeli withdrawal and a halt to attacks. This gap can scupper a deal in practice, even when both sides say they are discussing the same framework. Without an accepted verification mechanism, every delay can be read as preparation for the next round.

A Netanyahu government that again emerged dependent on the hard right would face added internal pressure for a military solution. The price of such a choice would fall primarily on the civilian population, while the destruction of more targets would not on its own answer the question of who will govern Gaza and guarantee its security.

Iran warns

On the Iranian front, the signs of preparation are more concrete. According to a Reuters report of 1 October citing Iranian officials, Tehran is considering a broader and stronger response to any new major US strikes, while keeping channels of negotiation open. The same reports say the planning includes a possible widening of targets and the readying of allied groups in the region, though no final decision has been taken. The warning also bears on how risk is calculated in Washington and in Israel. An operation designed to be limited could provoke a response larger than expected. The choice of targets, casualties and each side’s need to show it is maintaining its deterrent power could quickly widen the conflict. Neither of the two elections cancels out this risk.

The assessment that new escalation on both fronts could follow the US elections rests on a specific chain of conditions: Netanyahu would have secured the political ability to stay in power, no workable agreement on Gaza would have been reached, and negotiations with Tehran would have failed. Under those circumstances, a new Israeli government could regard the election result as a mandate to continue military pressure, while Trump would by then have passed the immediate test of the midterms. His own answer, that it is “likely” the bombing will be stepped up after the vote, gives the Iranian strand of the scenario clear political footing. It does not, however, prove joint operational planning for a simultaneous attack on Gaza and Iran.

The two fronts could flare up for different reasons and on different timetables. In Gaza, it would be as an operation to enforce the disarmament of Hamas. In Iran, it would be as a fresh attempt to coerce its leadership into accepting American and Israeli terms. The end of the campaign period would remove one immediate constraint, without eliminating resistance from public opinion, the military cost or pressure from allies. Even an electoral defeat for the Republicans would not dictate a single response from Trump. It could push him to scale back a costly entanglement or to seek a decisive foreign policy success. Neither option can be ruled out today.

On a tightrope

By early November, the Flydubai investigation, the course of negotiations and the result of the Israeli ballot will show whether the present tension can be contained or is preparing a new cycle of conflict. The aircraft incident is not evidence of Iranian involvement, nor a sufficient explanation for the strategic choices of the two governments. But it shows how easily fear returns to the centre of political life.

If the ballot boxes strengthen the conviction that outstanding issues can be resolved chiefly by military means, November will find the Middle East facing a new danger. And this time, the coincidence of the election dates may affect the timing of any escalation, not the scale of its consequences.