Greece is emerging as a key battleground in the global competition over commercial ports, according to an analysis by The Economist. As the publication notes, the Port of Piraeus—located about 1,200 kilometers north of the Suez Canal—is one of Europe’s busiest ports, handling more than 4 million containers annually. Majority-owned by COSCO Shipping, it highlights Greece’s dominant position in global shipping capacity.

Just 30 kilometers to the west, the U.S. government is backing plans to develop a commercial port in Elefsina. Further north, Russian and Chinese investors have acquired stakes in the Port of Thessaloniki, while even farther northeast, American and NATO forces have established a logistics hub at the Port of Alexandroupoli.

This competition in Greece is part of a broader global struggle for control over maritime trade infrastructure—from Argentina to Thailand. In some regions, such as the Panama Canal, tensions have escalated into a more dangerous phase within the wider geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. Globally, spending on port infrastructure is expected to rise by more than 30%, reaching $90 billion annually by 2035, according to PwC.

The importance—and risks—of maritime trade

Around 80% of global trade by volume is transported by sea, making the stability of supply chains a top priority for governments. Recent crises—from the pandemic to the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz—have exposed how fragile the system can be. Reducing dependence on key chokepoints has therefore become both an economic and geopolitical objective.

However, the rush to build new port infrastructure risks creating major inefficiencies. Many investors—including American and Chinese taxpayers—may see disappointing returns. At the same time, political pressure on shipping companies to use specific ports or routes, regardless of commercial logic, is expected to increase.

China’s expansion and the West’s response

Much of the tension is driven by concerns over China’s growing influence in global supply chains. Chinese companies manage or hold stakes in at least 129 ports outside China and have invested over $80 billion in port construction worldwide—from Antigua to Tanzania.

More than one-third of these ports are located near strategic maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Suez Canal. This expanding footprint has raised alarms in Western capitals. Research by MERICS suggests that trade with China tends to increase significantly after such investments, often at the expense of exports to other countries.

A fragmented future for global ports

At the same time, non-Chinese shipping companies are strengthening their own networks, announcing acquisitions worth around $140 billion since 2021. Governments—including those of India, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the UAE—are also ramping up investments to secure trade routes.

The United States, meanwhile, is taking a more assertive stance, as seen in disputes over control of the Panama Canal’s terminals. These developments are contributing to a growing divide between Chinese and Western port networks.

While increased competition could lead to better services and lower costs, it also raises the risk of overcapacity and inefficient trade routes. As one European shipping executive told The Economist, “Every port and every country wants to become a logistics hub—but not everyone can.”

Despite the challenges, the expansion of port infrastructure is not necessarily negative. Greater competition may ultimately drive innovation and efficiency—though perhaps not in the way those fueling this global “port war” initially envisioned.