The absence of airstrikes on Iran does not yet amount to peace—and how could it? Tehran has deliberately avoided describing the temporary halt in military operations as a ceasefire and, above all, has shown no urgency to return to the table for direct negotiations with the United States.

Behind this position lies more than the Iranian regime’s need to project resilience at home.

It also reflects a broader geopolitical calculation: that uncertainty, the threat of renewed conflict and the ability to disrupt global energy flows currently provide Iran with greater negotiating leverage than a hastily concluded agreement ever could.

The leadership of the Islamic Republic appears convinced that it can withstand greater military and economic pressure than Donald Trump is politically willing to bear. Iran’s wager is that the U.S. president, confronted with rising energy prices, mounting pressure on the American economy and the prospect of a prolonged military engagement, will ultimately seek a compromise more closely aligned with Tehran’s demands.

The Suspension of Attacks as a Tool, Not a Ceasefire

Iranian diplomacy insists that there is no agreed ceasefire. This formulation allows Tehran to maintain pressure on Washington without assuming formal commitments, while simultaneously portraying the suspension of hostilities as the result of its own military resilience rather than an American initiative.

In doing so, Iran seeks to impose its own interpretation of the temporary de-escalation: according to its narrative, this is not a pause granted because it found itself in a weakened position, but rather a state of equilibrium in which the United States failed to impose its terms.

The rhetoric of the enemy’s “strategic defeat” is aimed primarily at the domestic audience. After widespread destruction, military losses and continued economic strain, Iran’s leadership needs to present the conflict as proof of the system’s resilience. Admitting that the country is urgently seeking negotiations could be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

At the same time, rejecting immediate talks shields Tehran from being drawn into negotiations under the threat of renewed U.S. airstrikes. Iran is not simply seeking the resumption of dialogue—it wants to change the terms under which that dialogue takes place.

The Real Objective Lies in the Strait of Hormuz

At the heart of Iran’s strategy lies the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran understands that its overall military capabilities cannot match those of the United States. It does, however, possess the ability to inflict disproportionate costs on the global economy by disrupting shipping through one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

For Iran, therefore, the Strait is not merely a defensive lever or a means of retaliation. It is the principal instrument through which it seeks to transform an uneven military confrontation into a more balanced political negotiation.

Iran’s ambitions appear to extend beyond guaranteeing the free passage of its own vessels. Tehran is seeking recognition of its role in managing and securing the strategic waterway. Such recognition would strengthen its standing as a regional power while limiting the United States’ ability to impose blockades or unilaterally control energy flows.

This also explains why the talks Tehran publicly acknowledges do not involve direct contact with Washington but rather mediation by countries such as Oman, Qatar and Pakistan. Iran prefers a multilateral process in which the Strait of Hormuz is treated as a regional security issue rather than solely a bilateral dispute between Tehran and Washington.

The distinction is fundamental. In direct negotiations with the United States, Iran would appear to be the party expected to halt its actions. Within a broader regional framework, however, it can present itself as an indispensable stakeholder in Gulf security.

Betting on Political Endurance

Iran’s leadership believes time is on its side. That assessment is rooted more in political than military calculations.

The United States retains the capability to launch further strikes and inflict even greater damage on Iran’s military and economic infrastructure. However, every new escalation heightens the risk of sharp increases in oil and fuel prices, with immediate consequences for American consumers.

Iran is attempting to convert that economic pressure into political costs for the White House. Tehran believes that an administration placing significant emphasis on the economy and gasoline prices will struggle to sustain a conflict without a swift and decisive outcome.

At the same time, Iran’s leadership understands that Trump wants to project himself as a leader who brokers deals, not as a president trapped in another prolonged Middle Eastern war. Tehran is betting precisely on that contradiction: that the American president wants to demonstrate military resolve while simultaneously needing an agreement he can present as a victory.

From Iran’s perspective, as long as Washington cannot impose a complete military solution without significant economic and geopolitical costs, waiting is preferable to making concessions.

The Regional Dimension of Iran’s Strategy

Tehran’s stance is also tied to its broader objective of preserving its position as an indispensable regional power. Iran is not merely seeking the survival of its regime or relief from immediate military pressure.

It is also seeking to prevent the emergence of a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf from which it would be excluded.

An agreement that reduced Iran’s role in the Strait of Hormuz or allowed the United States to oversee maritime traffic without Iranian involvement would amount to a strategic defeat—even if accompanied by a halt in hostilities.

Conversely, recognition of an Iranian role in maritime security would allow Tehran to argue that, despite military pressure, it preserved its regional influence and compelled the United States to engage with it as an equal.

This issue is also of direct concern to the Gulf states. Countries whose economies depend on the uninterrupted export of oil and natural gas want neither permanent Iranian control over maritime traffic nor an American military escalation that could paralyse their exports. Tehran understands that fears of a broader energy crisis encourage regional governments to push for compromise.

In other words, Iran is not negotiating only with the United States. It is negotiating indirectly with the global energy market as a whole.

The Risk of Overestimating Its Leverage

Iran’s strategy, however, carries significant risks. Tehran may believe that the threat to the Strait of Hormuz gives it decisive leverage, but any prolonged disruption to maritime traffic could ultimately backfire.

Major importing nations, European governments, the Arab Gulf states and Asian economies would be unlikely to accept a situation in which Iran could unilaterally impose conditions or extract economic concessions from ships passing through the waterway.

Even countries favouring de-escalation would be reluctant to establish a precedent whereby a regional power could use an international maritime route as a tool of political coercion.

There is also the possibility that Tehran is underestimating Trump’s willingness to return to the military option. If the White House concludes that any agreement would appear to hand Iran effective control over the Strait, renewed airstrikes could become the politically preferable course of action.

The current balance is therefore highly fragile. Iran may be able to endure the pressure, but its economy continues to suffer under sanctions, wartime destruction and prolonged uncertainty. Every day without a definitive agreement strengthens some of Tehran’s negotiating cards while simultaneously increasing the costs borne by the country itself.

Iran’s reluctance to return immediately to negotiations does not mean that Tehran rejects the idea of an agreement. It means that it does not wish to negotiate from the position of the defeated.

Iran’s leadership is attempting to demonstrate that America’s military superiority alone is insufficient to impose a sustainable regional order. Through the Strait of Hormuz, energy prices and the threat of renewed escalation, Tehran wants to make clear that no agreement on the region’s future can be reached without its participation.

The ultimate contest, therefore, is not simply whether military operations will resume. It is about which side will define the terms of de-escalation.

Iran believes it can transform its capacity to generate instability into formal recognition of its regional influence. The United States, on the other hand, can hardly accept an agreement that would appear to reward Tehran for threatening to close—or restrict access to—an international maritime artery.

Between these two irreconcilable objectives lies today’s fragile pause. It is not yet peace, nor is it merely a lull before the next round of attacks. It is the continuation of war by other means—with Iran betting that geography, oil and political timing can offset American military superiority.