The agreement giving the United States majority control over Venezuelan oil fields containing more than 65 billion barrels of proven reserves is far more than another energy investment. If implemented as announced, it could become one of the most significant realignments in the global oil market in decades.

Washington gains long-term access to a huge hydrocarbon resource base located a short distance from the U.S. coast, creates a new potential supply source for Gulf Coast refineries, and at the same time seeks to reduce its energy exposure to the Middle East, at a time when the war with Iran and turmoil around the Strait of Hormuz have once again highlighted the vulnerability of global energy flows.

At the same time, the agreement paves the way for the return of U.S. energy companies to a country that possesses the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves but currently produces only a small fraction of its potential.

The 65 billion barrels and the 55% control

The plan concerns 17 strategic oil fields containing more than 65 billion barrels of proven reserves. That amount is equivalent to roughly one-fifth of Venezuela’s total reserves.

According to the latest available OPEC data, the country has approximately 303 billion barrels of proven reserves, the largest in the world. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that these account for approximately 17% of the world’s proven oil reserves.

The agreement provides that the U.S. side will control approximately 55% of the new joint venture’s actual production, through a combination of an ownership stake and the right to purchase oil at cost. The concessions for the specific fields could last as long as 100 years.

Caracas says that developing the fields will require investments of more than $100 billion, while it estimates that over time they could generate more than $209 billion in tax revenue for Venezuela.

This is therefore very different from a simple commercial crude oil purchase agreement: essentially, a mechanism is being created through which Washington gains strategic control over the production of a huge oil resource base outside U.S. territory.

Why 65 billion barrels does not mean 65 billion barrels of “U.S. reserves”

This is an important distinction. Donald Trump claims that the agreement “more than doubles” U.S. reserves. From a strategic perspective, it can be argued that it dramatically increases the volume of oil to which the United States has preferential access.

Geologically and in terms of sovereignty, however, the oil remains in Venezuela. Sixty-five billion barrels are not being transferred from Venezuela’s balance sheet into the official reserves of the United States. What Washington gains is economic and operational control through the new corporate structure and long-term concessions.

The distinction matters, particularly because the legal framework of the agreement will likely become one of the biggest sources of uncertainty in the years ahead.

The real weapon for the U.S.: oil “at cost”

Perhaps the most important element of the agreement is not even the size of the reserves, but the ability of the United States to obtain some of the produced oil at cost.

If the mechanism works as described, Washington potentially gains a source of crude whose pricing would not be fully dependent on fluctuations in the international market. This could be used for three main purposes: supplying U.S. refineries, strengthening the energy security of the armed forces, and replenishing the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).

The latter is particularly significant. On August 20, the U.S. strategic reserve contained approximately 294 million barrels, compared with a total authorized capacity of 714 million barrels. In other words, the underground facilities remain only about 41% full.

The agreement’s 65 billion barrels are therefore more than 220 times larger than the SPR’s current holdings. Of course, this is only a comparison of scale: the fields require decades of production and do not constitute stored, immediately available oil.

Why Venezuela is so important to U.S. refineries

There is also a technical reason why Venezuelan oil is particularly valuable to the United States. Much of it is heavy and sour crude, while much of U.S. production is lighter.

Many complex refineries on the Gulf Coast are specifically designed to process heavier grades of oil. The EIA notes that Venezuelan crude has historically been particularly well suited to these U.S. refineries. And commercial flows are already beginning to show this return.

U.S. Gulf Coast crude imports from Venezuela increased from approximately 200,000 barrels per day in January to 457,000 barrels per day in May 2026, according to the EIA. In other words, the agreement is not creating a theoretical commercial relationship from scratch. It is accelerating an already developing Venezuela–Gulf Coast energy corridor.

Chevron on the front line

The development takes on even greater significance as Chevron is close to a separate agreement that would give it greater operational control and the ability to expand in the country. At the center is Petropiar, Chevron’s major heavy-crude project in Venezuela, as well as a potential expansion into neighboring Ayacucho 8 in the Orinoco Belt.

At the same time, U.S. oilfield services companies such as Halliburton are considering returning, while the situation is more complicated for companies such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, which still have outstanding claims stemming from the nationalization of assets in 2007.

The biggest mistake would be to assume that because there are 65 billion barrels, they can also be brought quickly to market. Venezuela is the clearest example of a country where enormous reserves do not translate into high production. Production is currently around 1.2 million barrels per day, less than half the level of a decade ago. The situation is even more complicated because a large portion of the reserves lies in the Orinoco Belt and consists of extremely heavy oil. Producing and commercially exploiting it requires capital, technology, diluents, upgraded facilities, pipelines, electricity, and specialized processing units.

The EIA points out that a lack of investment, skilled personnel, and capital at PDVSA has constrained the development of the sector for years.

Therefore, the agreement may affect price expectations immediately, but actual supply much more slowly.

Can it lower the price of gasoline?

This is Trump’s major political gamble. Fuel prices have become a serious problem for the White House following the disruptions caused by the war with Iran, and the administration is looking for ways to increase supply ahead of the November midterm elections.

The agreement with Venezuela could help, but it is not an immediate switch that will cause prices to fall. In the short term, greater importance will be attached to Venezuela’s existing production, increased exports to the United States, and the ability of U.S. refineries to turn more crude into gasoline and diesel.

In the long term, however, if tens of billions of dollars are actually invested in Venezuela and production increases significantly, a new major source of supply in the Western Hemisphere will be created. And this could exert structural downward pressure on international prices.

The geopolitical dimension: less Hormuz, more Western Hemisphere

Perhaps this is where the agreement’s greatest strategic value lies. The war with Iran once again demonstrated how dependent the global market remains on the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil flows.

For the United States, Venezuelan oil has a huge geographic advantage: it does not need to pass through any major international maritime chokepoint to reach Gulf Coast refineries.

That means shorter distances, lower transportation risk, and reduced exposure to geopolitical crises in the Middle East.

Venezuela could thus evolve into a kind of strategic oil “backyard” for the United States.

The message to China and Russia

The agreement has a second geopolitical recipient: Beijing. After the imposition of U.S. sanctions, China became a major destination for Venezuelan oil. The EIA notes that Beijing had lent nearly $50 billion to Venezuela under agreements in which repayment was made through oil deliveries.

Washington’s return does not simply mean that the United States gains oil. It means that China loses some of its strategic access to one of the planet’s largest energy reserves. Russia’s sphere of influence is likewise reduced, as Moscow had developed close energy ties with Caracas.

The agreement therefore forms part of a broader U.S. strategy to bring the Western Hemisphere back under Washington’s economic and geopolitical influence.

The next blow to OPEC?

There is one more possible consequence. Venezuela is considering even leaving OPEC, the organization of which it was a founding member in 1960. The discussion has become even more significant following the United Arab Emirates’ departure earlier this year.

Venezuela’s current production is too small for an exit by itself to change the market balance. But over the long term, the picture changes.

If U.S. capital significantly increases production and Caracas is no longer bound by OPEC policy, the United States could effectively gain influence over a new independent producer producing millions of barrels per day.

In a market where OPEC+ has already lost some of its power because of the war and production problems, the development would be particularly significant.

There is, however, one critical asterisk. The agreement is unprecedented, and there is no certainty that its current structure can survive for decades.

The 100-year concessions, U.S. participation, and degree of control over production could face challenges from both Venezuela’s constitutional framework and future governments in Caracas.

The same uncertainty exists in Washington: a future U.S. administration could change policy. This is critical for oil companies because developing new fields and infrastructure in Venezuela requires tens of billions of dollars and a time horizon of many years.

Companies do not invest these amounts simply because enormous oil fields exist. They need certainty that the contracts will remain in force. Ultimately, this is the key to assessing the agreement. The 65 billion barrels are an impressive number, but they are not what will determine the success of the plan. The critical figure will be how many additional barrels per day Venezuela can produce in three, five, or ten years. If the agreement merely changes the ownership structure of the fields without major investment, its impact on the global market will be limited. But if U.S. companies, capital, and technology manage to restore Venezuela to production levels of several million barrels per day, then the agreement will be far more significant: it will shift an important portion of future global oil power from the Middle East to the Western Hemisphere and under much stronger U.S. influence.

And that explains why the agreement concerns far more than the gasoline the American driver pays for today. It concerns who will control oil supply over the coming decades, how much power OPEC will retain, and how dependent the West will remain on the Middle East.