The package includes more than three billion barrels of proven and probable reserves, as well as critical facilities on the European market, among them in Bulgaria and Romania

Until a few months ago, the sale of Lukoil’s international operations looked mainly like a vast corporate transaction prompted by the pressure of Western sanctions on Russia’s energy industry. Today the affair has moved to an entirely different level. The fate of assets worth around $20 billion appears to have entered the discussions between Washington and Moscow over Ukraine, turning the sale of Lukoil into a point where the diplomacy of US President Donald Trump, Russia’s energy interests and an intricate network of American and Arab investors, with business ties to figures in the US president’s inner circle, all meet.

The starting point was the US sanctions of 22 October 2025. The US Treasury Department targeted Lukoil and other major players in the Russian energy sector, explicitly linking the move to efforts to increase pressure on Moscow over the war in Ukraine. A few months later, on 29 January 2026, Lukoil itself announced that it had reached an agreement with the American group Carlyle for the sale of LUKOIL International GmbH, the company that holds a large share of its international interests. The deal, however, was not exclusive and remained subject to the necessary US approvals.

From sanctions to negotiations with Putin

The picture changes fundamentally once Lukoil ceases to be solely a matter of sanctions and investment and, according to new reports, enters the direct channel between the Trump administration and the Kremlin. The New York Times reported that when Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff met Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin last month, the Russian president himself raised the question of completing the sale of Lukoil’s international assets. According to the same investigation, the American interlocutors appeared willing to work towards that end, believing that a business deal of such magnitude could create an additional channel of communication with Moscow while also having a positive effect on supply in the global energy market. This version of events comes from the report and has not so far been presented as an official agreement between Washington and Moscow.

This is not the first time the Trump administration has treated economic deals as a possible tool of rapprochement with Russia. What sets Lukoil apart is the size and strategic value of the package. It is not a single company or a single field, but an international portfolio that includes oil and gas fields, refineries and extensive networks of petrol stations. Published estimates put its value at around $20 to $22 billion, while the package includes more than three billion barrels of proven and probable reserves and critical facilities on the European market, among them in Bulgaria and Romania.

That is precisely what gives the affair its geopolitical dimension. The sale is not only about who acquires a major energy portfolio at a lower valuation because of the sanctions. It is about who will control infrastructure that until now has been in Russian hands, what role the US government will have in the new ownership structure, and to what extent the transaction can be used as part of a broader effort to reshape economic relations between the US and Russia.

Todd Boehly and the new bid

At the centre of the new proposal is Todd Boehly, an American billionaire investor with a strong presence in sport, financial services and investment. Boehly has put together a new consortium that is seeking to outflank the earlier Carlyle agreement and acquire Lukoil’s international operations. According to the Financial Times and Reuters, investors from the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are taking part in the effort, while the involvement of the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the American federal agency that finances investment abroad, is particularly significant.

The DFC’s presence creates an unusual situation. On the one hand, it is the US government that, through the relevant authorities, must approve the transfer of the assets of sanctioned Lukoil. On the other, a US state agency appears as a potential investor in one of the competing bids. According to published information, the DFC could acquire a stake of between 10 and 20 per cent in the new company and, together with Boehly, would have a strong presence on its board. The final structure has yet to be settled.

A second detail adds political weight to the affair. Boehly is not simply an interested investor. On 31 December 2025 he paid $1 million to MAGA Inc., the political committee linked to Trump. The contribution is recorded in campaign finance data. On its own, this does not prove preferential treatment or any personal financial gain for the president, but it is a factor that explains why the make-up of the investment group is under heightened scrutiny.

Gulf billionaires and the connections

The most complex side of the affair lies with the other investors. The consortium includes interests linked to Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, National Security Adviser of the United Arab Emirates and brother of the country’s president. International Holding Company, which he chairs, appears to play a central role in the proposal alongside Allied Investment Partners.

The interest does not end there. Business interests linked to Sheikh Tahnoon acquired a 49 per cent stake in World Liberty Financial, the cryptocurrency company that has been associated in business terms with members of the Trump family and the Witkoff family. The transaction, worth around $500 million according to reports, has already prompted public debate in the US about the overlap between business relationships and government policy. The existence of these ties does not mean that Trump, Witkoff or Kushner acquire a personal stake in the sale of Lukoil, but it does create a web of prior financial relationships among people who now stand on both sides of the same major transaction.

The Al Qayyat family from Qatar also appears in the same investment group. Mutaz and Ramez Al Qayyat already work with business ventures linked to Kushner and Ivanka Trump in Albania. Their participation in the Lukoil group adds one more link to the existing business relationships between Gulf investors and people in the American president’s circle.

Carlyle and the question of US approval

On the other side stands Carlyle. The American investment giant had already agreed with Lukoil in January to buy its international operations. The Russian company itself noted at the time that the agreement was not exclusive and that the necessary approvals were required, which left the door open to competing bids. Eight months later, the transaction has not been completed and Boehly’s new offer has shifted the balance.

The crucial point is that Washington is no longer simply in the position of regulator. If the DFC ultimately joins the Boehly proposal, part of the US state apparatus will have a financial interest in a transaction that other agencies of the same government are being asked to give final approval to. This lies at the heart of the questions being raised about the affair. No public evidence has been presented that Carlyle has been turned down in order to favour the rival bid. There is now, however, a process in which the regulatory, diplomatic and investment dimensions meet at the same point.

Lukoil as part of a bigger deal

The most important element is, in the end, neither the identity of the buyer nor the valuation of the assets. It is the timing of the transaction. The sale is being discussed while the US is trying to find a path to an agreement on Ukraine, while sanctions remain one of the main tools of pressure on Russia, and while energy remains a fundamental source of revenue for the Russian economy.

For Moscow, a deal over Lukoil could offer more than the proceeds of the sale. It could signal that the economic relationship with the United States can begin to be restored even before all the issues connected with the war have been resolved. For Washington, in turn, the transfer of strategic Russian energy assets to a structure in which American interests and an American state body play a significant role could be presented as a strengthening of Western influence over critical infrastructure.

Here lies the real weight of the affair. The sanctions, designed to deprive Moscow of resources and access to Western markets, have at the same time created one of the biggest opportunities to acquire energy assets in recent years. And today the handling of that opportunity appears to have become linked to the most important geopolitical negotiation of the era.

The Lukoil deal has not yet been closed and its final form remains open. What has already changed, however, is its place in the bigger picture. It is no longer only about who will acquire refineries, oil fields and thousands of petrol stations. It is about whether an energy transaction worth tens of billions can become part of the effort to reach a new modus vivendi between Washington and Moscow, and, above all, about how closely financial interests, sanctions and the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine can become intertwined.