Chronic pathologies, “criminal mistakes“, omissions and weaknesses of the railway, public infrastructure are included in the result of the National Organisation for the Investigation of Air and Railway Accidents and Transport Safety (EODASAM) in its 178 pages regarding the Tempi tragedy, presented to its authors yesterday.

Before Tempi

This is a conclusion of a thread of causes that allowed the two trains to be on the same line, with a head-on collision developing as inevitable because of this condition. Beginning with the depletion of the Hellenic Railways Organisation (OSE) during the years of the memoranda, resulting in the maintenance of the network becoming stagnant, staff being removed and remaining employees performing a disproportionate amount of work in relation to their numbers.

And while “preventive maintenance of control, telecommand and signalling infrastructure” was, in fact, lacking, the way in which “OSE manages the skills of its station masters does not guarantee that they are competent for safety-related tasks for which they are responsible and under any circumstances“, the finding said. At the same time, “Hellenic Train failed to demonstrate that it provided ongoing training to its drivers, particularly for safety-related communications and for relevant and non-technical competencies (skills, behaviours or attitudes).”

See the EODASAM finding in English

At Tempi

In a nearly obsolete network and with marginal working conditions for much of the industry’s staff, pathologies and structural weaknesses of the railway network reached their peak on 28 February 2023, in the Tempi Valley. The head-on collision of the two trains, however, is interpreted, according to EODASAM, by a series of “causal factors” that affected a critical mass of persons involved.

A key figure on the night of the train accident was the Station Master, who “did not use the automated method to set the route for the IC-62 train to leave Larissa station northbound to Nei Pori, which would have properly adjusted all the changes“. The stationmaster’s actions must be understood “in the difficult operational context with which he was faced that night” according to the finding, given that “there were a number of technical failures, both temporary and more permanent, which created additional responsibilities or made his existing duties more difficult“. In addition, the emotional strain on the stationmaster, as he had been preceded by another mistake that day, affected his psychology at a time when he had to manage a large volume of information.

After Tempi

As a result of the collision that occurred at 23:18 on February 28, 2023, exactly two years ago, 57 people lost their lives, of which 5-7 were burned to death.

Evaluating the findings, as well as the documents of the collision, the Agency concludes on the fateful night that “most of the fatalities in this accident were due to the effects of the collision of the two trains“. With no safety valves and at speed, the collision between the two trains was violent, followed by the creation of a fireball in the first minutes after the collision.

At the same time, however, “based on the observations that could be made, there is no indication that the technical equipment of the vehicles caused the creation and spread of the massive fireball that resulted after the collision, and subsequently caused the subsequent ignitions,” the finding said, stressing that “with the available evidence it is impossible to determine exactly what caused the fireball.” “The simulations, however, suggest the possible presence of an as yet unknown fuel,” the experts note.

In this light, “it remains to be assessed whether better fire retardant materials could have played a role in the probability of survival for the victims who had survived the initial collision and subsequently died from the fire,” they stressed, as new questions now arise for the victims’ relatives regarding the fuel that caused the fireball.

On the consequences of the tragic accident, “taking into account, on the one hand, the results of the Psychological Impact Study (4.6.3.5) and, on the other hand, the level of preparedness of the Plan for this incident (575), we conclude that there was/is a high risk of worsening of the initial consequences associated with PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder), especially for all those who were not able to access psychological support services in a timely manner,” the researchers stress, noting that “there are still 22 individuals at a level of ‘severe’ and above (over ¼ of the survey sample).”

17 comments

After the tragic report and with questions still unanswered for the relatives of the victims, the study of the Tempi train accident concludes with 17 recommendations to the Hellenic Railways, Hellenic Train and the Railway Regulatory Authority, sounding the alarm regarding the safety of Greek railways. In a first step, “after consultations and in agreement with the European Commission, an Action Plan was drawn up by the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure. The European Commission, to which Greece submits reports on a bimonthly basis, acknowledges in a press release of 16/12/2024, which is attached to a letter for the official information of Greece, that “satisfactory progress is being made in the implementation of this Action Plan”. Although “deviations from the implementation of the Safety Directive continue to exist”. The same Action Plan partially addresses some of the key risk factors, which are also identified in this report:

a. The creation of a new, unified public entity, which will include OSE, ERGOSE and partly GAIAOSE, with the aim of resolving the gaps and/or overlaps, in terms of responsibilities between the entities currently operating, as well as the lack of direct and effective coordination.

b. Signing a contract between OSE and the Greek State to increase the annual funding from 45 to 75 million euros and defining the obligations and rights of both parties.

c. Strengthening the staffing of the reformed OSE, RAS, EODASAAM and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, as approved by Law 5167, which was passed in December 2024.

d. The preparation of a Strategic and Operational Plan, as well as an Investment Plan for the development of rail transport in Greece, in cooperation with the European Investment Bank (EIB).

e. Organization of a sectoral risk management initiative, aiming at mapping safety procedures and identifying critical problems.

f. The creation of a national investigation body (EODASAAM), with sufficient human and financial resources, in order to undertake the investigation of serious rail accidents, on a completely independent basis.

g. Clarification of overlapping roles and responsibility for railway safety between the RAS and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport.