The prediction that fierce regional competition would follow the ‘war’ in Gaza and the upheavals it caused, compounded by the war in Iran and the wholesale reshuffling of the balance of power that conflict triggered, and that this competition would centre on Turkey and Israel, is now being borne out by the latest developments.

Turkey, exploiting its geostrategic position, its considerable defence capabilities, its diplomacy as the “skilful neutral” in every major crisis, and now enjoying the favour of US President Donald Trump, believes it has a unique opportunity to fulfil Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ambition of turning the country into a great, dominant regional power.

The biggest obstacle to that effort is the region’s other major power, Israel, which is mired in a stalemate on the Palestinian front and, now facing a formidable front ranged against it, is determined to risk everything rather than find itself “encircled” by hostile states backed by regional powers such as Turkey.

By demonising Israel, Erdoğan has carved out a powerful role for himself, one that appeals not only to Muslim Arab states but also to Western public opinion, which is highly sensitive to the situation in Gaza and to Israeli aggression, as shown by Tel Aviv’s multi-front campaign against Palestinian extremist organisations and groups. The Palestinian cause and Gaza have been used by the Turkish president to serve a narrative that casts Turkey as protector of the Palestinians and as the leading power in the Muslim world.

The red line Turkey crossed

The rivalry between the two countries extends further still. Turkish leaders, through statements and manifestos about the “liberation of Jerusalem”, have edged up to a red line, moving close to the rhetoric of those who make Israel’s destruction their slogan.

The situation that has built up over the past three years is pushing the two countries, the closest US allies in the region and also its two strongest military powers, towards an unrestrained rivalry.

Israel has never looked favourably on Turkey’s expanding influence in neighbouring Syria, wary of seeing the Iranian sphere of influence, long a existential threat to it, simply replaced by Turkish influence there.

Turkey’s seizure of large areas of northern Syria was an early warning sign for Israel, which watched the fall of Bashar al-Assad give rise to a new Syrian leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former jihadist commander who, with Ankara’s backing, has managed to win acceptance from the Arab world and, crucially, from the EU and the US.

The prospect of Syria’s military capabilities being upgraded through its strategic relationship with Ankara, along with the implementation of a defence pact between the two countries, represents a further red line for Israel.

The bombing of the Abu al-Duhur base was no coincidence

The bombing of the Abu al-Duhur base, just 200 miles from Israeli territory and only 80km from the Turkish-Syrian border, was no bolt from the blue. Turkey has maintained a military presence in northern Syria while also taking a role in rebuilding the Syrian armed forces and air defence system.

Unofficial reports suggest the targeting of this particular base was not accidental and was not simply intended to destroy facilities. Among the scenarios Turkey has explored in recent months to break the deadlock over its Russian-made S-400 missile systems (giving them up being a precondition for rejoining the F-35 fighter jet programme) was moving them to Syria to bolster Syrian air defence, primarily against Israel.

Israeli officials have stated categorically that they will not accept foreign forces, Turkey above all, maintaining a military presence in Syria. The bombing of the Abu al-Duhur base was a forceful message, all the more so given reports that the base could have become the official home for S-400 batteries and other anti-aircraft systems.

The two countries are also at odds over the Horn of Africa and over the major question of new energy transport routes and trade corridors, with Turkey seeking to derail projects such as IMEC, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which bypasses it in favour of turning Israel and Greece into hubs.

Turkey has worked hard throughout this period, helped by Israel’s unchecked actions in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria, to expose Israel further and undermine the working relationship Arab states have built with Israel under the Abraham Accords, while also trying to prevent Saudi Arabia from joining them. Such an outcome would ultimately isolate Turkey itself, something Ankara is determined to avoid at all costs.

The Mecca Trilateral Alliance was a further worrying signal for Israel, bringing together three major Sunni powers.

It is no coincidence that, amid this rivalry, Turkey frequently turns publicly against Greece and Cyprus, not only as part of a campaign to smear the two countries over their cooperation with a “genocidal” Israel, but increasingly treating them, at a strategic level, not merely as Israeli allies but as its “forward outposts”, targeting Turkey and its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Israel, too, is watching, and taking what may be pre-emptive measures against Turkey’s efforts, with the support and guidance of the US Ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, to exploit the rift that has emerged in recent months between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and to fill that gap itself.

Trump’s backing

In Gaza, Washington is pushing for acceptance of Trump’s plan, for an end to attacks in Lebanon, and for military interventions in Syria, all while the US fully backs al-Sharaa’s government. Israel has also registered Trump’s repeated support for Turkey’s return to the F-35 programme.

The two closest US allies in the region, despite contacts between their intelligence services, have not managed to establish even a difficult communication channel, let alone a conflict-avoidance mechanism of the kind Israel achieved with Russia over Syrian territory, to prevent an unwanted but decisive flashpoint.

Any understanding between them in the foreseeable future looks extremely unlikely, as their differences have become ideological. The current standoff may well be used by Netanyahu for electoral purposes too, but its causes run deeper, and bridging the rift will remain difficult even if Israel has a new government after October’s elections.

The US keeps the balance

For now, the US is maintaining a balance between the two allies, despite the strongly pro-Turkish stance of Ambassador Barrack, who also serves as the US envoy for Syria and Iraq. Clearly, neither side wants a conflict that would truly set the Middle East alight, since the force ranged against Israel would not be Hamas, Hezbollah, Lebanon or Syria but a country with NATO’s second-largest army and a now well-developed defence industry.

But for as long as no de-escalation mechanism, including an early-warning system for military activity, is put in place (a mechanism that touches on sensitive political and diplomatic issues), the risk of an accidental incident could trigger serious escalation at any moment.