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Erdoğan is legislating even the maps of his imagination, fully adopting the concept of casus belli

Turkey’s initiative to give legal status to the “Blue Homeland” doctrine and to the entirety of its claims in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean is leading to a new framework that will complicate any diplomatic effort toward dialogue and maritime delimitation, while also creating the groundwork for constant tensions on the ground.

According to information from Turkish sources, the bill — whose exact content has not yet been made public — is expected to be submitted to the Turkish National Assembly after the end of Bayram on May 31, after which, through a brief procedure, it will become Turkish state law.

Erdoğan is legislating even the maps of his imagination, fully adopting the concept of casus belli

This move by Ankara comes at a time when the climate with both Greece and Cyprus has become particularly strained, demonstrating how fragile the so-called “calm waters” are. While major incidents on the ground may have been avoided, political and diplomatic moves are taking place that are changing the landscape.

Athens is concerned as it watches this atmosphere escalate. It has conveyed its concerns to the Turkish side, as well as its assessment that such moves undermine the “calm waters.” Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis stated that “if any country chooses to unilaterally take measures which, according to international law, should be determined on a multilateral or bilateral basis, then these moves will simply be for domestic consumption, without international effect, and any kind of activity attempted unilaterally will fail.”

The decision to legislate Turkey’s claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean also comes as Ankara’s response to what it sees as an effort by Israel to encircle it, using Greece and Cyprus as “proxies.” At the same time, it seeks to reassure domestic public opinion, which in recent weeks has been bombarded by a truly hysterical wave of reports and statements regarding the threat allegedly posed to Turkey’s national security by the cooperation of Greece and Cyprus with both Israel and France.

In addition, both the main opposition and Turkey’s nationalist governing allies frequently criticize Erdoğan’s government for allegedly abandoning exploratory activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and tolerating “faits accomplis” in the Aegean, thereby undermining the “Blue Homeland” doctrine. This toxic environment is creating significant nervousness within the Turkish government regarding developments in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean and generating a need to demonstrate a reaction.

Closing

Spatial planning

A key role in shaping the bill is being played by the National Center for the Law of the Sea (DEHUKAM), which also designed the map submitted to UNESCO a year ago in the form of Maritime Spatial Planning. Of particular interest was the press conference held last week by DEHUKAM, attended by officials from the Turkish presidency, focusing precisely on the bill regarding “Turkish Maritime Jurisdiction Zones.”

The law is intended to supplement Turkey’s original Law No. 476 (15/5/1964) and Act 2674 of May 20, 1982, which defined the limits of territorial waters and the straight baselines used to measure them.

According to information stemming from that press conference, the bill will “regulate the framework of rights and authorities in Turkish internal waters, territorial waters, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)” and will serve “as a fundamental regulation for determining the scope and boundaries of Turkey’s maritime jurisdiction areas, establishing the basic rules regarding the determination of the limits and breadth of these maritime jurisdiction areas, and granting certain powers to the presidency regarding them.”

Several important conclusions emerge from the available information: the bill essentially creates a framework law — an “umbrella” — for all of Turkey’s rights and unilateral claims in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. It fully adopts the concept of casus belli concerning the non-extension of Greece’s territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, while also incorporating into its provisions the geographical formations in the Aegean of “undetermined sovereignty,” namely the so-called grey zones.

According to a particularly paradoxical approach, those involved from DEHUKAM in drafting the bill claim they are filling the gap caused by Turkey not being a party to UNCLOS, while accepting that certain provisions of the convention have universal validity. For this reason, the new law seeks to provide the “correct” interpretation of the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention — despite Turkey not being a member.

Especially problematic is also the provision granting the President of the Republic of Turkey the authority to declare maritime zones of “special status” in areas where EEZs have not yet been declared, for purposes such as fishing, marine environmental protection, and others. Thus, beyond the Eastern Mediterranean — where Turkey has unilaterally presented the (illegal) outer boundaries of its EEZ — in the Aegean, where no EEZ has been defined, it would be up to the Turkish president to establish “special status” zones within which Turkey would exercise powers and rights. It is obvious, however, that in the Aegean any such move would cover areas that largely belong to the Greek continental shelf.

“Blue Homeland”

According to the available information, the Turkish bill will include the entire framework established through Turkey’s letters to the UN, which form the basis and expression of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, the Turkey-Libya Memorandum (2019), the “delimitation agreement” with the occupied northern part of Cyprus (2011), as well as the Maritime Spatial Planning maps designed by DEHUKAM.

The publication of these maps had provoked strong reactions from Greece, as they represent the application of Turkey’s unprecedented delimitation theories, which fall outside the framework of UNCLOS.

Thus, the philosophy and wording of the new law will reportedly provide that islands are deprived of maritime zones beyond their territorial waters, that the Aegean is a semi-enclosed sea where special rules apply, and that there can be no right to extend territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. It will also stipulate that the delimitation of the continental shelf/EEZ should be based on the median line, but one drawn between the mainland coasts of the two countries, completely ignoring the existence of islands. Such a practice would bring the Turkish continental shelf to the middle of the Aegean, around the 25th meridian, effectively trapping the Greek islands within Turkey’s claimed continental shelf and areas of jurisdiction.

Turkey’s unilateral claims and its direct questioning of Greek sovereignty through the grey zones will now also acquire a legal framework within Turkey’s domestic legal order. Together with the casus belli — which also originated from a decision of the Turkish National Assembly — they will form a suffocating “legal” framework, the invocation of which by Ankara will serve as a powerful pretext for undermining any effort toward dialogue and cooperation.

At the same time, any activities in areas that Turkey labels as areas of Turkish rights or jurisdiction will not only be considered illegal, but will also carry penalties under Turkish law. This could lead to serious tensions, whether concerning research activities, fishing, or other operations in international waters within Greece’s non-delimited continental shelf.

From the Turkish side, it is argued that Greece was the one that first advanced its claims through the Maritime Spatial Planning map it published a year ago, since that map depicts the country’s maximum potential EEZ.

The reality is that through its Maritime Spatial Planning map Greece neither unilaterally declared an EEZ based on its claims, nor — even more so — depicted potential territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles, a right derived from the Law of the Sea. Greece specifies on that map, with a special note regarding the continental shelf, that it constitutes a “depiction of the median line defining the outer limits of the Greek continental shelf until delimitation agreements are concluded with neighboring states whose coasts are adjacent or opposite to Greek coasts (Law 4001/2011).” This has consistently served as a form of pressure aimed at advancing the process of referring the dispute to The Hague.

The Astypalaia incident

The Greek map also notes that it depicts the boundary of the Territorial Sea based on existing legislation, the Greek-Turkish Protocol of 1926, the Italian-Turkish Agreement and Protocol of 1932, while reserving the general right to extend its breadth up to 12 nautical miles in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention, which reflects customary international law.

Turkey has also been particularly irritated by the granting to Chevron of research licenses in the two blocks south of Crete. The concession was based on the median line appearing on the Maritime Spatial Planning map (Law 4001/2011), overlapping a large portion of the continental shelf that the Turkey-Libya Memorandum had illegally attributed to Libya. Ankara recognizes that even as a “temporary” line, this median line is producing tangible effects on the ground.

Until now, Turkey has attempted to assert its positions operationally, as happened last Wednesday with the radio harassment of the vessel Ocean Link, which was carrying out fiber-optic cable installation work for OTE between Astypalaia and Kos. However, following the intervention of the Greek frigate “Andrias,” the Turkish missile boat withdrew and the work continued normally. This reflects a new practice adopted by Athens, whereby ships conducting research or cable-laying operations in the Aegean and between Greek islands are discreetly monitored by Greek warships in order to prevent harassment or obstruction by Turkish vessels.

After the new Turkish law is passed, Turkish authorities will also have a legal obligation to halt activities that “violate” Turkish legislation, and even take police-type measures against those who fail to comply with warnings. Such a scenario would obviously lead to extremely serious tensions and the end of the “calm waters.”